Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be Constitutional? by Gross, Oren
Article
Chaos and Rules:





I. IN TRODUCTION ................................................................................. 1014
II. DEMOCRACY AND STATES OF EMERGENCY:
A TENSION OF "TRAGIC DIMENSIONS". ........................................... 1027
A . Action over D eliberation ............................................................ 1031
B . Judicial D eference ..................................................................... 1034
C. Public Support, Temporal Duration, and "Otherness ............. 1035
D. Perceptions and Misperceptions ................................................ 1038
" Associate Professor, University of Minnesota Law School. Parts of this Article were
prepared while I was a visiting scholar at the Law and Public Affairs Program at Princeton
University and a visiting professor at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. Earlier drafts were
presented at the University of Baltimore, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Cornell
University, the University of Minnesota, and the University of Texas. I have many to thank for
taking the time to comment and suggest improvements to this Article. I would especially like to
thank Linda Bosniak, Dale Carpenter, David Dyzenhaus, Christopher Eisgruber, Dan Farber,
Sanford Levinson, Lance Liebman, David McGowan, Fionnuala Ni Aolain, Michael Paulsen,
Wilfred Prest, Steven Ratner, Fred Schauer, William Scheuerman, and Philip Weiser. Finally, my
thanks to Anne Troy for her tireless research assistance. If, despite so much good advice, this
Article is neither better nor shorter, it is only due to my own limitations.
1011
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
The Yale Law Journal
III. KEEPING THE LAW ON OUR SIDE:
CONSTITUTIONAL MODELS OF EMERGENCY POWERS ..................... 1042
A. The Business as Usual Model .................................................... 1043
1. "It is imperative that the trains run on schedule. "............. 1043
2. Challenges and Justifications .............................................. 1044
a. The Charge of Hypocrisy .............................................. 1044
b. Absolutism and Resistance ............................................ 1046
i. Constitutional Absolutism and Perfection .............. 1046
ii. A Strategy of Resistance ......................................... 1048
iii. Myths, Symbolism, and Ideals ................................ 1050
iv. Slippery Slopes ....................................................... 1052
3. Courage and Relevancy: Ex parte Milligan ........................ 1053
B. Models ofAccommodation ......................................................... 1058
1. "Each crisis brings its word and deed . ............................ 1058
a. Interpretative Accommodation ...................................... 1059
b. Legislative Accommodation .......................................... 1064
i. Modifying Ordinary Laws ...................................... 1065
ii. Special Emergency Legislation .............................. 1065
c. Executive Inherent Powers ........................................... 1066
2. Challenges and Justifications .............................................. 1068
IV. THE ASSUMPTION OF SEPARATION .................................................. 1069
A. Normalcy and Emergency:
The Discourse of Rule and Exception ........................................ 1070
B. Four Degrees of Separation ....................................................... 1073
1. Sequencing and Temporal Distinctions:
Separating the Best and the Worst of Times ........................ 1073
2. It's a Bad World out There (I):
Spatial D istinctions ............................................................. 1075
3. It's a Bad World out There (I):
Domestic and Foreign Affairs ............................................. 1077
4. Communal Divisions: Us vs. Them ..................................... 1082
C. The Breakdown of the Normalcy-Emergency Dichotomy .......... 1089
1. Normalization of the Extraordinary .................................... 1089
2. Increasing D osages ............................................................. 1090
3. One Can Get Used to This .................................................. 1092
4. Persistence of Judicial Precedents ...................................... 1094
5. Structural and Institutional Changes .................................. 1095
V. THE EXTRA-LEGAL MEASURES MODEL ........................................... 1096
A. Ethic of Political Responsibility ................................................. 1102
1. Locke's Theory of the Prerogative Power ........................... 1102
2. Theory: Searching for "Moral Politicians ....................... 1104
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
1012 [Vol. 112: 1011
Chaos and Rules
3. Practice: "Casting Behind Metaphysical Subtleties ......... 1106
4. Ex Post Ratification ............................................................. 1111
B. Challenges and Justifications .................................................... 1115
1. A Nation W orth Saving? ...................................................... 1115
2. Acting upon Great Occasions .............................................. 1118
a. Warning: You Are Now Entering an Emergency Zone.
Usual Categories of Judgment No Longer Apply! ........ 1118
b. The (Not So) Obvious Case for Rule Departures .......... 1121
i. Crossing the Threshold
(and Giving Reasons for It) .................................... 1122
ii. Open and Informed Public Deliberation ................ 1126
iii. Precedents: Hard Cases Make Bad Law ................ 1130
VI. CONCLUSION: FAITH AND MICROSCOPES ........................................ 1134
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
101320031
The Yale Law Journal
Books on constitutional law find little to say about emergency
powers. ... 1
[W]e urgently require new constitutional concepts to deal with the
protection of civil liberties. Otherwise, a downward cycle threatens.
After each successful attack, politicians will come up with
repressive laws and promise greater security-only to find that a
different terrorist band manages to strike a few years later. This
disaster will, in turn, create a demand for even more repressive
laws, and on and on.
2
I often wonder whether we do not rest our hopes too much upon
constitutions, upon laws and upon courts. These are false
hopes .... Liberty lies in the hearts of men and women; when it
dies there, no constitution, no law, no court can save it; no
constitution, no law, no court can even do much to help it. While it
lies there it needs no constitution, no law, no court to save it.
3
I. INTRODUCTION
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the ensuing "war on
terrorism" brought to center stage issues that have previously lurked in a
dark corner at the edge of the legal universe, such as how a constitutional
regime should respond to violent challenges.4 This question is as ancient as
the Roman Republic 5 and as new as the realities wrought by the terrorist
1. Ian Brownlie, Interrogation in Depth: The Compton and Parker Reports, 35 MOD. L. REV.
501, 501 (1972).
2. Bruce Ackerman, Don't Panic, LONDON REV. BOOKS, Feb. 7, 2002, at 15.
3. LEARNED HAND, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY: PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF LEARNED HAND
189-90 (Irving Dilliard ed., 3d ed. 1960).
4. By "violent challenges," I mean such events as rebellions, wars, or terrorist threats and
attacks. As explained below, my focus in this Article is on violent crises and emergencies as
distinguished from economic crises and natural disasters. Cf ALEX P. SCHMID & ALBERT J.
JONGMAN, POLITICAL TERRORISM 1-38 (1988) (describing the problems associated with defining
"terrorism"); Oren Gross, "'Once More unto the Breach": The Systemic Failure of Applying the
European Convention on Human Rights to Entrenched Emergencies, 23 YALE J. INT'L L. 437,
438-39 (1998) (describing the problems associated with defining "emergency"); Keith E.
Whittington, Yet Another Constitutional Crisis?, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2093, 2096-98 (2002)
(describing the problems associated with defining "crisis").
5. For a discussion of the Roman dictatorship, the constitutional institution used by the
Roman Republic to deal with states of emergency, see, for example, M. CARY & H.H. SCULLARD,
A HISTORY OF ROME (3d ed. 1975); and CLINTON L. ROSSITER, CONSTITUTIONAL
DICTATORSHIP: CRISIS GOVERNMENT IN THE MODERN DEMOCRACIES 15-28 (1948). Alexander
Hamilton also commented on the Roman dictatorship:
Every man the least conversant in Roman history knows how often that republic was
obliged to take refuge in the absolute power of a single man, under the formidable title
of dictator, as well against the intrigues of ambitious individuals who aspired to the
tyranny, and the seditions of whole classes of the community whose conduct threatened
the existence of all government, as against the invasions of external enemies who
menaced the conquest and destruction of Rome.
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
1014 [Vol. 112: 1011
Chaos and Rules
attacks of September 1 Ith. It has faced nations embroiled in wars against
external enemies, as well as those responding to violent movements within
their own borders. It has haunted countries powerful and weak, rich and
poor. The dilemma confronting a constitutional democracy having to
respond to emergencies has been famously captured by Abraham Lincoln's
rhetorical question: "[A]re all the laws but one to go unexecuted, and the
Government itself go to pieces, lest that one be violated?' '6 Yet, prior to the
attacks in New York, Washington, and Pennsylvania, violent crises and
emergencies and their implications for legal systems had not attracted much
attention in legal scholarship. Ian Brownlie's perceptive observation about
the scant attention given to such issues in studies of English constitutional
law7 can be applied, with at least equal force, to the United States.
Discussion of emergency powers in general, and counterterrorism measures
in particular, has been relegated to a mere few pages, at most, in the leading
American constitutional law texts. 8 Nor has the situation been much
different in other countries. 9 Emergencies have been conceptualized as
THE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 423 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
6. Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special Session (July 4, 1861), in 4 THE
COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 421, 429-30 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953) [hereinafter
COLLECTED WORKS].
7. Brownlie, supra note 1. Since 1972, when this observation was made, a number of books
have been dedicated to dealing with emergency powers and counterterrorism in the United
Kingdom. See, e.g., DAVID BONNER, EMERGENCY POWERS IN PEACETIME (1985); CLIVE
WALKER, THE PREVENTION OF TERRORISM IN BRITISH LAW (2d ed. 1992); PAUL WILKINSON,
TERRORISM AND THE LIBERAL STATE (2d ed. 1986). However, and notwithstanding those
publications and the interest in the complex issues that terrorism in Northern Ireland raises, to date
there is still little discussion of these issues in the leading treatises on English constitutional law.
See, e.g., A.W. BRADLEY & K.D. EWING, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATTVF, LAW 667-94
(12th ed. 1997).
8. Indeed, none of the following selected texts have the word "emergency" or "emergency
powers" in their index. See, e.g., PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL
DECISIONMAKING 378-97 (4th ed. 2000) (discussing World War I and the First Amendment
cases); id. at 704-24 (discussing war and emergency powers); GERALD GUNTHER,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 351-70 (12th ed. 1991) (discussing separation of powers in the context of
foreign affairs and war); GEOFFREY STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 477-88 (3d ed. 2000 &
Supp. 2002) (discussing war powers generally); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 965-67 (3d ed. 2000) (discussing war powers).
While a full exposition of the reasons for this apparent lack of interest is beyond the scope of
this Article, the following reasons may be noted briefly. First, for those steeped in the liberal legal
tradition, principles of generality, publicity, and stability of legal norms form part of the bedrock
of the rule of law. Emergencies tend to challenge those tenets since they often call for particularity
and extremely broad discretionary powers, while the forces they bring to bear on the relevant
society are inherently destabilizing. Second, the geopolitical position of the United States and its
history have facilitated the externalization of conflict. Violent emergencies have been mostly
regarded as falling within the realms of foreign affairs and national security, which have
traditionally been treated as deserving special treatment and as standing outside the normal realm
of constitutional legal principles, rules, and norms.
9. E.g., TONY BLACKSHIELD & GEORGE WILLIAMS, AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW &
THEORY: COMMENTARY & MATERIALS 647-74 (2d ed. 1998) (discussing the defense power as
related only to times of war or preparation for war); PETER HOGO, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF
CANADA 1 17.4-17.5 (4th ed. 1997 & Supp. 2001) (describing the relationship of "emergency"
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aberrations, rare and uninteresting exceptions to the otherwise ordinary
state of affairs.' As Fred Schauer suggested in another, yet related, context,
the exception has been "an invisible topic in legal theory."' 1
In the context of emergency powers, the exception is no longer
invisible. Nowhere is this more pronounced than in the current controversy
over the possible establishment of special military tribunals. Until relatively
recently, few (legal academics and practitioners included) were aware of
the Supreme Court's decision in Ex parte Quirin12 or of the requirements
set forth by the international laws of war for acquiring the status of lawful
combatancy. Certainly, more were familiar with the 1866 decision in Ex
parte Milligan,13 but even there, one suspects that the extent of such
familiarity was quite limited.
All this changed when President Bush signed an executive order on
November 13, 2001, authorizing special military tribunals to try aliens who
are either suspected of involvement in terrorist activities or of membership
in al Qaeda, or are believed to have knowingly harbored such individuals.
1 4
One of a series of measures designed to enhance the powers of law
enforcement and intelligence agencies to fight the threat of future terrorist
attacks, as well as to bring to justice those who were involved in the attacks
of September 1 1th, special tribunals have attracted much public and
scholarly debate both in the United States 15 and abroad.' 6 Legal journals,
powers to "nonemergency" powers); 2 AMNON RUBINSTErN, HA-MISHPAT HA-KONSTITUTSYONI
SHEL MEDINAT ISRAEL 801-25 (5th rev. ed. 1996).
10. See infra Section IV.A.
11. Frederick Schauer, Exceptions, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 871, 872 (1991). Schauer suggests that
the notion of the exception deserves to be treated as a discrete jurisprudential phenomenon. He
suggests that a study of the exception reveals important insights about the linkage of law and a
"background social landscape" by which he refers particularly to the language a society uses and
the categories it deploys to carve up the world. Id. As I will seek to show below, discussion of the
phenomenon of emergency-as-exception can similarly tell us a great deal about that linkage.
12. 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
13. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
14. Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism,
66 Fed. Reg. 57, 833 (Nov. 13, 2001).
15. There are those who argue that the proposed use of military tribunals is unconstitutional
and undermines the basic values of freedom, democracy, and the rule of law values for the
defense of which the United States went to war. See, e.g., Philip B. Heymann, Civil Liberties and
Human Rights in the Aftermath of September 1!, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 441, 452 (2002)
(depicting the irregular military trial as "foolhardy disdain for American pride in, and foreign
admiration of, the fairness of our courts"); Neal K. Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War,
Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military Tribunals, Ill YALE L.J. 1259, 1260 (2002) (calling the
Executive Order establishing military tribunals "flatly unconstitutional").
Others argue that the military tribunals, in addition to being the only practicable course to
deal with al Qaeda members, are in accordance both with international legal norms and with
constitutional dictates. See, e.g., Ruth Wedgwood, Al Qaeda, Terrorism, and Military
Commissions, 96 AM. J. IN'L L. 328, 330, 332 (2002). But see Christopher M. Evans, Terrorism
on Trial: The President's Constitutional Authority To Order the Prosecution of Suspected
Terrorists by Military Commission, 51 DUKE L.J. 1831 (2002) (arguing that the Executive Order
is constitutional but violates international law); Joan Fitzpatrick, Jurisdiction of Military
Commissions and the Ambiguous War on Terrorism, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 345, 353-54 (2002)
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newspapers, and radio and television shows have all dealt extensively with
this issue. It has become as "invisible as a nose on a man's face or a
weathercock on a steeple."
' ' 7
Taken together, the panoply of counterterrorism measures put in place
since September 11 th has created "an alternate system of justice" aimed at
dealing with suspected terrorists.' s While its contours have shifted
considerably since the early responses to the attacks, that alternate system
of justice includes such additional elements as allowing the monitoring of
exchanges between suspected terrorists and their lawyers,' 9  the
(noting that use of military commissions as replacements for federal courts in trying suspected
terrorists who are not combatants in Afghanistan is "unprecedented and legally insupportable");
Jordan J. Paust, Antiterrorism Military Commissions: Courting Illegality, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1,
10-17 (2001); Jordan J. Paust, Antiterrorism Military Commissions: The Ad Hoc DOD Rules of
Procedure, 23 MICH. J. INT'L L. 677 (2002). It has been suggested that foreign terrorists simply
do not deserve constitutional guarantees that "[w]ould be used for an American citizen going
through the normal judicial process." Elisabeth Bumiller & Steven Lee Myers, Senior
Administration Officials Defend Military Tribunals for Terrorist Suspects, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15,
2001, at B6 (quoting Vice President Cheney).
Situating themselves between these two opposing poles are those who argue that the use of
military tribunals may be justified under certain conditions and those who suggest that such use,
while not unlawful per se, would be imprudent and unwise. See, e.g., Michal R. Belknap, A Putrid
Pedigree: The Bush Administration's Military Tribunals in Historical Perspective, 38 CAL. W. L.
REV. 433, 440 (2002) (arguing that while the military tribunals may not be unlawful and may
even be an appropriate method to deal with certain types of suspected terrorists, their use would
be unwise in light of "the many abuses and injustices associated with past military commission
trials"); Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Military Courts and Constitutional
Justice 7 (May 14, 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
16. In reaction to the Bush Administration's plan to use military tribunals, as well as the
possibility that the United States will seek the death penalty in such proceedings, certain countries
within the European Union, as well as the European Parliament, stated that they either would
refuse to extradite suspected terrorists or would see both the military tribunal and death penalty
issues as obstacles to a speedy extradition. See Mark Champion et al., Europe Tour by Ashcroft
Starts Sourly, WALL ST. J., Dec. 13, 2001, at A18 (noting that the Spanish, French, and European
legislatures oppose military tribunals and the death penalty); Sam Dillon & Donald G. McNeil,
Jr., Spain Sets Hurdle for Extraditions, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2001, at Al (reporting on Spain's
refusal to extradite eight suspected al Qaeda members in Spanish custody). But see Jason Benneto,
Suspects Face Fast- Track Removal in Overhaul of Extradition Laws, INDEPENDENT (London),
June 21, 2002, at P6 (describing the streamlining of the British extradition process, including
curbing the right of appeal).
17. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TWO GENTLEMEN OF VERONA act 2, sc. 1, 11. 120-21 (S.
Greenblatt ed., W.W. Norton & Co. 1997).
18. Matthew Purdy, Bush's New Rules To Fight Terror Transform the Legal Landscape, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 25, 2001, at A 1. One infamous example of the operation of such an alternate system
of justice is the circumstances surrounding the arrest and detention of Jose Padilla, a.k.a. Abdullah
al-Muhajir, an American citizen who was suspected of researching how to build a "dirty bomb" in
Pakistan. Oliver Burkeman, FBI Says Dirty Bomb Suspect Is No Big Fish, GUARDIAN (London),
Aug. 15, 2002, at 12.
19. Attorney General John Ashcroft explained the contours of this policy during a Senate
hearing:
We have the authority to monitor the conversations of 16 of the 158,000 federal
inmates and their attorneys because we suspect that these communications are
facilitating acts of terrorism. Each prisoner has been told in advance his conversations
will be monitored. None of the information that is protected by attorney-client privilege
may be used for prosecution. Information will only be used to stop impending terrorist
acts and save American lives.
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20aggrandizement of powers of the federal government, combating the
financial infrastructure of terrorism,2 racial profiling,22 the refusal to
release information about hundreds of persons arrested since September
1lth,23 expanding the scope of government surveillance, 24 and the Total
Information Awareness project.25 It also involves significant structural and
institutional changes such as the establishment of the Department of
Homeland Security2 6 and the restructuring of the FBI, 27 as well as closer
coordination between the FBI and CIA with respect to intelligence
gathering on terrorist threats.28
Antiterrorism Policy: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 2001 WL
26188084 (Dec. 6, 2001) (testimony of Attorney Gen. John Ashcroft); see also Avidan Y. Cover,
A Rule Unfit for All Seasons: Monitoring Attorney-Client Communications Violates Privilege and
the Sixth Amendment, 87 CORNELL L. REv. 1233 (2002).
20. See, e.g., Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71, § 107, 115 Stat.
597 (2001) (codified in scattered titles and sections of the United States Code) (establishing the
Transportation Security Administration); see also Matthew L. Wald, U.S. Begins Taking Over
Screening at Airports, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2002, at A18.
21. See Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions with Persons Who Commit, Threaten
To Commit, or Support Terrorism, Exec. Order No. 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (Sept. 23, 2001);
Neil MacFarquhar, Saudis To Sign Agreement on Assets of Terror Groups, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6,
2001, at B4; Michael M. Phillips & David S. Cloud, U.S. To Seize Assets in Antiterrorism Drive,
WALL ST. J_, Sept. 25, 2001, at A3.
22. See, e.g., Samuel R. Gross & Debra Livingston, Racial Profiling Under Attack, 102
COLUM. L. REV. 1413 (2002) (examining and critiquing the practice of racial profiling generally
and in the context of post-September 11 th); Leti Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 UCLA
L. REv. 1575, 1576-86 (2002) (discussing the changed perceptions of racial profiling post-
September 11th); Jackie Calmes, Washington Wire, WALL ST. J., Oct. 12, 2001, at Al (noting that
the Department of Transportation suspended a study of alleged racial profiling at Detroit's Metro
Airport that began in June 2001 as part of reassessing "what security changes [were] needed");
Jason L. Riley, "Racial Profiling " and Terrorism, WALL ST. J., Oct. 24, 2001, at A22 (stating that
popular talk of racial profiling intensified after the terrorist attacks on September 1 th).
23. See Danny Hakim, States Are Told To Keep Detainee Information Secret, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 19, 2002, at A14 (reporting on an INS directive to state and local governments that
prohibited disclosing names of immigration detainees in local government custody); Tamar
Lewin, Rights Groups Press for Names of Muslims Held in New Jersey, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23,
2002, at A9; Katharine Q. Seelye, Moscow, Seeking Extradition, Says 3 Detainees Are Russian,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2002, at A13 (noting that U.S. investigators were refusing to release or
confirm names of Guantanamo Bay prisoners even if native countries identified them as citizens).
24. See, e.g., Mark G. Young, Note, What Big Eyes and Ears You Have!: A New Regime for
Covert Governmental Surveillance, 70 FORDHAM L. REv. 1017 (2001).
25. See, e.g., Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., Total Information Awareness (TIA), at
http://www.epic.org/privacy/profiling/tia/#introduction (last visited Feb. 9, 2003).
26. See Philip Shenon, Threats and Responses: The Reorganization Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
20, 2002, at A14 (describing the reorganization of many departments into the Department of
Homeland Security as a massive and difficult undertaking); see also Mike Allen & Bill Miller,
Bush Seeks Security Department; Cabinet Level Agency Would Coordinate Antiterrorism Effort,
WASH. POST, June 7, 2002, at Al (stating that the new department would encompass the United
States Coast Guard, Secret Service, FEMA, INS, and Customs, as well as the Transportation
Security Administration).
27. Naftali Bendavid, FBI's Mueller Reshapes Agency's Top Ranks, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 4, 2001,
at 3.
28, See Julian Borger, Blunders Prompt U.S. Security Shake-Up: Bush Moves To Force CIA
and FBI Cooperation, GUARDIAN (London), June 7, 2002, at 1; David Wise, Spy-Game.
Changing the Rules so the Good Guys Win, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2002, at D3; Calvin Woodward,
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The creation of such an alternate system of justice has not been
confined to the United States. In the aftermath of September 11 th and in
light of the perceived need to respond to the challenges of global terrorism,
many nations have passed, or are in the process of passing, new
antiterrorism bills while strengthening existing antiterrorism laws.29 With
the scene of the Twin Towers collapsing and being reduced to gray dust
still fresh in everybody's mind, the political right and left mobilized behind
their governments in support of the fight against terrorism.
30
Despite repeated statements that the events of September 1 th have
forever changed the world,3" much of the discussion around matters dealing
with terrorism, the structuring of counterterrorism measures, and
extraordinary governmental powers to answer future threats is not new. The
same holds true with respect to fashioning legal responses to terrorist
threats. Many of the measures proposed in the United States post-
September 11 th can find precedents in other countries. Indeed, some may
find forebears in the legal history of the United States itself.
Experience shows that when grave national crises are upon us,
democratic nations tend to race to the bottom as far as the protection of
human rights and civil liberties, indeed of basic and fundamental legal
principles, is concerned. Emergencies suspend, or at least redefine, de facto,
if not de jure, much of our cherished freedoms and rights.32 Thus, there is
FBI, CIA Struggle To Put History of Animosity Behind Them in the Antiterror Age, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, June 1, 2002, LEXIS, Nexis Library, AP File.
29. See, e.g., Act of Dec. 18, 2001, ch. 41, 2001 S.C. 1 (Can.); Anti-Terrorism, Crime and
Security Act, 2001, c. 24 (Eng.); Celia W. Dugger, India, Too, Weighs Antiterror Measure
Against Liberties, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2001, at A10; Statement by Prime Minister Junichiro
Koizumi on the Passing of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law by the Diet of Japan (Oct.
29, 2001), at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/terroO109/speech/pm1 029.html; see also
THE SECURITY OF FREEDOM: ESSAYS ON CANADA'S ANTITERRORISM BILL (Ronald J. Daniels et
al. eds., 2001) [hereinafter THE SECURITY OF FREEDOM]; Joshua D. Zelman, Recent
Developments in International Law: Anti- Terrorism Legislation-Part One: An Overview, 11 J.
TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 183 (2001); Joshua D. Zelman, Recent Developments in International
Law: Anti-Terrorism Legislation-Part Two: The Impact and Consequences, 11 J. TRANSNAT'L
L. & POL'Y 421 (2002).
30. See, e.g., Edmund L. Andrews, German Greens Patch Rift and Support Use of Military,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2001, at A6 (pointing out that "the tenor of the debate over military
activities has changed markedly since the terrorist attacks on Sept. 11. In recent days, even party
veterans with deep roots in the left-leaning and often anti-American wing of the party have argued
that the Greens need to abandon their categorical antimilitarism.").
31. See, e.g., Anthony Lewis, A Different World, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2001, at A27;
President Bush s Address on Terrorism Before a Joint Meeting of Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
21, 2001, at B4 (."All of this was brought upon us in a single day. And night fell on a different
world ... ' (quoting President George W. Bush)); see also W. Michael Reisman, Editorial
Comments: In Defense of World Public Order, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 833, 833 (2001) (noting that the
attacks "shattered the world view [that took national security for granted] and, quite possibly, the
emotional foundation on which that sense of security rested").
32. The First Amendment, for instance, has not fared well in times of great actual or
perceived peril. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW 109 (1980) (stating that the history of free speech jurisprudence in times of crisis "mocks
our commitment to an open political process"); HARRY KALVEN, JR., A WORTHY TRADITION
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much to be learned from past experience-of the United States as well as
that of other countries33-in order to avoid repeating old mistakes.
Unfortunately, experience also tells us that it is quite likely that old
mistakes will, in fact, be repeated. Speaking in Jerusalem in 1987, Justice
Brennan stated:
There is considerably less to be proud about, and a good deal to be
embarrassed about, when one reflects on the shabby treatment civil
liberties have received in the United States during times of war and
perceived threats to its national security .... After each perceived
security crisis ended, the United States has remorsefully realized
that the abrogation of civil liberties was unnecessary. But it has
proven unable to prevent itself from repeating the error when the
next crisis came along.34
This Article seeks to explore why it is that we seem unable to avoid
repeating old mistakes and errors when faced with new crises and
emergencies.
35
187-211 (Jamie Kalven ed., 1988); Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First
Amendment, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 449, 457 (1985) ("Most constitutional commitments are fragile
in the sense that they embody ideals that are easily abandoned or tempered in times of stress.
Certain distinctive features of the commitment to free speech enhance that fragility."); L.A. Powe,
Jr., Situating Schauer, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1519, 1531-32 (1997) (describing speech as "a
good times civil liberty"); Rodney A. Smolla, Terrorism and the Bill of Rights, 10 WM. & MARY
BILL RTS. J. 551, 573-74 (2002); Bill Carter & Felicity Barringer, In Patriotic Time, Dissent Is
Muted, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 200 1, at Al.
33. Many of the trends and patterns identified in this Article transcend national boundaries in
their existence and effects. Thus, I do not share (at least in the particular context that is the subject
of this Article) Seth Kreimcr's concern that "it is the particular pathologies of the American
history that are most important" in evaluating the likelihood that failures of other systems will
replicate themselves in the United States. See Seth F. Kreimer, Commentaries, Invidious
Comparisons: Some Cautionary Remarks on the Process of Constitutional Borrowing, 1 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 640, 643-44 (1999); cf David Fontana, Refined Comparativism in Constitutional Law,
49 UCLA L. REV. 539, 566-72 (2001) (discussing the pragmatic virtues of comparative projects in
constitutional law, e.g., American courts can use Vincent Blasi's idea of the "pathological
perspective" to avoid the harmful results of rules that resulted in other countries, or can adjust the
rules from other countries based on what worked best there).
34. William J. Brennan, Jr., The Quest To Develop a Jurisprudence of Civil Liberties in
Times of Security Crises, 18 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 11, 11 (1988); see also MICHAEL LrNFIELD,
FREEDOM UNDER FIRE: U.S. CIVIL LIBERTIES IN TIMES OF WAR (1990). But see WILLIAM H.
REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE 219-21 (1998) (identifying a "generally ameliorative trend"
in the protection of civil liberties during wartime including a pattern of increased congressional
and judicial involvement in the protection of civil liberties); Jack Goldsmith & Cass R. Sunstein,
Military Tribunals and Legal Culture: What a Difference Sixty Years Makes, 19 CONST.
COMMENT. 261, 284-89 (2002) (noting increased protection for civil liberties during wartime as a
result of shifting baselines for determining which civil liberties restrictions are appropriate and
recognizing past mistakes).
35. When speaking of mistakes in the context of responding to violent crises, I mostly have in
mind the mistake of overreaction to perceived or even real threats and dangers. I take Chief
Justice Rehnquist's point:
In any civilized society the most important task is achieving a proper balance
between freedom and order. In wartime, reason and history both suggest that this
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Several distinct constitutional frameworks have dominated both the
practice and the theoretical debate concerning responses to acute national
crises. The Business as Usual model is based on notions of constitutional
absolutism and perfection. According to this model, ordinary legal rules and
norms continue to be followed strictly with no substantive change even in
times of emergency and crisis. The law in times of war remains the same as
in times of peace. Other models of emergency powers may be grouped
together under the general category of "models of accommodation" insofar
as they attempt to accommodate, within the existing normative structure,
security considerations and needs. Though the ordinary system is kept
intact as much as possible, some exceptional adjustments are introduced to
accommodate exigency. This compromise, it is argued, allows for the
continued faithful adherence to the principle of the rule of law and to
fundamental democratic values, while at the same time providing the state
with adequate measures to withstand the storm wrought by the crisis.
Within this general category, I identify several possible models, each
corresponding to a somewhat different equilibrium between maintenance of
the ordinary system of rules and norms and accommodation for emergency,
as well as to a different mechanism by which such equilibrium is
established.
I suggest that these traditional models may not always be adequate,
both as a matter of theory and practice. The Business as Usual model is
criticized as either naive or hypocritical in the sense that it disregards the
reality of governmental exercise of extraordinary measures and powers in
responding to emergencies. While its appeal is found in its insistence upon
clear rules and upon maintaining the ideal that the constitutional framework
is not affected by crises and exigencies, the main weakness of the model
lies in its rigidity in the face of radical changes in the surrounding context.
The models of accommodation are subject to claims of being unprincipled.
Their relative strength inheres in their flexibility in the face of great
calamities and in their accommodation of shifting and expanding the
powers needed to meet such exigencies. Yet, their shortcoming is found in
the innate susceptibility to manipulation and in the danger that
accommodating counter-emergency responses within the existing legal
balance shifts to some degree in favor of order-in favor of the government's ability to
deal with conditions that threaten the national well-being. It simply cannot be said,
therefore, that in every conflict between individual liberty and governmental authority
the former should prevail. And if we feel free to criticize court decisions that curtail
civil liberty, we must also feel free to look critically at decisions favorable to civil
liberty.
REHNQUIST, supra note 34, at 222-23. However, it is also the case that historical perspective
teaches us that overreaction has frequently been the case in times of crisis. Moreover, as I will
show below, reason also indicates that overreaction is more likely than not in times of crisis and
great peril. Thus, while balancing freedom and order is necessary, there are compelling reasons to
question our ability to strike a "proper balance" in such times.
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system starts us down a slippery slope toward excessive governmental
infringement on individual rights and liberties while undermining
constitutional structures and institutions in the process.
Furthermore, a basic assumption on which all the traditional models of
emergency powers are premised does not hold true in practice. The
assumption of separation is defined by the belief in our ability to separate
emergencies and crises from normalcy, 36 counterterrorism measures from
ordinary legal rules and norms. This assumption facilitates our acceptance
of expansive governmental emergency powers and counterterrorism
measures, for it reassures us that once the emergency is removed and
terrorism is no longer a threat, such powers and measures will also be
terminated and full return to normalcy ensured. It also assures us that
counter-emergency measures will not be directed against us, but only
against those who pose a threat to the community.
However, bright-line demarcations between normalcy and emergency
are all too frequently untenable, and distinctions between the two made
difficult, if not impossible. In fact, the exception is hardly an exception at
all.37 In various meaningful ways, the exception has merged with the rule.
"Emergency government has become the norm.",38 Fashioning legal tools to
respond to emergencies on the belief that the assumption of separation will
serve as a firewall protecting human rights, civil liberties, and the legal
system as a whole may be misguided. Since the assumption of separation is
also closely linked to the goals of the different models of emergency
powers and inasmuch as it informs each of these models, we must reassess
the strength of the arguments supporting each of them. Blind adherence to
the models may result in long-term destabilization of such fundamental
principles as the rule of law and the strong protection of rights, freedoms,
and liberties. Innovative legal concepts to deal with the problem of
emergencies may be needed.39
Building on these critiques of the existing models, I suggest that we
need to reexamine a second fundamental assumption that underlies the
traditional models of emergency powers. The assumption of
36. The term "normalcy" was famously invoked by Warren G. Harding in his
"Readjustment" speech during the 1920 presidential campaign. See ROBERT K. MURRAY, THE
POLITICS OF NORMALCY: GOVERNMENTAL THEORY AND PRACTICE IN THE HARDING-COOLIDGE
ERA 9 (1973). By "normalcy," Harding described not "the old order, but a regular steady order of
things." Id. at 15.
37. For the notion of emergency as exception, see infra Section IV.A.
38. SPECIAL SENATE COMM. ON NAT'L EMERGENCIES & DELEGATED EMERGENCY POWERS,
93D CONG., A BRIEF HISTORY OF EMERGENCY POWERS IN THE UNITED STATES, at v (Comm.
Print 1974) (Frank Church & Charles McC. Mathias). Prompted by general distrust of the Nixon
Administration's foreign and domestic policy, Senators Mathias and Church investigated the
nearly continuous state of emergency that had existed in the United States since 1933, discovering
nearly 470 pieces of emergency power legislation that remained in force. Id.
39. See Ackerman, supra note 2, at 16.
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constitutionality tells us that whatever responses are made to the challenges
of a particular exigency, such responses are to be found and limited within
the confines of the constitution. While terrorists are lawless and operate
outside the sphere of legal principles, rules, and norms, democratic
governments must be careful not to fight terrorism with lawless means.
Otherwise, they may only succeed in defeating terrorism at the expense of
losing the democratic nature of the society in whose defense they are
fighting.
It may well be that the assumption of constitutionality has served as a
rhetorical, more than a real, check on governmental powers during "times
of great crises. However, I challenge that assumption not merely as a
descriptive tool, but mostly on normative grounds. I argue that there may be
circumstances where the appropriate method of tackling grave dangers and
threats entails going outside the constitutional order, at times even violating
otherwise accepted constitutional principles, rules, and norms. Such a
response, if pursued in appropriate circumstances and properly applied,
may strengthen rather than weaken, and result in more rather than less,
long-term constitutional fidelity and commitment to the rule of law.41
This Extra-Legal Measures model proposed in this Article informs
public officials that they may act extralegally when they believe that such
action is necessary for protecting the nation and the public in the face of
calamity, provided that they openly and publicly acknowledge the nature of
their actions. It is then up to the people to decide, either directly or
indirectly (e.g., through their elected representatives in the legislature), how
to respond to such actions. The people may decide to hold the actor to the
wrongfulness of her actions, demonstrating commitment to the violated
principles and values. The acting official may be called to answer, and
make legal and political reparations, for her actions. Alternatively, the
people may act to approve, ex post, the extralegal actions of the public
official.
Thus, under the Extra-Legal Measures model, we may conclude in
particular instances that acting in a certain way is the right thing to do to
promote the greatest good for the greatest number of people, but in other
situations we may decline to approve such action from legal, political,
40. Attorney General Francis Biddle stated that "the Constitution has not greatly bothered any
wartime President. That was a question of law, which ultimately the Supreme Court must decide.
And meanwhile probably a long meanwhile-we must get on with the war." FRANCIS BIDDLE,
IN BRIEF AUTHORITY 219 (1962) (referring specifically to President Roosevelt's Executive Order
9066, which authorized the evacuation of persons of Japanese ancestry from the West Coast); see
also REHNQUIST, supra note 34, at 224 ("[T]he fact that the phrase Inter arma silent leges is
quoted by modem writers suggests that it has validity at least in a descriptive way.").
41. I should clarify up front that this Article is designed to put forward the rationale and
arguments in support of an alternative model of emergency powers. I will not attempt here to
define or give concrete meaning to the concepts of "appropriate circumstances" and "proper
application" of the model. These will have to wait for another opportunity.
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social, and moral standpoints. At the same time, the model does not
completely bar the possibility that public officials will take such actions and
that their actions may be later ratified by the public. By separating the two
issues-action and ratification-the model adds an element of uncertainty
hanging over the head of the public official who needs to decide how to act.
That uncertainty raises the cost of taking an extralegal course of action.
Hence, it ought to be clear that the Extra-Legal Measures model must
not be confused with what may be called political realism. Political realists
have often made the argument that when dealing with acute violent crises,
democracies ought to forgo legal and constitutional niceties. The Extra-
Legal Measures model reflects a diametrically opposite approach. It seeks
to preserve the long-term relevance of, and obedience to, legal principles,
rules, and norms. While going outside the legal order may be a "little
wrong," it is advocated here in order to facilitate the attainment of a "great
right," namely the preservation not only of the constitutional order, but also
of its most fundamental principles and tenets.42 Significantly, I argue that
the Extra-Legal Measures model promotes, and is promoted by, ethical
concepts of political and popular responsibility, political morality, and
candor. To be implemented properly, the model calls for candor on the part
of government agents, who must disclose the nature of their counter-
emergency activities. The model then focuses on the need for a direct or
indirect popular ex post ratification of such activities. The process leading
up to such ratification (or rejection) of those actions promotes deliberation
after the fact, as well as establishes the individual responsibility of each
member of the relevant community for the actions taken on behalf of the
public during the emergency. That very process, with its uncertain
outcomes, also serves the important function of slowing down any possible
rush to use extralegal powers by governmental agents. Although the model
may seem open to the challenge that its application would result in a
downward spiral toward authoritarian rule and totalitarianism, 43 as it
seemingly dispenses with existing constitutional norms and structures, there
are other, perhaps more important, checks against governmental abuse of
extralegal powers.
The Article proceeds in five parts. Part II examines the tension that
exists between democratic values on the one hand, and the realities and
42. "To do a great right, do a little wrong" is the advice given by Bassanio to Portia.
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, TIE MERCHANT OF VENICE act 4, sc. 1, 1. 211 (S. Greenblatt ed., W.W.
Norton & Co. 1997); see also Ward Farnsworth, "'To Do a Great Right, Do a Little Wrong": A
User's Guide to Judicial Lawlessness, 86 MINN. L. REV. 227 (2001) (suggesting that the remedial
decision in Bush v. Gore was an instance of pragmatism or perhaps even lawlessness by the
Supreme Court).
43. On the place of antitotalitarianism sentiment in shaping both modem theories of
American constitutional law and case law, see Richard Primus, Note, A Brooding Omnipresence
Totalitarianism in Postwar Constitutional Thought, 106 YALE L.J. 423 (1996).
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necessities of responding to emergencies and crises on the other. Part III
presents the traditional frameworks for responding to emergencies, namely
the Business as Usual model and several models of accommodation. Part IV
focuses on the assumption of separation, which informs the constitutional
models of emergency powers discussed in Part III. After explaining both
the role that this assumption plays in each model and the traditional
mechanisms used to maintain the separation between normalcy and
emergency, I argue that the assumption does not hold true in practice. As a
result, it distorts the expected effects of each of the constitutional models.
In Part V, I introduce an alternative model of emergency powers, namely
the Extra-Legal Measures model. I argue that this model, when properly
applied, may strengthen, rather than weaken, our constitutional
commitments and the rule of law in the long term. A brief conclusion
follows.
Before going further, three notes are in order. First, while emergencies
need not be limited to violent events and threats such as terrorism and war
but can also encompass economic crises and natural disasters,44 the main
focus of this study is on violent emergencies and crises. While parts of my
argument are also applicable to other types of emergency situations (and
examples of past responses to such crises are used in developing my
argument),45 I believe that such a distinction is warranted in light of the
44. Emergencies have been traditionally classified into three major categories: grave political
crises (including international armed conflicts, terrorist attacks, riots, and rebellions), economic
crises such as the Great Depression, and natural disasters and force majeure events. See, e.g.,
Study of the Implications for Human Rights of Recent Developments Concerning Situations
Known as States of Siege or Emergency, U.N. Commission on Human Rights, 35th Sess., Agenda
Item 10, at 8-9, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1982/15 (1982) [hereinafter Questiaux Report];
SUBRATA ROY CHOWDHURY, RULE OF LAW IN A STATE OF EMERGENCY 15 (1989) (categorizing
three different circumstances from which emergency situations may arise). Clinton Rossiter
suggests a slightly different classification of emergency situations. See ROSSITER, supra note 5, at
6 (distinguishing among war, rebellion, and economic depression); see also Aaron S. Klieman,
Emergency Politics: The Growth of Crisis Government, 70 CONFLICT STUD. 5 (1976) (dividing
the major causes of emergency situations among aggression, public calamity, and internal
disorder).
The use of emergency powers appears with at least as much frequency in times of great
economic consternation and in situations of severe natural disasters as it does in the context of
violent conflicts. For a recent analysis of the use of emergency powers to deal with an "economic-
financial state of emergency," see William E. Scheuerman, The Economic State of Emergency, 21
CARDOZO L. REV. 1869, 1869 (2000). See also Aaron Perrine, The First Amendment Versus the
World Trade Organization: Emergency Powers and the Battle in Seattle, 76 WASH. L. REV. 635,
654 (2001) (noting that the emergency power in the United States evolved along with capitalist
liberal democracy).
45. To a large extent, emergency responses to economic crises have been shaped along
contours similar to those of emergency measures taken in the face of military or political threats.
The Roosevelt Administration treated the Great Depression, both in rhetoric and practice, as
equivalent to a war waged against a foreign invader. See Michal R. Belknap, The New Deal and
the Emergency Powers Doctrine, 62 TEX. L. REV. 67, 70-76 (1983); see also ROBERT HIGGS,
CRISIS AND LEVIATHAN: CRITICAL EPISODES IN THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 159-
95 (1987) (discussing the Great Depression as "An Emergency More Serious than War"); Daniel
W. Levy, A Legal History of Irrational Exuberance, 48 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 799, 807 (1998)
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different categorical requirements for action that each situation raises. Thus,
for example, a violent conflict may (but does not have to) require
immediate action, without time for consultation with other institutions. On
the other hand, an economic crisis usually allows (but does not have to
allow) for longer response periods, thus enabling interbranch action.46
Second, since September 11 th, much has been said about the threats
posed by "global" terrorism as well as the need to meet the challenge of
terrorism by a coordinated global response.47 The roles played by global
interconnectedness; the mobility of people, goods, and money across
national borders; and technologically advanced systems of communication
and transportation in facilitating terrorism have all been closely scrutinized
and debated since the attacks.
48 In as much as "terrorism globalizes us,"
49
many believe that a response must be global in nature in order to succeed.
In this respect, it may well be that trends of increased interconnectedness
and interdependence among the nations of the world will lead to heightened
emphasis on the exception. 50 Yet, such was the case even prior to
September 11 th. Modem terrorism has been changing its face and the scope
(suggesting that "by the mid-twentieth century, emergency response to economic distress would
eventually either be subsumed under statutes which, like war, require congressional declaration of
a national emergency, or be justified as a necessary extension of war-making power").
46. Rossiter distinguishes between executive- and legislative-type emergency powers.
ROSSITER, supra note 5, at 9-11, 290-94. Executive emergency powers include all those powers
given to the executive in times of emergency, but which do not confer upon it lawmaking power.
Id. at 10. Legislative emergency powers are relevant when the executive acquires emergency
legislative powers either by means of specific, temporary legislation; broad delegation of powers
from the legislature; an enabling act; or permanent legislation with an "emergency-flavor." Id. at
292-93. While the executive-type emergency regime is thought to be more suitable to meet an
emergency of a violent nature such as war or extreme rebellion, the legislative-type emergency
regime is considered better suited to cope with such crises as severe economic depression. Id. at
292. See, e.g., CARL J. FRIEDRICH, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT AND DEMOCRACY: THEORY
AND PRACTICE IN EUROPE AND AMERICA 563-66 (4th ed. 1968) (distinguishing between the
legislative and executive emergency powers). Friedrich argues, however, that the distinction
between executive and legislative powers in times of crisis is questionable. See id. at 565;
Frederick M. Watkins, The Problem of Constitutional Dictatorship, in PUBLIC POLICY 324, 368-
79 (C.J. Friedrich & Edward S. Mason eds., 1940) (distinguishing among administrative
dictatorship, legislative dictatorship, and dictatorship by delegation).
47. See, e.g., Reisman, supra note 31, at 833 (suggesting that the attacks were designed to
destroy the "social and economic structures and values of a system of world public order"); David
Schneiderman, Terrorism and the Risk Society, in THE SECURITY OF FREEDOM, supra note 29, at
63, 65-67 (discussing the global scope of the new terrorism threat); Wedgwood, supra note 15, at
329 (arguing that "Al Qaeda's real target was globalization itself").
48. See, e.g., Janice Gross Stein, Network Wars, in THE SECURITY OF FREEDOM, supra note
29, at 73, 75-76 (discussing "global networks of terror"); see also Kevin E. Davis, Cutting Offthe
Flow of Funds to Terrorists: Whose Funds? Which Funds? Who Decides?, in id. at 299
(describing the war on terrorism on the financial front); Audrey Macklin, Borderline Security, in
id. at 383 (describing the war on terrorism's impact on immigration policy).
49. Schneiderman, supra note 47, at 66 (quoting John Manley, Foreign Affairs Minister of
Canada).
50. But see Peter J. Spiro, Globalization and the (Foreign Affairs) Constitution, 63 OHIO ST.
L.J. 649 (2002) (contending that globalization eliminates the need for a special and different
treatment of foreign affairs).
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and areas of its activities. Narcoterrorism, organized international crime,
and cyberterrorism have been most facilitated by the blurring of
geographical boundaries and the increasing difficulties facing nation-states
in regulating and controlling their environments under conditions of
globalization. 51 The compression of time and space brought about by
technological innovation, the communications revolution, and
advancements in transportation brings new challenges and threats to states
while significantly reducing the state's available time for response.52
This leads to my final preliminary point. This is not an "American"
study, nor is it a post-September 11 th one. Nor are the patterns identified in
this Article unique to the post-September 11 th world. The arguments set
forth below ought to be treated as generally applicable to constitutional
democratic regimes faced with the need to respond to extreme violent
crises.
II. DEMOCRACY AND STATES OF EMERGENCY:
A TENSION OF "TRAGIC DIMENSIONS"
Times of crisis pose the greatest and most serious danger to
constitutional freedoms and principles.53 In such times, the temptation to
disregard constitutional freedoms is at its zenith, while the effectiveness of
traditional checks and balances is at its nadir.54 In times of crisis, it is often
51. In a study published in December 2000, the United States National Security Council
suggested that global criminals perpetrating global crimes such as terrorism, drug trafficking,
alien smuggling, trafficking in women and children, copyright violations, and even auto theft
ought to be treated as threats to national security. See Joseph Kahn & Judith Miller, Getting Tough
on Gangsters, High Tech and Global, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2000, at A9 ("'Globalization has
created a new kind of national security threat that is not fully recognized by the administration or
Congress."' (quoting Richard A. Clarke, Counterterrorism Coordinator on the National Security
Council)).
52. See generally ANTHONY GIDDENS, RUNAWAY WORLD: How GLOBALIZATION IS
RESHAPING OUR LIVES (2000) (demonstrating the effect of compression of time and space on
democratic and capitalistic structures); DAVID HARVEY, THE CONDITION OF POSTMODERNITY:
AN ENQUIRY INTO THE ORIGINS OF CULTURAL CHANGE 240, 284-307 (1990) (articulating the
theory of time-space compression).
53. See, e.g., Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 686 (1995) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) ("It cannot be too often stated that the greatest threats to our constitutional freedoms
come in times of crisis."); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 635 (1989)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) ("History teaches that grave threats to liberty often come in times of
urgency, when constitutional rights seem too extravagant to endure.").
54. Judicial and academic warnings against sacrificing individual freedoms under pretensions
of "emergency" or "national security" abound. For example, the majority in United States v. Robel
recognized:
Implicit in the term "national defense" is the notion of defending those values and
ideals which set this Nation apart. ... It would indeed be ironic if, in the name of
national defense, we would sanction the subversion of one of those liberties-the
freedom of association-which makes the defense of the Nation worthwhile.
389 U.S. 258, 264 (1967). In addition, Judge Youngdahl in United States v. Peck recognized,
"Although an infringement of the Bill of Rights may be necessary under certain circumstances, no
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argued, legal niceties may be cast aside as luxuries to be enjoyed only in
times of peace and tranquility.55 Yet, it is precisely in such times that
constitutional safeguards for the protection of rights, freedoms, and liberties
are put to the test.5 6 A continued commitment to preserving and maintaining
rights, freedoms, and liberties ought to be reconciled with the caution
against turning a constitution into a suicide pact.57 The issue this Article
explores is whether such acts of reconciliation should at all times be
pursued within the confines of a constitution, or whether they can be carried
out, in certain truly extraordinary circumstances, outside the constitutional
framework. This Part argues that times of emergency lower, rather than
increase, the costs of curtailing liberties and freedoms from the perspective
of government officials and the vast majority of the population.
There exists a tension of "tragic dimensions" between democratic
values and responses to emergencies.58 Democratic nations faced with
serious terrorist threats must "maintain and protect life, the liberties
necessary to a vibrant democracy, and the unity of the society, the loss of
one can rejoice in such an exigency. For with each such authorized infringement, the rights of all
citizens become fewer, the freedoms we cherish are limited, and democracy itself is weakened."
154 F. Supp. 603, 607 (D.D.C. 1957). Academic commentators have also warned against such
sacrifices. See, for example, James Oakes's poignant warning:
Our institutions fortunately do not hang by a thread, but a deep depression, a serious
blow to national pride, extensive internal terrorism, a serious external threat to security,
or a combination of these may enlarge the ranks of the elements of society that are ever
ready to abandon liberty for order and to abandon freedom for security.
James L. Oakes, The Proper Role of the Federal Courts in Enforcing the Bill of Rights, 54 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 911, 925 (1979).
55. Thus, for example, the British Home Secretary, David Blunkett, referred to the view that
people ought not to be detained indefinitely without trial as an "airy-fairy" view of the world. See
Brian Groom, Detaining Suspects Not Abuse of Human Rights, Says Blunkett, FIN. TIMES
(London), Nov. 12, 2001, at 3.
56. See cases cited supra note 53; see also Blasi, supra note 32, at 449-50 (arguing that the
First Amendment should be equipped "to do maximum service in those historical periods when
intolerance of unorthodox ideas is most prevalent and when governments are most able and most
likely to stifle dissent systematically. The first amendment, in other words, should be targeted for
the worst of times."). But see Acton, 515 U.S. at 686 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("[W]e must also
stay mindful that not all government responses to [crisis] times arc hysterical overreactions; some
crises are quite real, and when they are, they serve precisely as the compelling state interest that
we have said may justify a measured intrusion on constitutional rights."); REHNQUIST, supra note
34, at 222-23. Two well-known maxims capture the essence of the debate. Compare Benjamin
Franklin's statement that "[t]hey that can give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary
safety deserve neither liberty nor safety," BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, HISTORICAL REVIEW OF
PENNSYLVANIA (1759), quoted in THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF POLITICAL QUOTATIONS 141
(Anthony Jay ed., 1996), with Justice Jackson's statement that "[t]he choice is not between order
and liberty. It is between liberty with order and anarchy without either," Terminiello v. Chicago,
337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
57. See Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 309-10 (1981); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S.
144, 160 (1963) ("[WIhile the Constitution protects against invasions of individual rights, it is not
a suicide pact."); Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 37 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (warning that the majority
decision in that case might lead to the conversion of the Bill of Rights into a suicide pact).
58. Pnina Lahav, A Barrel Without Hoops: The Impact of Counterterrorism on Israel's Legal
Culture, 10 CARDOzo L. REV. 529, 531 (1988) (noting the "tragic dimensions of the tension
between terrorism, counterterrorism, and justice in any democratic society").
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which can turn a healthy and diverse nation into a seriously divided and
violent one." 59 At the same time, exigencies and acute crises directly
challenge the most fundamental concepts of constitutional democracy. The
question then arises to what extent, if any, violations of fundamental
democratic values can be justified in the name of the survival of the
democratic, constitutional order itself; and if they can be justified, to what
extent a democratic, constitutional government can defend the state without
transforming itself into an authoritarian regime.
Take, for example, the notion that a government must be of limited
powers, a government of laws, not of men (or women).6 ° When an extreme
exigency arises it almost invariably leads to the strengthening of the
executive branch not only at the expense of the other two branches, but also
at the expense of individual rights, liberties, and freedoms. The
government's ability to act swiftly, secretly, and decisively against a threat
to the life of the nation becomes superior to the ordinary principles of
limitation on governmental powers and individual rights.' 1 Crises tend to
result in the expansion of governmental powers, the concentration of
powers in the hands of the executive, and the concomitant contraction of
individual freedoms and liberties.62 Enhanced and newly created powers are
asserted by, and given to, the government as necessary to meet the
challenge to the community. Concepts such as separation of powers and
federalism are likely to be among the first casualties when a nation needs to
respond to a national emergency, as by engaging in a war against
terrorism. 63 The executive branch assumes a leading role in countering the
59. PHILIP B. HEYMANN, TERRORISM AND AMERICA: A COMMONSENSE STRATEGY FOR A
DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY, at ix (1998); Wedgwood, supra note 15, at 330 (arguing that the "fabric
of American liberalism and democracy would be irreparably coarsened if government proves
unable to provide a reasonable guarantee of life and safety to its citizens").
60. This idea traces its origins to Aristotle, who suggested that "where the laws have no
authority, there is no constitution." 2 ARISTOTLE, THE COMPLETE WORKS 2051 (Jonathan Barnes
ed., Princeton Univ. Press 1984); see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803)
("The government of the United States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and
not of men.").
61. See, e.g., LrNFIELD, supra note 34; CHARLES DE SECONDAT MONTESQUIEU, TIHE SPIRIT
OF LAWS 154 (Thomas Nugcnt trans., Univ. of Cal. Press 1977) (1748); Jules Lobel, Emergency
Power and the Decline ofLiberalism, 98 YALE L.J. 1385, 1386 (1989); Watkins, supra note 46, at
343-44; Itzhak Zamir, Human Rights and National Security, 23 ISR. L. REV. 375 (1989).
62. See HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER
AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 117-49 (1990); ROSSITER, supra note 5, at 288-90; PITIRIM A.
SOROKIN, MAN AND SOCIETY IN CALAMITY: THE EFFECTS OF WAR, REVOLUTION, FAMINE,
PESTILENCE UPON HUMAN MIND, BEHAVIOR, SOCIAL ORGANIZATION AND CULTURAL LIFE 122-
44, 275-76 (1942); Arthur S. Miller, Constitutional Law: Crisis Government Becomes the Norm,
39 OHIO ST. L.J. 736, 738-41 (1978).
63. EDWARD S. CORWIN, TOTAL WAR AND THE CONSTITUTION 35-77 (1947) (describing
how total war shapes and transforms domestic governments); Peter Rosenthal, The New
Emergencies Act: Four Times the War Measures Act, 20 MAN. L.J. 563, 576-80 (1991) (noting a
long history of encroachment by the Canadian federal parliament on provincial jurisdiction in
times of emergency, under the aegis of the "emergency doctrine").
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crisis, with the other two branches pushed aside (whether of their own
volition or not). 64 The increase in governmental powers leads, in turn, to a
contraction of traditional individual rights, freedoms, and liberties. 65 While
such expansions and concentrations of powers are not unique to times of
crisis, but rather are part of the modernization of society and the need for
governmental involvement in an ever-growing number of areas of human
activity, 66 it can hardly be denied that such phenomena have been
accelerated tremendously (and, at times, initiated) during emergencies.
67
Our acceptance of the growing role of the executive branch as natural may
be attributed, in part, to our conditioning during times of emergency.
Thus, two seemingly antithetical vectors are in a constant tug-of-war.
The existence of restrictions and limitations on governmental powers is a
fundamental attribute of democratic regimes. The ideals of democracy,
individual rights, legitimacy, accountability, and the rule of law suggest that
even in times of acute danger, government is limited, both formally and
substantively, in the range of activities that it may pursue in order to protect
the state. However, grave terrorist threats directly challenge this organizing
principle. The notion of raison d'6tat privileges the exercise of a wide
panoply of measures by the state faced with challenges to its very
existence.
68
Terrorists seek to exploit this fundamental conundrum facing their
victims. In most cases, terrorist groups and organizations do not believe
they can win by sheer force. They are no real physical or military match to
well-organized states.69 The threats they pose are not existential in the sense
that they do not put in real danger the very existence of the victim state.
Instead, terrorism presents its real threat in provoking democratic regimes
to embrace and employ authoritarian measures7" that (1) weaken the fabric
of democracy; (2) discredit the government domestically as well as
internationally; (3) alienate segments of the population from their
64. See KOH, supra note 62, at 117-49; ROSSITER, supra note 5, at 288-90; Miller, supra note
62, at 738-41.
65. See Alan M. Dershowitz, The Role of Law During Times of Crisis: Would Liberty Be
Suspended?, in CIVIL DISORDER AND VIOLENCE 129, 133-34 (Harry M. Clor ed., 1972) (focusing
on the way that "stretch points" in a legal system allow for the expansion of governmental powers
at the expense of rights and freedoms).
66. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 421 (1987).
67. See PAUL L. MURPHY, THE CONSTITUTION IN CRISIS TIMES, 1918-1969 (1972).
68. C.J. FRIEDRICH, CONSTITUTIONAL REASON OF STATE 4-5 (1957). Friedrich explains that
considerations of "reason of state" exist when "whatever is required to insure the survival of the
state must be done by the individuals responsible for it, no matter how repugnant such an act may
be to them in their private capacity as decent and moral men." Id.; see also MAURIZIO VIROLI,
FROM POLITICS TO REASON OF STATE 238-80 (1992).
69. This may change should the use of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons become a
real option for terrorist groups.
70. See HEYMANN, supra note 59, at ix-xi (outlining governmental responses to terrorism).
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government, thereby pushing more people to support (passively, if not
outright actively) the terrorist organizations and their cause; and (4)
undermine the government's claim to the moral higher ground in the battle
against the terrorists, while gaining legitimacy for the latter. 71 The most
critical danger from terrorism is "not that democracies would fail to defend
themselves, but rather that they would (and did) do so far too well" and, in
so doing, become "less democratic., 72 This overreaction may result in the
"barbarization" 73 of society not only in that terrorism from "below" may be
transplanted by institutionalized terror from "above," 74 but also in that use
of power and force is legitimated as a means for settling disputes.
75
Setting the equilibrium between the powers of the state and the rights of
individuals is, of course, not unique to the realm of emergency powers.
76
However, certain characteristics of times of crisis suggest likely distortions
in trying to strike the proper balance under conditions of extreme pressures.
A. Action over Deliberation
Violent emergencies in general, and shocking terrorist attacks in
particular, tend to bring about a rush to legislate. The prevailing belief may
be that if new offenses are added to the criminal code and the scope of
existing offenses broadened, and if the arsenal of law enforcement agencies
71. See Yehezkel Dror, Terrorism as a Challenge to the Democratic Capacity To Govern, in
TERRORISM, LEGITIMACY, AND POWER 65 (Martha Crenshaw ed., 1983); see also R.D.
Crelinsten, Terrorism as Political Communication: The Relationship Between the Controller and
the Controlled, in CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH ON TERRORISM 3, 9 (Paul Wilkinson & Alasdair
M. Stewart eds., 1987).
72. David A. Charters, Introduction to THE DEADLY SIN OF TERRORISM 1, 1 (David A.
Charters ed., 1994); see also Lahav, supra note 58, at 559 ("Counterterrorism may be tamed, but
too much domestication may render it ineffective .... Undomesticated counterterrorism on the
other hand, when challenged by the state, responds by attempting to tame the legal system rather
than be tamed by it.").
However, a successful terrorist campaign met by a hesitant governmental counteraction may
eliminate inhibitions against using force and violence to accomplish political, social, and
economic goals by other committed groups and individuals within the community. See
HEYMANN, supra note 59, at 16. Thus, if the state is expected to guarantee the "liberty" of its
citizens, surely it is supposed to protect and guarantee their "life." See generally Irwin Cotler,
Thinking Outside the Box: Foundational Principles for a Counter-Terrorism Law and Policy, in
THE SECURITY OF FREEDOM, supra note 29, at 111.
73. Dror, supra note 71, at 73-74 (noting the barbarization of the international global system
as a result of counterterrorism measures invoked against the challenge of international terrorism).
74. See GRANT WARDLAW, POLITICAL TERRORISM 69 (2d ed. 1989); see also BENJAMIN
CONSTANT, The Spirit of Conquest and Usurpation and Their Relation to European Civilization,
in POLITICAL WRITINGS 43, 134-35 (Biancamaria Fontana ed. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press
1988) (1814).
75. See, e.g., CONSTANT, supra note 74, at 136 ("Power, by emancipating itself from the
laws, has lost its distinctive character and its happy pre-eminence. When the factions attack it,
with weapons like its own, the mass of the citizens may be divided, since it seems to them that
they only have a choice between two factions.").
76. See, e.g., ALAN BARTH, THE PRICE OF LIBERTY 193 (1961) (discussing such equilibrium
in routine policing).
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is enhanced by putting at their disposal more sweeping powers to search
and seize, to eavesdrop, to interrogate, to detain without trial, and to deport,
77the country will be more secure and better able to face the emergency.
Furthermore, it is often easier to pass new legislation than to examine why
it is that the existing legislation, and the powers granted under it to
government and its agencies, was not sufficient. This allows government to
demonstrate that it is doing something against the dangers facing the nation
rather than sitting idly.78 Legislation of this sort permits the government to
claim that the preexisting legal infrastructure was inefficient and thus it
forestalled efficient actions/responses to the threat. The result is a piling up
of legislative measures into a complex state of emergency.7 9 Moreover, the
need to respond quickly to future threats-as much as to assure the public
that its government is acting with a vengeance against past and future
terrorists-frequently results in rushed legislation, often without much
debate and at times forgoing normal legislative procedures. The lack of
interest in the problem of dealing with emergencies and terrorism during
times of quiet has also led to the fashioning of emergency and
counterterrorism legislation without much thought and deliberation.
Examples of this abound.
On March 9, 1933, with all the banks in the United States closed for
four consecutive days, Congress passed-within an hour of receiving the
White House proposal-the Emergency Banking Act,8° which granted
expansive powers to the President. 81 Given the time constraints, the votes of
some members of Congress "were not recognized and there was no roll call
vote allowed in the House.,
82
77. Kent Roach, The Dangers of a Charter-Proof and Crime-Based Response to Terrorism,
in THE SECURITY OF FREEDOM, supra note 29, at 131, 138-42; see also Conor Gearty, Airy-Fairy,
LONDON REV. BOOKS, Nov. 29, 2001, at 9.
78. Francis Wheen recounted a telling story about Britain's passage of the Prevention of
Terrorism Act of 1974:
Clare Short attended the 1974 debate in her capacity as a Home Office civil servant,
sitting on the bench reserved for senior Whitehall officials. After listening to a couple
of speeches she whispered to her neighbour-the man who had drafted the bill-that it
would do nothing to prevent terrorism. "You know very well that is not what it is
about," he replied. The point, he said, was to appease the Tories and the tabloids.
Francis Wheen, Bill That Costs Too Much, GUARDIAN (London), Sept. 2, 1998, at 5.
79. See Questiaux Report, supra note 44, at 29 (noting that a complex state of emergency is
characterized by "the great number of parallel or simultaneous emergency rules whose complexity
is increased by the 'piling up' of provisions designed to 'regularize' the immediately preceding
situation and therefore embodying retroactive rules and transitional regimes").
80. Pub. L. No. 73-1, 48 Stat. 1 (1933).
81. The bill was decried by one of its opponents as .'a dictatorship over finance in the United
States."' Roger I. Roots, Government by Permanent Emergency: The Forgotten History of the
New Deal Constitution, 33 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 259, 266 n.39 (2000) (quoting Rep. McFadden of
Pennsylvania).
82. Id. at 266. In addition, only a single copy of the actual bill was delivered by the President
to the floor of both houses and as no additional copies had been made, the bill was read to the
assemblies.
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More recently, Congress overwhelmingly supported the passage of the
USA PATRIOT Act merely six weeks after the terrorist attacks of
September 1 lth. 3 Congress moved to act despite strong claims that it was
interfering unnecessarily and excessively with individual rights and
liberties.14 Established legislative procedures-such as the committee
process and floor debate-were abandoned in the name of speedy process895
In the United Kingdom, a new terrorism act came into force in February
2001.86 Merely nine months later, as a response to the events of September
11 th, the British Government put the 118-page Anti-Terrorism, Crime and
Security Bill before Parliament. 87 Despite its complexity, and despite the
fact that questions had been raised as to the necessity of passing yet another
piece of antiterrorism legislation, the bill passed in the House of Commons
in sixteen hours. 88
A similar story can be told of the British Parliament's enactment of the
first Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act of 1974 (PTA)8 9
immediately after the Birmingham pub bombings that killed twenty-one
people. 90 For the first time, emergency legislation addressing the conflict in
Northern Ireland hit home in Great Britain proper. The PTA marked a
watershed in legal responses to terrorism related to Northern Ireland in that
it deviated from the previous pattern of enacting special emergency
legislation for Northern Ireland that did not apply to the rest of the United
83. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required To
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272
(2001); see also Michael T. McCarthy, Recent Developments, USA Patriot Act, 39 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 435, 435 (2002) (noting that after the attacks, "Congress moved with tremendous alacrity
to authorize new powers for the federal government"). The House vote was 357-66. 147 CONG.
REC. H7224 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 2001). The Senate vote was 98-1. 147 CONG. REC. SI 1,059 (daily
ed. Oct. 25, 2001).
84. For reports on the process that led to passage of the Act, see Jess Bravin & Ted Bridis,
Political Role Reversals Shape Antiterrorism Legislation, WALL ST. J., Oct. 8, 2001, at A8; and
Neil A. Lewis & Robert Pear, Terror Laws Near Votes in House and Senate, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5,
2001, at B8. On objections to the enactment of the USA PATRIOT Act, see, for example, Frank
Rich, Wait Until Dark, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2001, at A27 ("Congress... pass[ed] the U.S.A.-
Patriot Act before anyone could read it ... "). For critical views of the Act, see, for example,
Jennifer C. Evans, Comment, Hijacking Civil Liberties: The USA PATRIOTAct of 2001, 33 LOY.
U. CHI. L.J. 933 (2002). For a favorable view of Congress's role in shaping the USA PATRIOT
Act, see McCarthy, supra note 83, at 439-40 (noting that Congress ensured a continuing oversight
role for itself and for the judicial branch).
85. Gia Fenoglio, Jumping the Gun on Terrorism?, 33 NAT'L J. 3450 (2001); McCarthy,
supra note 83, at 439; Letter from the American Civil Liberties Union to the U.S. Senate (Oct. 23,
2001), at http://www.aclu.org/congress/I102301 k.html.
86. Terrorism Act, 2000, c. 11.
87. Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001, c. 24.
88. See, e.g., Philip A. Thomas, September lIth and Good Governance, 53 N. IR. LEGAL Q.
(forthcoming 2003) (detailing the legislative process).
89. c. 56.
90. Fionnuala Ni Aolain, The Fortification of an Emergency Regime, 59 ALB. L. REV. 1353,
1357 (1996).
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Kingdom.91 Yet, despite the significant transformation of the British legal




Courts are seen as the bulwarks that safeguard rights and freedoms
against encroachment by the state. As exigencies tend to test the protection
of such rights and freedoms, courts are expected to be evermore vigilant in
a time of emergency. Notwithstanding statements about the courts' role in
safeguarding human rights and civil liberties precisely when those rights
and liberties are most at risk,93 when faced with national crises, the
judiciary tends to "go[] to war."94 Judges, like the general public and its
political leaders, "like[] to win wars, 95 and are sensitive to the criticism that
they impede the war effort. Thus, in states of emergency, national courts
assume a highly deferential attitude when called upon to review
governmental actions and decisions.96 Both domestic 97 and international98
judicial bodies share this systemic failure.
91. JOHN E. FINN, CONSTITUTIONS IN CRISIS: POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND THE RULE OF LAW
118 (1991); WALKER, supra note 7, at 31-33; Oren Gross & Fionnuala Ni Aolain, To Know
Where We Are Going, We Need To Know Where We Are: Revisiting States of Emergency, in
HUMAN RIGHTS: AN AGENDA FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 79, 97 (Angela Hegarty & Siobhan
Leonard eds., 1999).
92. The Act of 1974 passed through the House of Commons in less than twenty-four hours.
See PADDY HILLYARD, SUSPECT COMMUNITY 1 (1993). Similarly, in 1914, at the outbreak of
World War I, Parliament passed the most important and far-reaching emergency legislation in
British history without any meaningful debate. See JOHN EAVES, JR., EMERGENCY POWERS AND
THE PARLIAMENTARY WATCHDOG: PARLIAMENT AND THE EXECUTIVE IN GREAT BRITAIN 1939-
1951, at 8-9 (1957).
93. See, e.g., United States v. United States Dist, Court, 444 F.2d 651, 664 (6th Cir. 1971)
("It is the historic role of the Judiciary to see that in periods of crisis, when the challenge to
constitutional freedoms is the greatest, the Constitution of the United States remains the supreme
law of our land.").
94. Michal R. Belknap, The Supreme Court Goes to War: The Meaning and Implications of
the Nazi Saboteur Case, 89 MIL. L. REV. 59, 59 (1980).
95. CLINTON ROSSITER & RICHARD P. LONGAKER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
COMMANDER IN CHIEF 91 (expanded ed. 1976) (referring to the U.S. Supreme Court).
96. See, e.g., THOMAS M. FRANCK, POLITICAL QUESTIONS/JUDICIAL ANSWERS: DOES THE
RULE OF LAW APPLY TO FOREIGN AFFAIRS? 124 (1992) (supporting the German courts' rejection
of the political question doctrine, but recognizing that "[m]easured by outcomes, the German
judiciary, taking jurisdiction in virtually every instance, has upheld the contested foreign-policy
and security initiatives of the political branches in roughly the same proportion ... as the U.S.
federal courts have by practicing abdication"); KOH, supra note 62, at 134; CHRISTOPHER N.
MAY, IN THE NAME OF WAR: JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE WAR POWERS SINCF 1918, at 261-64
(1989) (speaking of "[r]itualistic [aipproval" by courts of governmental emergency measures);
REHNQUIST, supra note 34, at 221-22; Michal R. Belknap, The Warren Court and the Vietnam
War: The Limits of Legal Liberalism, 33 GA. L. REV. 65, 66-67 (1998); Anne-Marie Slaughter
Burley, Are Foreign Affairs Different?, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1980, 1991-95 (1993) (book review).
Some courts invoke judicial mechanisms, such as the political question doctrine, and
proclaim issues pertaining to emergency powers to be nonjusticiable. See, e.g., FRANCK, supra, at
10; KOH, supra note 62, at 146-48.
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C. Public Support, Temporal Duration, and "Otherness"
Few situations can solidify broad national consensus behind the
government. Times of crisis and emergency can and do.99 Moved by
In a famous letter to Zechariah Chafee, Judge Learned Hand described his rejection of the
"clear and present danger" test as invoked by Justice Holmes in Abrams v. United States. 250 U.S.
616, 628-30 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Judge Hand criticized the test, stating: "Besides even
their Ineffabilities, the Nine Elder Statesmen, have not shown themselves wholly immune from
the 'herd instinct' and what seems 'immediate and direct' to-day may seem very remote next year
even though the circumstances surrounding the utterance be unchanged." Letter from Learned
Hand to Zechariah Chafee, Jr. (Jan. 2, 1921), quoted in GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE
MAN AND THE JUDGE 169 (1994). In a similar vein, Chafee himself wrote that "[t]he nine Justices
in the Supreme Court can only lock the doors after the Liberty Bell is stolen." ZECHARIAH
CHAFEE JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 80 (1941).
For two post-September l1th examples of such deferential judicial attitudes toward
government, see the decision of the House of Lords in Secretary of State for the Home
Department v. Rehman, 2002 A.C. 6 (H.L. 2001), and the Administrative Court's decision in The
Queen v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, No. 0/2587/2001, 2002 WL 498873 (Q.B.
Apr. 17, 2002).
97. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF
VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH 54-60 (1993); FRANCK, supra note 96, at 10-30; KOH, supra note
62, at 134-49; LAURENCE LUSTGARTEN & [AN LEIGH, IN FROM THE COLD: NATIONAL SECURITY
AND PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY 320-59 (1994); George J. Alexander, The Illusory Protection
of Human Rights by National Courts During Periods of Emergency, 5 HUM. RTS. L.J. 1, 15-27
(1984), see also Brennan, supra note 34, at 20 ("Without prolonged exposure to the claimed
threat, it is all too easy for a nation and judiciary. . . to accept gullibly assertions that, in times of
repose, would be subjected to the critical examination they deserve."). Evaluating the performance
of domestic courts during World War I, George Bernard Shaw was paraphrased as saying,
"During the war the courts in France, bleeding under German guns, were very severe; the courts
in England, hearing but the echoes of those guns, were grossly unjust; but the courts in the United
States, knowing naught save censored news of those guns, were stark, staring, raving mad." Ex
parte Starr, 263 F. 145, 147 (D. Mont. 1920); see also Arnon Gutfeld, "Stark, Staring, Raving
Mad". An Analysis of a World War I Impeaehment Trial, 30 Y.B. GERMAN-AM. STUD. 57, 69
(1995).
98. The argument is often made that international or regional courts, which enjoy detachment
and independence from the immediate effects of national emergencies, are better situated to
monitor and supervise the exercise of emergency powers by national governments. As one
commentator pointed out, "It is entirely possible that superior courts whose relevant executive
authority is not threatened may in fact effectively place limits on subordinate executives."
Alexander, supra note 97, at 3; see also L.C. Green, Derogation of Human Rights in Emergency
Situations, 16 CANADIAN Y.B. INT'L L. 92, 112-13 (1978) (describing international public opinion
as the sole means to promote protection of human rights, and the European Court as the sole
effective judicial mechanism of protection among international and regional human rights
adjudicatory organs).
For the argument that international and regional judicial bodies are not necessarily more
effective in dealing with the concept of "emergency" than are domestic courts, see Fionnuala Ni
Aolain, The Emergence of Diversity: Differences in Human Rights Jurisprudence, 19 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 101 (1995); and Gross, supra note 4, at 490-500.
99. Indeed, that fact was noted by James Madison in The Federalist No. 49, in which he
wrote that constitutions originated in the midst of great danger that led, among other things, to "an
enthusiastic confidence of the people in their patriotic leaders, which stifled the ordinary diversity
of opinions on great national questions." THE FEDERALIST NO. 49, at 315 (James Madison)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961); see also I KARL R. POPPER, THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES
43, 198 (5th ed. 1971); E.L. Quarantelli & Russell R. Dynes, Community Conflict: Its Absence
and Its Presence in Natural Disasters, I MASS EMERGENCIES 139, 140, 145 (1976) (noting that
emergency periods are characterized by an absence of conflict, as conflict is deemed
dysfunctional for the maintenance or survival of the relevant social system); Roots, supra note 81,
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perceptions of substantial physical threat, motivated by growing personal
fear of being the next victim and by hatred toward the terrorists, and
frustrated by the continuance of terrorist activities, the general public may
"rally 'round the flag"' 00 by supporting and calling on the government to
employ more radical measures."' The creation and maintenance of such
consensus depend on a whole slew of factors, but two are of special
importance to our inquiry here: the perception that emergency powers and
measures are temporary, and the perception that they will be directed
against "others," i.e., not against members of the public who, after all, are
the victims of terrorist aggression.
The concept of "emergency" powers invokes images of short-term,
transient measures that are designed to respond to a particular emergency
and then be removed as soon as, or shortly after, that emergency has been
met successfully.0 2 The sense that emergency measures, which may deviate
from what is normally acceptable within the confines of a legal system in
ordinary times, are to be temporary and are not to affect the legal and
political terrain for years to come makes the draconian nature of such
measures easier to accept.
at 266 n.40 ("'[T]here are provisions in the bill [the Emergency Banking bill of 19331 to which in
ordinary times I would not dream of subscribing, but we have a situation that invites the patriotic
cooperation and aid of every man who has any regard for his country."' (quoting Sen. Glass));
Eugene V. Rostow, The Japanese American Cases-a Disaster, 54 YALE L.J. 489, 490-91 (1945);
John Harwood, By Big Margin, Americans Support Bush on Fight Against Terrorism, WALL ST.
J,, Sept. 17, 2001, at A24 (reporting that eighty percent of Americans expressed support for
President Bush's response to the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks); Greg Jaffe, U.S.
Bomber Crashes as Planes Attack Tora Bora, WALL ST. J., Dec. 13, 2001, at A3 (indicating
continued support for the Bush Administration "war effort").
100. BRUCE RUSSETF, CONTROLLING THE SWORD: THE DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE OF
NATIONAL SECURITY 34 (1990) (describing the "rally 'round the flag effect" as the phenomenon
by which "a short, low-cost military measure to repel an attack... is almost invariably popular at
least at its inception. So too are many other kinds of assertive action or speech in foreign
policy."), see also GAD BARZILAI, A DEMOCRACY IN WARTIME: CONFLICT AND CONSENSUS IN
ISRAEL 248-60 (1992).
101. See Purdy, supra note 18 (noting the Bush Administration's claim that its agenda
commands strong public support and suggesting that claim is "bolstered by recent polls"); Tim
Rutten & Lynn Smith, When the Ayes Have It, Is There Room for Naysayers?, L.A. TIMES, Sept.
28, 2001, at E l (quoting political theorist Michael Walzer as saying that "the burden of proof has
shifted in a significant way. Before Sept. 11, a police agency that wanted to expand its powers had
to make its case. After Sept. 11, if a police agency comes forward and says we need these
additional powers to prevent another terrorist attack, the burden of proof is on those who want to
say 'No."'); Robin Toner, Now, Government Is the Solution, Not the Problem, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
30, 2001, at D14; see also Quarantelli & Dynes, supra note 99, at 141 (highlighting external
threats as consolidating communal solidarity).
102. See Quesiaux Report, supra note 44, at 20 ("[A]bove and beyond the rules [that
constitute the general principles of the derogation system]. . one principle, namely, the principle
of provisional status, dominates all the others. The right of derogation can be justified solely by
the concern to return to normalcy."); CHOWDHURY, supra note 44, at 45 (discussing the
temporary nature of emergencies); R. St. J. Macdonald, Derogations Under Article 15 of the
European Convention on Human Rights, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 225, 241 (1997) ("It is
inherent in theory and practice that the declaration of an emergency represents a temporary
measure.").
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Moreover, in times of crisis, when emotions run high, the dialectic of
"us-them" serves several functions. It allows people to vent fear and anger
in the face of (actual or perceived) danger and to direct negative emotional
energies toward groups or individuals clearly identified as different. The
same theme also accounts for the greater willingness to confer emergency
powers on the government when the "other" is well-defined and clearly
separable from the members of the community. 0 3 The clearer the
distinction between "us" and "them" and the greater the threat "they" pose
to "us," the greater in scope become the powers assumed by government
(with the cooperation of the legislature and frequent acquiescence of the
courts) and tolerated by the public.
The fact that the targets of counter-emergency measures are perceived
as outsiders, frequently foreign ones, has important implications when
communities set out to strike a proper balance between liberty and security
in times of crisis. Targeting outsiders means that while the benefits
(perceived or real) of fighting terrorism and violence accrue to all members
of a society, the costs of such actions seem to be borne by a distinct,
smaller, and ostensibly well-defined group of people. Under such
circumstances, the danger is that political leaders will tend to strike a
balance disproportionately in favor of security and impose too much of a
cost on the target group without facing much resistance (and, in fact,
receiving strong support) from the general public.
10 4
103. W.A. ELLIOTT, US AND THEM: A STUDY OF GROUP CONSCIOUSNESS 9 (1986) (arguing
that crises lead to heightened individual and group consciousness such that internal conformities
within the community are exaggerated while divergence from "outsiders" is emphasized); Blasi,
supra note 32, at 457 ("Because the instinct to suppress dissent is basic, primitive, and aggressive,
it tends to have great momentum when it breaks loose from the shackles of social constraint.
Aggression is contagious, and hatred of strangers for what they believe is one of the safest and
most convenient forms of aggression."); David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953, 955
(2002) ("It is often said that civil liberties are the first casualty of war. It would be more accurate
to say that noncitizens' liberties are the first to go."); Oren Gross, On Terrorists and Other
Criminals: States of Emergency and the Criminal Legal System, in DIRECTIONS IN CRIMINAL
LAW: INQUIRIES IN THE THEORY OF CRIMINAL LAW 409 (Eli Lederman ed., 2001) (suggesting
that reference to terrorists as "others" leads to greater acceptance of sweeping governmental
emergency powers); lleana M. Porras, On Terrorism: Reflections on Violence and the Outlaw,
1994 UTAH L. REV. 119 (discussing descriptions of terrorists as "foreign" and "other"); Natsu
Taylor Saito, Crossing the Border: The Interdependence of Foreign Policy and Racial Justice in
the United States, I YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 53, 57-59 (1998) (detailing the "us against
them" mentality in national security policy); Volpp, supra note 22 (discussing the effects of
September 1 th on the redefinition of the protection offered by citizenship as well as the effects
on noncitizens); Note, Blown Away? The Bill of Rights After Oklahoma City, 109 HARV. L. REV.
2074, 2091 (1996) [hereinafter Blown Away?] ("The majority may be willing to accept broad,
vaguely defined law enforcement powers when the minority's constitutional rights are at
stake...."); Huong Vu, Note, Us Against Them: The Path to National Security Is Paved by
Racism, 50 DRAKE L. REv. 661, 663 (2002) (describing how U.S. national security policy singles
out nonwhite citizens and legal residents as possible security risks); Ronald Dworkin, The Threat
to Patriotism, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Feb. 28, 2002, at 44.
104. Blasi, supra note 32, at 457 ("[T]he suppression of dissent ordinarily is undertaken in
the guise of political affirmation, of insisting that everyone stand up and be counted in favor of the
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D. Perceptions and Misperceptions
It is easy to say that in times of crisis, when panic, fear, hatred, and
similar emotions prevail, rational discourse and analysis are pushed aside in
formulating the nation's response. Moreover, when faced with serious
terrorist threats or with extreme emergencies, the general public and its
leaders are unlikely to be able to assess accurately the risks facing the
nation. Any act of balancing-taking into consideration the threats,
dangers, and risks that need to be met, and the costs for society and its
members of meeting those risks in different ways-is going to be heavily
biased, even when applied with the best of intentions.
People operate under a set of cognitive limitations and biases that may
prevent them from capturing the real probabilities of the occurrence of
certain types of risks and uncertainties. Because accurate risk assessment
requires information pertaining to both the magnitude of the risk and the
probability of that risk materializing, such cognitive limits color our risk
assessment in times of crisis and create a strong tilt toward putting undue
emphasis on certain potential risks. While similar observations hold true in
a wide variety of areas,1 °5 the risks involved in acute national crises, in
supposed true values of the political community. As such, this particular type of challenge to
constitutional liberties can take on the character of a mass movement; it can engage the
imagination of the man on the street."); Cole, supra note 103, at 957 (noting the "illegitimate
balance," established by "sacrificing the liberties of a minority group to further the majority's
security interests"); Juan E. Mrndez, Human Rights Policy in the Age of Terrorism, 46 ST. LOUIS
U. L.J. 377, 383 (2002) (comparing the "relatively muted criticism among the public at large" to
the withholding of information about persons arrested after September 1 th, and attributing this to
the fact that all of those arrested were non-Americans); William J. Stuntz, Local Policing After the
Terror, 111 YALE L.J. 2137, 2165 (2002) ("Anytime the government does something that has
concentrated costs but diffused benefits, there is a danger that it will do too much-harming one
voter to please ten is generally thought to be a good deal from the point of view of politically
accountable decisionmakers."); Volpp, supra note 22, at 1576-77 (detailing the public consensus
in favor of racial profiling).
Public choice theory's accepted wisdom that concentrated costs would lead to the emergence
of interest groups that would fight the imposition of such costs does not detract from the validity
of the above statement. DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILLIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE 21-
37 (1991). The "outsiders" in times of crisis are all too often those belonging to some sort of
discrete and insular minority. The creation of such interest groups is less meaningful as far as their
potential political weight. Moreover, inasmuch as violent emergencies may lead to the targeting of
"foreigners," as the post-September 11 th measures have, those targeted may lack the most basic of
requirements for a meaningful political leverage-the right to vote political officials out of
office. Thus, borrowing from William Stuntz, violent emergencies tend to result in situations
where the cost bearers are sufficiently few and powerless, or have certain substantial (perhaps
even insurmountable) barriers to their coalescing to fight the government's actions. See Stuntz,
supra, at 2165 n.87.
105. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge & G. Mitu Gulati, How Do Judges Maximize? (The
Same Way Everybody Else Does-Boundedly): Rules of Thumb in Securities Fraud Opinions, 51
EMORY L.J. 83, 113-18 (2002); Ward Edwards & Detlof von Winterfeldt, Cognitive Illusions and
Their Implications for the Law, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 225 (1986); Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Limits
of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L. REV. 211 (1995); Christine Jolls et al., A
Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998); Thomas S. Ulen,
Cognitive Imperfections and the Economic Analysis of Law, 12 HAML1NE L. REV. 385 (1989).
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general, and in threats of terrorist activity, in particular, have a special
tendency to trigger such cognitive limitations and biases due not only to
their potential magnitude, but mostly due to the manner in which they are
perceived.
The concept of "bounded rationality" relates to our limited knowledge
and computational imperfections and explains our failure to process
information perfectly.'0 6 An important element of information processing
and analysis is the time needed to investigate consequences and
alternatives. Emergencies, characterized by sudden, urgent, and usually
unforeseen events or situations that require immediate action, often without
time for prior reflection and consideration, accentuate the problems related
to our ability to process information and evaluate complex situations.
Hence, such crises tend to lead to an increased reliance on cognitive
heuristics-shortcuts that people use when making decisions-as a means
of countering the lack of sufficient time to properly evaluate the situation.
However, the most common heuristics tend to create patterns of mistaken
assessments. Those patterns are reinforced when such heuristics are applied
in times of crisis.
The availability heuristic means that individuals tend to link the
probability of a particular event taking place with their ability to imagine
similar events taking place.1"7 Past emergencies and terrorist attacks make it
easier for us to imagine such events taking place in the future. Terrorism
and emergency do not remain abstract notions, but rather are transformed
into tangible, real, and probable events.'0 8 The stronger the images of past
terrorist attacks, the more such attacks are going to be perceived as likely to
occur in the future.' 0 9 In the context of September 1 1th, images of the
planes hitting the Twin Towers, the towers crumbling down, firefighters
and police officers battling against time, and people jumping to their death
are extremely powerful. In addition, the obsessive public discussion of
possible future attacks, regardless of the low probability of many of the
specific scenarios ever materializing, coupled with repeated official
106. HERBERT A. SIMON, MODELS OF MAN: SOCIAL AND RATIONAL 198 (1957) ("The
capacity of the human mind for formulating and solving complex problems is very small
compared with the size of the problems whose solution is required for objectively rational
behavior in the real world-or even for a reasonable approximation to such objective rationality."
(emphasis omitted)).
107. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency
and Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207 (1973); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman,
Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY:
HEURISTICS AND BIASES 3, 11 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982) [hereinafler Tversky &
Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty].
108. See Note, Responding to Terrorism: Crime, Punishment, and War, 115 HARV. L. REV.
1217, 1230 (2002).
109. Tversky & Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty, supra note 107, at 11 ("[Tlhe
impact of seeing a house burning on the subjective probability of such accidents is probably
greater than the impact of reading about a fire in the local paper.").
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warnings of pending attacks on bridges,"10 apartment buildings,'' or attacks
carried out on days of particular significance 1 2 further feed the terrorism
frenzy, increasing the imaginability of various potential hazards and hence
their perceived riskiness." 3 It comes as little surprise that many Americans
regard future domestic attacks as virtually inevitable.'
14
Prospect theory suggests that individuals tend to give excessive weight
to low-probability results when the stakes are high enough and the
outcomes are particularly bad.115 Terrorist threats such as those imagined
post-September 1 1th are perceived to raise the stakes to a sufficiently high
level.' 16 Thus, our perception of the risk presented by emergencies and
110. See, e.g., William Booth, Alert Issued on Four Big California Bridges, WASH. POST,
Nov. 2, 2001, at Al (reporting on Governor Gray Davis's warning that four suspension bridges
were potential targets of a terrorist attack in November 2001).
111. See, e.g., Philip Shenon & James Risen, Terrorist Yields Clues to Plots, Officials Assert,
N.Y. TIMEs, June 12, 2002, at Al (noting the possibility of attacks on banks, shopping malls,
apartment buildings, and landmarks in New York City); Marjorie Valbrun, INS Handling of Visas
Criticized, WALL ST. J., May 21, 2002, at A8 (reporting that a national apartment trade group
notified its members of an FBI warning that al Qaeda networks had discussed the possibility of
renting apartments with the intention of blowing them up).
112. See, e.g., Don Van Natta, Jr. & David Johnston, New F.B.I. Alert Warns of Threat Tied
to July 4th, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2002, at 1; see also E.S. Browning, A 2% Fall Puts Index on
Verge of Bear Level,- Dow Falls 102 Points, WALL ST. J., July 3, 2002, at Cl (describing the
effect that warnings about possible terrorist attacks on July 4th had on Standard & Poor's stock
index).
113. See Patricia Leigh Brown, Preparing for a Potential Emergency, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4,
2001, at F12 (discussing steps individuals were taking to prepare for future terrorist attacks, such
as taking classes in disaster-preparedness techniques and buying gas masks); Lauren Lipton,
Preparing for the Worst..., WALL ST. J., Oct. 5, 2001, at W14 (listing prices and suppliers of
"emergency gear" such as gas masks, antibiotics, hazmat suits, and radiation detectors); see also
Paul Slovic et al., Facts Versus Fears: Understanding Perceived Risk, in JUDGMENT UNDER
UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra note 107, at 463, 465 (discussing how a low-
probability hazard may increase in memorability and imaginability and hence in perceived
riskiness, regardless of what the evidence indicates); Thomas L. Friedman, Editorial, Cool It!,
N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2002, at A27 (criticizing the Bush Administration for "terrorizing" the
country by "predicting every possible nightmare scenario, but no specific ones, post 9/11").
114. E.g., Joe Battenfeld, A Nation Rebuilds, BOSTON HERALD, Sept. 3, 2002, at Al
(reporting that in a nationwide poll 30% of people considered another terrorist attack a certainty
and 59% thought it to be a probability); Adam Nagourney & Marjorie Connelly, Poll Finds New
York Fearful, but Upbeat over Future, Too, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2002, at Al (reporting that 70%
of New Yorkers thought an attack was inevitable, but that the heightened sense of insecurity
might have been exacerbated by recent alerts by Washington of potential future attacks); see also
Josh Meyer, FBI Expects Suicide Bomb Attack in U.S., L.A. TIMES, May 21, 2002, at Al (noting
that FBI Director Robert Mueller told a group of prosecutors it was "inevitable" that an Islamic
terrorist organization would attempt a suicide bombing attack).
115. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under
Risk, in CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES 17 (2001).
116. See David S. Cloud et al., Cold War Echo: Soviet Germ Program Is a Worry Once
Again amid Anthrax Scare, WALL ST. J., Oct. 15, 2001, at At (describing how the appearance of
anthrax in three states increased the public and Administration's focus on possibilities of nuclear,
chemical, and biological terrorism); James Dao, Defense Secretary Warns of Unconventional
Attacks, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2001, at B5 (reporting on remarks by Administration officials about
the possibility of nuclear, biological, or chemical attacks); Jim Rutenberg, Talk of Chemical War
Grows Louder on TV, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2001, at C6 (discussing the media focus on biological
and chemical terrorism).
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terrorism may be skewed. Cass Sunstein has recently suggested that the
predictions of prospect theory are especially valid where the bad outcome is
"affect rich," namely when it involves not merely a serious loss, but one
that produces particularly strong emotions. 1 17 Sunstein focuses on what he
calls "probability neglect," i.e., situations where individuals do not assess at
all the probability that a certain scenario will materialize, but instead focus
exclusively on the worst possible outcome, which, in turn, invokes strong,
if not extreme, emotions (such as fear).
1 18
Finally, it has been noted that people entertain myopic perspectives
about the future in that they tend to undervalue future benefits and costs
when comparing them with present benefits and costs.1 19 While a strong
governmental response against terrorism is perceived by the public as
socially beneficial, the longer-term costs for the rule of law and to
individual rights and liberties tend to be overly discounted. 120 The fact that
such future costs seem mostly intangible and abstract, especially in
comparison with the very tangible sense of fear for one's person and loved
ones, coupled with a feeling of increased security as a result of
governmental action, only exacerbates this defect in our risk assessment.121
All of the above suggests why, under extreme circumstances,
governments may opt for draconian, authoritarian measures and why
overreaction against the terrorist threat is a likely outcome. This
overreaction may be the result of the breaking down of traditional checks
and balances in times of emergency, as well as of bona fide (but potentially
cognitively biased) assessments of the risks facing the nation.' How then
should the legal system attempt to immunize itself against the dangers of
overreaction, while still allowing the authorities to respond effectively to a
given crisis? And how should the legal system account, if at all, for the fact
that when faced with an acute emergency, governments tend to, in the
words of Attorney General Francis Biddle, "get on with the war" while not
117. Cass R. Sunstein, Probability Neglect: Emotions, Worst Cases, and Law, 112 YALE L.J.
61, 66 (2002) [hereinafter Sunstein, Probability Neglect]; Cass R. Sunstein, The Laws of Fear,
115 HARV. L. REV. 1119, 1137-44 (2002) (book review) (discussing the "affect heuristic").
118. Sunstein, Probability Neglect, supra note 117, at 69 ("When a bad outcome is highly
salient and triggers strong emotions, government will be asked to do something about it, even if
the probability that the bad outcome will occur is low.").
119. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 105, at 222; see also Quarantelli & Dynes, supra note
99, at 142 (discussing how disasters lead to focusing on the present).
120. This is exacerbated further due to the ability of the government to manipulate
information and to publicize both the potential risks and the costs and benefits of pursuing
different measures in response to such risks.
121. See, e.g., Cole, supra note 103, at 956; cf Quarantelli & Dynes, supra note 99, at 142
(describing how disasters result in placing a priority on activities that benefit the "'total'
community").
122. Of course, there is also the very strong possibility of intentional manipulation. See, e.g.,
Slovic et al., supra note 113, at 483 ("That subtle differences in how risks are presented can have
marked effects on how they are perceived suggests that those responsible for information
programs have considerable ability to manipulate perceptions.").
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bothering too much with the Constitution? 123 The next Part introduces the
models that have been pursued in search of an answer.
III. KEEPING THE LAW ON OUR SIDE:
CONSTITUTIONAL MODELS OF EMERGENCY POWERS
Two extreme responses to the conundrum suggested in Part II are
possible. One radical solution may be the domestic equivalent of the realist
school of international relations. 2 4 An extreme version would read as
follows: There is no room for any kind of "legalistic-moralistic" approach
in dealing with emergencies. 125 Legal rules and norms are too inflexible and
rigid to accommodate the security needs of states. Governments should
have full and unfettered discretion to determine what course of action ought
to be taken to fight any given crisis in the most efficient way. Maxims such
as "necessity knows no law," "salus populi suprema lex est,'" "inter anna
silent leges," and "raison d'6tat" reflect this approach. Where the survival
(or fundamental interest of the state) is concerned, there ought to be no
holding back on governmental action to save the nation. One also
frequently encounters the argument that since terrorists do not obey any
legal principles, the victim state need not put on self-imposed legal shackles
in its fight against them. Law is, to a large extent, irrelevant when dealing
with violent crises. 1
26
Under this brand of political realism, democracies face no real
conundrum in dealing with emergencies. The only constraints within which
government functions are those emanating from efficiency and limited
resources. This cannot be acceptable to those who believe that law matters
123. BIDDLE, supra note 40, at 219; cf Frederick Schauer, May Officials Think Religiously?,
27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1075, 1083-84 (1986). Schauer argues:
We must deal with the fact that, regardless of what the norm of official behavior is,
public officials will take their own religious convictions into account in performing
their official duties. They may not always do so, but it is absurd to suppose that they
have never done so with some frequency, that they do not now do so with some
frequency, and that they will not always do so with some frequency.
The question is thus one of determining how to confront the inevitable ....
Id.; see also Stuntz, supra note 104, at 2190 ("[W]hatever the law says, there are some things the
police are bound to do. Better to get the relevant police behavior out in the open than to maintain
nominally strict rules that are ignored in practice.").
124. See generally HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS 4-15 (5th ed. 1973)
(outlining six principles of political realism as applied to international politics).
125. GEORGE F. KENNAN, AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, 1900-1950, at 95 (1951). For a recent
exposition of similar views, see Robert Kagan, Power and Weakness, POL'Y REV., June-July
2002, at 3.
126. See FRIEDRICH, supra note 68, at 14 (noting that Hobbes recognized the state as a
supreme value, and, therefore, its preservation and the maintenance of its internal order justified
all means necessary, regardless of the inherent justice of that order); see also GREGORY S.
KAVKA, HOBBESIAN MORAL AND POLITICAL THEORY (1986).
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and that it matters greatly, and perhaps especially, in times of crisis as a
check against arbitrary actions and unlimited discretion.
A diametrically opposed position to that of political realism is the claim
that legal systems must not, under any condition and regardless of
circumstances, recognize emergencies as deserving of special treatment and
accommodation. Whereas political realism abandons legal norms, this
approach eschews flexibility.
In the spectrum of possibilities that stretches between these two
opposing poles, we can identify several models that have been applied in
practice. The remainder of this Part introduces models of emergency
powers that seek to "keep the law on our side,"' 127 as we respond to violent
emergencies. The models presented below are "constitutional" in the sense
that they are based on the premise that legal rules control the government's
response to emergencies and terrorist threats. The fundamental assumption
that underlies these models is the assumption of constitutionality, which
dictates that whatever responses are made to the challenges of a particular
exigency, such responses are to be found and limited within the confines of
the constitution. While terrorists are lawless and operate outside the sphere
of legal principles, democratic governments must be careful not to fight
terrorism with lawless means. Otherwise, these governments may succeed
in defeating terrorism at the expense of losing the democratic nature of the
society they are defending. The assumption is, therefore, that the exception
is governed and controlled by legal norms.
A. The Business as Usual Model
1. "It is imperative that the trains run on schedule. ,,128
Under the Business as Usual model of emergency powers, a state of
emergency does not justify a deviation from the "normal" legal system. No
special "emergency" powers are introduced either on an ad hoc or a
permanent basis. The ordinary legal system already provides the necessary
answers to any crisis without the legislative or executive assertion of new or
additional governmental powers. The occurrence of any particular
127. Harold Hongju Koh, The Spirit of the Laws, 43 HARV. INT'L L.J. 23, 23 (2002). Koh
explicates this point as follows:
In thinking about our response [to the attacks of September 11 th], we need to ask
not just what the letter of the law permits and forbids, but which course of action most
closely comports with the spirit of the laws.... [D]oing so will keep the law on our
side, will keep us on the moral high ground, and will preserve the vital support of our
allies, international institutions, and the watching public as the crisis proceeds.
Id.
128. FRIEDRICH DORRENMATT, DER BESUCH DER ALTEN DAME [THE VISIT] 22 (1980) ("In
this country [Switzerland], you never pull the emergency brake, even when there is an emergency.
It is imperative that the trains run on schedule.").
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emergency cannot excuse or justify a suspension, in whole or in part, of any
existing piece of the ordinary legal system. Thus, Justice Davis could state
in Ex parte Milligan129 that the Constitution applied equally in times of war
as well as in times of peace.
1 30
The Business as Usual model rejects the possibility that a tension exists
between protecting the security of the nation and maintaining its basic
democratic values, including the rule of law.13 1 In times of danger and peril,
as in normal times of quiet and calm, the laws (and the powers vested in the
government) remain the same. Ordinary legal rules and norms continue to
be followed strictly and adhered to with no substantive change or
modification. This approach offers a unitary vision of the constitutional
order. While the occurrence of emergencies and acute crises is
acknowledged, such events are of no constitutional significance because no
distinct legal emergency regime is recognized under the constitution.1
32
Hence, we may think of this model as "Ordinary/Ordinary": Ordinary rules
apply not only in times of peace but also in times of war.
2. Challenges and Justifications
a. The Charge of Hypocrisy
Proponents of the Business as Usual model must respond to several
challenges to their approach. One argument is that the model can only be
supported by those who are naive or hypocritical. When faced with serious
threats to the life of the nation, government will take whatever measures it
deems necessary to abate the crisis. Regardless of whether government
ought to do so, history demonstrates that it does. 133 As Justice Ben-Porat of
the Israeli Supreme Court wrote in her opinion in Barzilai v. Government of
Israel:
134
129. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
130. Id. at 120-21.
131. See, e.g., Lobel, supra note 61, at 1387.
132. For the idea of nonderogable rights, see American Convention on Human Rights,
opened for signature Nov. 22, 1969, art. 27(2), 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, 152 (entered into force July
18, 1978); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 19, 1966, art. 4, S.
ExEc. DOc. E, 95-2, at 23, 24 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 174 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976);
and European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov.
4, 1950, art. 15(2), 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 232.
133. Joan F. Hartnan, Derogation from Human Rights Treaties in Public Emergencies, 22
HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 11 (1981) (noting that suspension of human rights treaties is practically
inevitable during periods of acute crisis).
134. H.C. 428/86, Barzilai v. Gov't of Israel, 40(3) P.D. 505, reprinted in 6 SELECTED
JUDGMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF ISRAEL 1 (1988) [hereinafter SELECTED JUDGMENTS]; see
also Mordechai Kremnitzer, The Case of the Security Services Pardon, 12 IYUNEI MISHPAT 595
(1987); Lahav, supra note 58, at 547-56.
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[T]he smaller the deviation from the legal norm, the easier it would
be to reach the optimal degree of harmony between the law and the
protection of the State's security. But we, as judges who "dwell
among our people," should not harbor any illusions .... There
simply are cases in which those who are at the helm of the State,
and bear responsibility for its survival and security, regard certain
deviations from the law for the sake of protecting the security of the
State, as an unavoidable necessity.1
35
Adopting the Business as Usual model means either being unaware of
the reality of emergency management, or ignoring it and knowingly
maintaining an illusory facade of normalcy. That indeed happened in Israel
with respect to the use of illegal interrogation techniques by the General
Security Service (GSS), which led in 1987 to the establishment of the
Landau Commission of Inquiry. 136 When GSS interrogators were faced
with an acute need to respond effectively to Palestinian terrorism, legal
restrictions limited their ability to conduct the interrogations of terrorist
suspects in ways the GSS deemed necessary. The officers opted to use force
in interrogations. In its report, the Landau Commission declared that a legal
system that is aware of such a pattern of conduct, but is unwilling to
acknowledge it normatively, can be charged with hypocrisy in that it
"declares that [it] abide[s] by the rule of law, but tum[s] a blind eye to what
goes on beneath the surface.,
13 7
Linked to that charge of hypocrisy is the related argument that
application of the Business as Usual model may result in public realization
that law and actual governmental practice diverge systematically when
emergencies arise. That may lead, in turn, to portrayal of the legal system as
unrealistic because it fails to adjust to the needs of fighting national crises.
As a result, particular norms, and perhaps the legal system in general, may
break down, as the ethos of obedience to law is seriously shaken and
challenges emerge with respect to the reasonableness of following these
norms. 138 Thus, legal rigidity in the face of severe crises is not merely
135. See Barzilai, 40(3) P.D. 505, reprinted in 6 SELECTED JUDGMENTS, supra note 134, at 63.
Alan Dershowitz has also noted:
We know, of course, what all governments would actually do under these
conditions of tragic choice: they (or more precisely, some flack-catching underling)
would torture (with the implicit approval of the powers-that-be). But could the
government justify it? Would they write a law expressly authorizing such means? Or
would they choose the "way... of the hypocrites ...."
Alan M. Dershowitz, Is It Necessary To Apply "Physical Pressure" to Terrorists-and To Lie
About It?, 23 [SR. L. REV. 192, 192 (1989) (quoting ISRAELI GOV'T PRESS OFFICE, COMMISSION
OF INQUIRY INTO THE METHODS OF INVESTIGATION OF THE GENERAL SECURITY SERVICE
REGARDING HOSTILE TERRORIST ACTIVITY (1987). reprinted in 23 ISR. L. REV. 146, 183 (1989)
[hereinafter LANDAU REPORT]).
136. LANDAU REPORT, supra note 135.
137. Id. at 183.
138. Schauer, supra note 123, at 1084.
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hypocritical, but is, in fact, detrimental to long-term notions of the rule of
law. Moreover, it may lead to more, rather than less, radical interference
with individual rights and liberties. 1
39
Finally, Justice Davis's statement that the Constitution is the same in
times of war as in times of peace is in danger of being reversed, so that the
Constitution will be the same in times of peace as in times of war. In other
words, government may be tempted to retain its expansive emergency
powers in order to have them available even when the emergency has
passed and normalcy has been restored. Emergency norms, measures, and
institutions are thus likely to find their way into the ordinary legal
system. 140
b. Absolutism and Resistance
Several different routes may be pursued in attempting to respond to the
challenges noted above.
i. Constitutional Absolutism and Perfection
Under the theory of constitutional absolutism supported by Justice
Davis in his extensive obiter dictum in Ex parte Milligan,141 the
constitutional limitations on power and the protections accorded to
individual rights are fully applicable in both times of peace and times of
war. 14 2 "Absolutism" in this context stands for two propositions. First,
whatever powers the government may lawfully wield under the constitution
to meet an emergency, such powers cannot diminish the scope of, let alone
suspend, constitutional guarantees. 143  The second proposition is that
139. See, e.g., Ackerman, supra note 2, at 15 ("If pedantic respect for civil liberties requires
government paralysis, no serious politician will hesitate before sacrificing rights to the war against
terrorism. He will only gain popular applause by brushing civil libertarian objections aside as
quixotic.").
140. See A. Kenncth Pye & Cym H. Lowell, The Criminal Process During Civil Disorders,
1975 DuKE L.J. 581, 600-01.
141. Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
142. CORWIN, supra note 63, at 79-80; see also Lobel, supra note 61, at 1386-87. Molly Ivins
also noted:
The U.S. Constitution was written by men who had just been through a long, incredibly
nasty war. They did not consider the Bill of Rights a frivolous luxury, to be in force
only in times of peace and prosperity, put aside when the going gets tough- The
Founders knew from tough going. They weren't airy-fairy guys.
Molly Ivins, Editorial, Trampling All over the Constitution, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 22, 2001, at N 19.
143. Thus, for example, almost all the major international human rights conventions
recognize the possibility of derogating from otherwise protected rights in times of public
emergency that threaten the life of the nation. See sources cited supra note 132. Constitutional
absolutism in this sense is anchored in a position that denies any room for a judicial balancing of
competing interests and values. See, e.g., Charles A. Reich, Mr. Justice Black and the Living
Constitution, 76 HARV. L. REv. 673, 737 (1963).
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government may not lawfully wield any special powers to deal with
emergencies unless such powers are explicitly provided for by the
constitution.14 4 Taken together, these propositions focus on the constitution
as a constitution of rights. 145 As Justice Davis reasoned:
It is insisted that the safety of the country in time of war demands
that this broad claim for martial law shall be sustained. If this were
true, it could be well said that a country, preserved at the sacrifice
of all the cardinal principles of liberty, is not worth the cost of
preservation. Happily, it is not so.'
46
The constitutional absolutism argument is joined by an argument about
constitutional perfection.1 47 Statements claiming that the constitutional
framework should be the same in times of war as in times of peace project a
belief in the fortitude, completeness, and perfection of the existing legal
system, and in the government's ability to fend off any crisis without
deviating from ordinary norms. According to this view, the constitution
144. Lobel, supra note 61, at 1386-87.
145. But see CORWIN, supra note 63, at 168-80 (noting the transformation of the
"Constitution of Rights" into the "Constitution of Powers"); ARTHUR SELWYN MILLER,
DEMOCRATIC DICTATORSHIP: THE EMERGENT CONSTITUTION OF CONTROL (1981). See
generally Louis Henkin, Constitutionalism and Human Rights, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
RIGHTS: THE INFLUENCE OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION ABROAD 383 (Louis Henkin &
Albert J. Rosenthal eds., 1990).
146. Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 126. Benjamin Constant shared similar sentiments when
speaking of the experience following the French Revolution:
All the mediocre minds, ephemeral conquerors of a fragment of authority, were full of
all these maxims [such as public safety and supreme law], the more agreeable to
stupidity in that they enable it to cut those knots it cannot untie. They dreamt of nothing
else but measures of public safety, great measures, masterstrokes of state; they thought
themselves extraordinary geniuses because at every step they departed from ordinary
means. They proclaimed themselves great minds because justice seemed to them a
narrow preoccupation. With each political crime which they committed, you could hear
them proclaiming: "Once again we have saved the country!" Certainly, we should have
been adequately convinced by this, that a country saved every day in this manner must
be a country that will soon be ruined.
CONSTANT, supra note 74, at 138.
147. 1 use the term "constitutional perfection" in this context to refer to the notion that the
Constitution anticipates any future emergency and incorporates, within its framework, all the
powers that may be necessary to respond to such a crisis, whatever its nature. See, e.g., ROSSITER,
supra note 5, at 212-15. Thus, constitutional perfection means that there is no need for
government to go outside the Constitution in order to meet emergencies. For a flip-side aspect of
constitutional perfection, see, for example, Nicholas N. Kittrie, Patriots and Terrorists:
Reconciling Human Rights with World Order, 13 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 291, 295 (1981). The
idea of constitutional perfection has also been extensively discussed in the context of
constitutional amending clauses. See, e.g., RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND
PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995) (providing a
collection of essays focusing on various issues concerning constitutional amendments); Sanford
Levinson, "Veneration" and Constitutional Change: James Madison Confronts the Possibility of
Constitutional Amendment, 21 TEX. TECH L. REv. 2443, 2451-52 (1990) (noting Madison's
argument that the very recognition of possible constitutional imperfection is dangerous to the
constitutional order, which depends on a mood of "veneration" toward the Constitution).
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includes within its purview all the powers that government might need to
exercise in order to carry out its functions and duties. The powers given to
government under the constitution encompass not only powers that are
required in order to deal with the normal functions of government in times
of peace, but also those powers that might be necessary in times of war.
There is no situation that is not covered by constitutional arrangement or
that might necessitate looking outside the basic law of the land for
additional powers and authority. 148 Since the American constitutional text
does not provide for special emergency powers to be vested in government
when faced with an emergency, 49 we must conclude that there is no place
under the Constitution for such exceptional governmental powers. 1
50
ii. A Strategy of Resistance
A different source of support for the Business as Usual model adopts a
"strategy of resistance."' 15 1 According to this strategy, "one says 'no' even
to the inevitable." 152 The argument from the strategy of resistance is that
maintaining the ordinary system of laws unchanged, and not succumbing to
pressure to stretch, bend, modify, or replace it, has a significant value in
and of itself. 53 Such a strategy does not purport to bar governments from
resorting to exceptional measures. "Resisting the inevitable is not to be
desired because it will prevent the inevitable, but because it may be the best
strategy for preventing what is less inevitable but more dangerous."' 15 4 The
strategy of resistance may not be able to stop the inevitable-the use of
extraordinary powers by government in times of crisis. Rather, it is
designed to minimize the likelihood of the use by government of
emergency powers in nonemergency situations or of the government's use
148. RoSSITER, supra note 5, at 212 ("It is constitutional dogma that his document foresees
any and every emergency, and that no departure from its solemn injunctions could possibly be
necessary.").
149. When the Framers considered such powers to be necessary, they made explicit and
specific allowance for such powers within the constitutional framework. See U.S. CONST. art. 1,
§ 8, cl. 15 (granting the power to call out the militia to execute the laws, suppress insurrections,
and repel invasions); id. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (granting the power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus).
150. Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 126 ("[The Framers] limited the suspension to one great
right [the writ of habeas corpus], and left the rest to remain forever inviolable.").
151. See Schauer, supra note 123, at 1084.
152. Id
153. Thus, for example, Schauer writes:
Although disturbing, perhaps reactions similar to those that prompted the internment of
the Japanese-Americans never can be expected to disappear, and during time of war or
national hysteria the courts will behave the way they did in Korematsu. The mere fact
that courts will fold under pressure, however, does not dictate that they should be told
that they may fold under pressure, because the effect of the message may be to increase
the likelihood of folding even when the pressure is less.
Id. at 1084-85 n.11.
154. Id. at 1085.
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of excessive powers. Thus, for example, the use of categorical prohibitions
on certain governmental actions, or of categorical rights, may make it
harder for governmental actors to exercise extraordinary powers in
deviation and violation of such absolutes. Similarly, the insistence that
times of crisis do not give rise to new powers may slow down the rush to
use such powers.' 55 A firm insistence on the applicability of ordinary legal
norms in times of emergency, and on governmental operation only within
the limits of the law, may lead government officials to be more circumspect
before breaking the law. Such a principled position not only imposes moral
inhibitions on government officials, but also raises the specter of public
exposure if a measure is later considered to have been unnecessary, and the
(albeit remote) possibility of criminal proceedings and civil suits brought
against the perpetrators.
Vincent Blasi put forward a similar argument for adopting a
"pathological perspective"-the equivalent of the Business as Usual
model-in adjudicating First Amendment disputes and fashioning First
Amendment doctrines. He argues that such an approach is necessary in light
of governmental proclivity to violate those rights protected by the First
Amendment in times of crisis. 156 Courts are called upon to make "a
conscious effort... to strengthen the central norms of the first amendment
against the advent of pathology."'5 7 Emphasis ought to be put "in
adjudication during normal times on the development of procedures and
institutional structures that are relatively immune from the pressure of
urgency by virtue of their formality, rigidity, built:in delays, or strong
internal dynamics." 158 Even if one thinks times of crisis justify redefining
the scope of protection of the First Amendment and lowering the walls of
protection surrounding the expression that falls within its ambit, Blasi
points out the danger that the rush to dilute First Amendment protections in
times of great peril will not merely end there, but rather will spill over to
"normal" First Amendment jurisprudence and doctrine.5 9 Thus, the long-
155. See GUIDO CALABRES[, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 178-79 (1982).
Calabresi acknowledges the desire "in situations of uncertainty to slow down change until we are
sure we want it." Id. Additionally, he suggests that "[t]he use of absolute or categorical language,
even when it is inaccurate and leads to inaccurate results, may have substantial merit for
this... reason." Id.
156. Blasi, supra note 32, at 450 ("'Pathology'... is a social phenomenon, characterized by
a notable shift in attitudes regarding the tolerance of unorthodox ideas. What makes a period
pathological is the existence of certain dynamics that radically increase the likelihood that people
who hold unorthodox views will be punished for what they say or believe.").
157. Id. at 459.
158. Id. at 468. Blasi advocates a "keep it simple" guideline, i.e., judges should use simple
First Amendment principles in order to strengthen the restraining power of the First Amendment
in times of crisis. Id. at 466-76. Blasi suggests viewing the First Amendment as concentrating on
core values that are more easily defensible in repressive times. Id. at 476-80.
159. Id. at 456-58; see also FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL
ENQUIRY (1982) (discussing the spillover of doctrines from economic-related speech to political
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term dangers of such an act of convenience outweigh the benefits of short-
term dilution in order to respond to a given emergency.
Finally, the strategy of resistance calls for a rules-based approach.
Clear, bright-line rules may make it more likely that decisionmakers
(including judges) will make unpopular decisions in times of stress
(namely, decisions that are more favorable to individual rights and liberties
than those deemed desirable by the general public and its political
leaders). 160
iii. Myths, Symbolism, and Ideals
An argument related to that made from the strategy of resistance
invokes the symbolic value of attachment to a Business as Usual attitude.'
61
One may acknowledge the unrealistic attributes of the model and still
contend that upholding the myth of regularity and control by normal
constitutional principles even under circumstances of emergency is socially
beneficial. 62  As Laurence Tribe has suggested, establishing and
maintaining "popular and institutional respect for constitutional structures
and liberties," as well as for the constitutional document itself, "may be an
even greater bulwark against tyranny than the textual provisions
speech); Lillian R. BeVier, The First Amendment and Political Speech: An Inquiry into the
Substance andLimits of Principle, 30 STAN. L. REV. 299 (1978); Frederick Schauer, Commercial
Speech and the Architecture of the First Amendment, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1181 (1988).
160. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 794 (2d ed. 1988)
("Categorical rules ... tend to protect the system of free expression better because they are more
likely to work in spite of the defects in the human machinery on which we must rely to preserve
fundamental liberties."); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV.
1175, 1180 (1989). Blasi does not completely disregard doctrinal standards. Rather, he professes
his preference for "mechanistic measures" that confine the range of discretion that is left to future
decisionmakers over standards (such as the "clear and present danger" test) that require in their
application an assessment of social conditions and that are more likely to bend and be distorted in
a way that is less protective of expression under intense pressure. Blasi, supra note 32, at 474-80;
see also ELY, supra note 32, at 109-16.
161. See, e.g., SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 11 (1988) (noting that
Madison's vision of veneration of the Constitution "has become a central, even if sometimes
challenged, aspect of the American political tradition"); Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer,
On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1375 (1997) ("[Tlhere
are good arguments for requiring people, and particularly legal officials, on pain of penalty, to
follow the law even when they believe they have good reason to disobey and even if they in fact
do have good reason to disobey."); Levinson, supra note 147, at 2452-55; Bruce G. Peabody,
Nonjudicial Constitutional Interpretation, Authoritative Settlement, and a New Agenda for
Research, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 63, 67 (1999) (noting that law's stability promotes a sense of
"law abidingness").
162. Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 399, 439 (1985) ("Myths serve
important functions. They provide goals and ideals, and as such they channel our thinking."); see
also Judith Olans Brown et al., The Mythogenesis of Gender: Judicial Images of Women in Paid
and Unpaid Labor, 6 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 457, 457-58 (1996) ("Myths can create reality and
increase meaning, operating not as reflection but inspiration.").
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themselves."'' 63  The model may serve as a constant reminder that
emergency neither justifies nor excuses forsaking fundamental
constitutional values and doctrines. 164
Thus, the Business as Usual model assumes important symbolic and
educational functions. Maintaining an unbending commitment to existing
legal norms, the constitution, and the ideal of the rule of law-maintaining
a "mood of veneration"' 165 toward them-helps us answer the question of
what are and what are not "necessary" measures in a particular state of
emergency. The more entrenched a legal norm is, the harder it is for the
government to convince the public that violating that norm is absolutely
necessary.
And what if the Business as Usual model is an aspiration, an ideal for
which to strive, rather than an accurate description of reality? Should we
discard that ideal just because it may not always be useful in practice? In a
sense it may be argued that the Business as Usual model does not purport to
be an accurate depiction of reality, but rather is a Weberian "ideal type."
'1 66
As an ideal type, the model may be regarded as a "theoretical construct[]
that model[s] certain aspects of social reality and help[s] us to explain
particular historical conditions... under explicit assumptions that actually
hold true in no historical society."'
167
163. Memorandum from Laurence H. Tribe to the Authors of the Constitution for the Czech
and Slovak Federated Republic (Jan. 8, 1991) [hereinafter Memorandum from Tribe] (on file with
author).
164. See CALABRESI, supra note 155, at 172-73; Schauer, supra note 162, at 439 ("The myth
of literalism... remains the conscience on the judicial shoulder, constantly reminding
judges ... that they are expounding a written Constitution, and that interpretations inconsistent
with the written text require an enormous amount of explanation and justification, if indeed they
are even legitimate.").
165. Levinson, supra note 147, at 2451-52. On the role of the Constitution in American civil
religion, see, for example, Max Lerner, Constitution and Court as Symbols, 46 YALE L.J. 1290,
1294-95 (1937); and Sanford Levinson, "The Constitution" in American Civil Religion, 1979
SUP. CT. REV. 123. See also DANIEL A. FARBER, LINCOLN'S CONSTITUTION: THE NATION, THE
PRESIDENT, AND THE COURTS IN A TIME OF CRISIS 199-200 (forthcoming 2003) (noting that
Lincoln's prewar position was that 'reverence for the constitution and laws' was key for '"our
future support and defense' (quoting President Lincoln)).
166. SUSAN J. HEKMAN, WEBER, THE IDEAL TYPE, AND CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL THEORY
18-60 (1983); MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds. &
Ephraim Fischoff et al. trans., Bedminster Press 1968) (1922); MAX WEBER, "Objectivity" in
Social Science and Social Policy, in MAX WEBER ON THE METHODOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES 49, 89-104 (Edward A. Shils & Henry A. Finch eds. & trans., 1949) [hereinafter
WEBER, Objectivity].
167. Dhananjai Shivakumar, The Pure Theory as Ideal Type: Defending Kelsen on the Basis
of Weberian Methodology, 105 YALE L.J. 1383, 1399 (1996); see also WEBER, Objectivity, supra
note 166, at 90 (offering his definition of the "ideal type"); Immanuel Kant, On the Common
Saying: "This May Be True in Theory, but It Does Not Apply in Practice," in POLITICAL
WRITINGS 61 (Hans Reiss ed. & H.B. Nisbet trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 2d ed. 1991). But see
Charles L. Black, Jr., Mr. Justice Black, the Supreme Court, and the Bill of Rights, HARPER'S
MAG., Feb. 1961, at 63. I wish to thank Steve Ratner and Sanford Levinson for drawing my
attention to this article.
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iv. Slippery Slopes
Accommodation of exigency considerations within the body of the
legal system may induce the government to use its emergency powers
expansively even when such use is uncalled for under the prevailing
circumstances. If the power "is there," it is more likely to be used than
when it has first to be put in place.' 68 Moreover, the existence of such
constitutional dictates could encourage unscrupulous political leaders to
foment an atmosphere of fear so as to be able to invoke these extraordinary
constitutional powers. 169 The danger that government will exercise
permissible, special emergency powers "and wield [them] oppressively or
selfishly, to the detriment of liberty, equality, or enduring national
progress,"' 170 may be "less inevitable but more dangerous."171 By the mere
incorporation of a set of extraordinary governmental powers into the legal
system, a weakening of that legal system will have already taken place and
a dangerous threshold will have been crossed. The system will have
embarked on its descent along a slippery slope as government will resort to
special emergency powers in situations that are farther and farther away
from a real exigency.
17 2
In fact, the degree of similarity between the ideal type and the actual reality can be taken as a
measure of the level of usefulness and utility of that ideal type as a descriptive and explanatory
tool. Usefulness in that sense is, however, the only criterion by which an ideal type model ought
to be evaluated. The question whether such a model is correct or incorrect is irrelevant since the
model does not purport to comport with any specific number of empirically observable
phenomena. Shivakumar, supra, at 1400-02. The ideal type is meant to represent a certain idea.
WEBER, Objectivity, supra note 166, at 91.
168. See CALABRESI, supra note 155, at 167-68 (discussing the claims that an open assertion
of judicial power will lead to the use of such power even when it is generally unwelcomed);
Christoph Schreuer, Derogation of Human Rights in Situations of Public Emergency: The
Experience of the European Convention on Human Rights, 9 YALE J. WORLD PUB. ORD. 113, 123
(1982) (noting that those who objected to the inclusion of derogation clauses in the major
international human rights conventions argued that the presence of a derogation clause, by
permitting considerations of expediency to prevail over true necessity, might actually encourage
governments to resort to that mechanism). But consider Justice Story's caution that "[i]t is always
a doubtful course, to argue against the use or existence of a power, from the possibility of its
abuse." Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 344 (1816).
169. It is worth noting in this context not merely the general patterns of consensus formation
in times of danger, see supra note 99 and accompanying text, but also the claim, made by
behavioral studies scholars, that choices are frequently shaped more by the framing of outcomes
than by the substance of the issues at stake, which may allow for manipulation. This is especially
so when issues are framed in terms of "our" security versus "their" rights. Thus, in order to
increase its public support, the government may seek to manipulate information pertaining both to
the potential risks to the public and to the costs and benefits of pursuing different measures in
response to such risks. See MICHAEL STOHL, WAR AND DOMESTIC POLITICAL VIOLENCE 82-95
(1976). On framing, see, for example, Richard L. Hasen, Comment, Efficiency Under
Informational Asymmetry: The Effect of Framing on Legal Rules, 38 UCLA L. REV. 391 (1990).
170. Memorandum from Tribe, supra note 163.
171. Schauer, supra note 123, at 1085.
172. See id. at 1084 ("If official toleration of the suspect occurs, the fear is that this will be
taken as implicit, if not explicit, permission to go one step further."); see also Frederick Schauer,
Slippery Slopes, 99 HARV. L. REV. 361 (1985).
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3. Courage and Relevancy: Ex parte Milligan
Perhaps nowhere has the Business as Usual model been more forcefully
debated than in the Supreme Court's decision in Ex parte Milligan.173 The
accolades and scathing criticisms that the decision has provoked are a
testament to the passions invoked by the issues discussed in that case.
Justice Davis's strong statement that the Constitution was "law for rulers
and people, equally in war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its
protection all classes of men, at all times, and under all circumstances"
' 174
came to be praised by some as "courageous," ' 175 "one of the great doctrines
of the Supreme Court,"'1 76 and "one of the bulwarks of American civil
liberty,"'' 77 while others declared it to be "irrelevant,"'
178 "sheer fustian,"'179
and an "'evident piece of arrant hypocrisy."
1 80
In its decision of April 3, 1866,181 the Supreme Court reversed
Milligan's conviction by a military commission. The Court held that the
military commission lacked jurisdiction over Milligan, who was a civilian
and a resident of Indiana, which had not joined the Confederacy.
Subsequently, the Supreme Court ordered Milligan's release from custody.
The Justices based their decision on their interpretation of the Habeas
Corpus Act of March 3, 1863,182 which authorized the President to suspend
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus whenever he deemed it necessary.
The Court held that the Act did not contemplate, and as a result did not
authorize, the trial of persons arrested and denied the privilege of habeas
corpus in military tribunals.
This element of the Court's decision provided a sufficient basis to issue
a writ of habeas corpus discharging Milligan from custody. However, from
173. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866). Much has been written about the case, mostly in the
immediate context that was at issue before the Court-the use of military commissions to try
civilians in states that were not part of the territory of the South occupied by the North during the
Civil War or, indeed, in border states, where the civilian courts had been open for business and
functioning. See, e.g., CHARLES FAIRMAN, 6 HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNTTFD
STATES: RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION, 1864-88, at 214-29 (1971); FARBER, supra note 165,
at 186-89; J.G. RANDALL, CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS UNDER LINCOLN 179-83 (rev. ed. 1951);
REHNQUIST, supra note 34, at 89-137.
174. Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 120-21.
175. Ruppert v. Caffey, 251 U.S. 264, 306 (1919) (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
176. RANDALL, supra note 173, at 513.
177. J.G. RANDALL & DAVID DONALD, THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION 304 (2d ed.
1969).
178. See MARK E. NEELY, JR., THE FATE OF LIBERTY 179-84 (1991) (citing to several
scholars who view Justice Davis's statement to be irrelevant and who predict that if the Court's
decision were to be subjected to the strain of actual war it would be disregarded).
179. CORWIN, supra note 63, at 142.
180. NEELY, supra note 178, at 184 (quoting Edward S. Corwin).
181. It is interesting to note that the opinions of the Justices were released on December 17,
1866-more than eight months after the actual decision in the case.
182. An Act Relating to Habeas Corpus, and Regulating Judicial Proceedings in Certain
Cases, ch. 81, 12 Stat. 755 (1863).
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
20031 1053
The Yale Law Journal
this agreed-upon holding, the Justices parted ways. The two main doctrinal
issues at stake were: first, the nature of martial law, the criteria for its
lawful imposition under the American legal system, and the scope and
range of powers available under such a regime; 8 3 and second, the sources
for emergency powers under the Constitution. It is the latter issue that is of
interest to us here.
Justice Davis's majority opinion essentially embraced the Business as
Usual model. He declared that it was the protection of the law that secured
human rights against "wicked rulers, or the clamor of an excited people."
184
Whether a law that allowed trial by a military commission existed was a
question to be determined in light of the Constitution and the statutes that
had been promulgated under it.'8 5 The laws of the land were applicable to
their fullest extent at all times, whatever the circumstances and the
exigencies.
Justice Davis explained:
Time has proven the discernment of our ancestors .... Those great
and good men foresaw that troublous times would arise, when
rulers and people would become restive under restraint, and seek by
sharp and decisive measures to accomplish ends deemed just and
proper; and that the principles of constitutional liberty would be in
peril, unless established by irrepealable law. The history of the
world had taught them that what was done in the past might be
attempted in the future.' 
86
Justice Davis continued to state the doctrinal conclusion in these
famous words:
The Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers and
people, equally in war and in peace, and covers with the shield of
its protection all classes of men, at all times, and under all
circumstances. No doctrine, involving more pernicious
consequences, was ever invented by the wit of man than that any of
its provisions can be suspended during any of the great exigencies
of government. Such a doctrine leads directly to anarchy or
183. The opinions of the Justices were split sharply on this point. Compare Ex parte
Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 127 (1866) (Davis, J.) (seeking to limit the lawful use of martial law
to situations of actual war and to the locality of such a war), with id. at 137-40 (Chase, C.J.,
dissenting).
184. Id. at 119.
185. Id. Several constitutional provisions that Milligan's trial before a military tribunal
seemed to violate were singled out by Justice Davis as the bulwark for protection of criminal
defendants. These provisions included Article i11, Section 2, Clause 3, which states, "The Trial of
all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury," see id. at 119, and the Fourth,
Fifth, and Sixth Amendments, see id. at 119.
186. Id. at 120 (emphasis added).
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despotism, but the theory of necessity on which it is based is false;
for the government, within the Constitution, has all the powers
granted to it, which are necessary to preserve its existence; as has
been happily proved by the result of the great effort to throw off its
just authority. 87
Justice Davis rejected the contention that in a time of war, military
commanders had the power to suspend constitutional civil rights.
Constitutional guarantees and safeguards cannot be ignored, suspended, or
removed in times of war and calamity any more than they can be so
ignored, suspended, or removed in times of peace. 188 The Constitution
embodies a fixed and unchanging balance between individual freedom and
liberty, on the one hand, and governmental powers, on the other. This
equilibrium is to be maintained at all times. Government does not acquire
any new powers in times of acute crisis nor do the powers that the
government wields in ordinary times expand in times of emergency. When
faced with an exigency, the government may employ its regular powers and
those alone.
The Business as Usual model as explicated by Justice Davis is not to be
understood as barring or prohibiting any use of measures to fight an
emergency; all it prohibits is the use of extraordinary measures that do not
constitute an integral part of the ordinary legal system. The Constitution
includes within its purview all the powers that the government might need
in order to carry out its functions and duties. Furthermore, constitutional
restrictions and limitations on power and the protections accorded to
individual rights are fully applicable not only in times of peace but also in
times of war. This means that whatever powers the government may
lawfully use under the Constitution to meet an emergency cannot diminish
the scope of, or suspend, constitutional guarantees. Take the protection of
individual rights away-by suspending constitutional safeguards or by
contracting the scope of rights protection under the Constitution-and you
have destroyed the basic justification for the preservation of the
constitutional order. For the Milligan majority, the mere concept of
"emergency" powers was anathema. The government had only one set of
powers available to it. Emergency was, from a legal perspective,
nonexistent. The vision offered by Justice Davis's opinion was that of a
monistic, unitary view of the Constitution.
Justice Davis's Milligan opinion has often been hailed as a "landmark
decision in the protection of individual rights" in the American legal
187. Id. at 120-21.
188. See id. at 125. The sole exception to that sweeping proposition is the privilege
concerning the writ of habeas corpus. Id.
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system. 189 It has also faced its share of criticism. '" The most scathing
critique of Justice Davis's decision relegates it to mere irrelevance or even
to outright "arrant hypocrisy." 191 The constitutional doctrine expounded by
Justice Davis is, it is argued, plainly unrealistic. To the extent that it is
designed to set out guidelines for future actions by Congress and the
Executive it is unworkable in the face of great calamities, as it ignores both
the needs of the moment and the realities that push governments to do
whatever they can in order to safeguard the nation. For opponents of the
majority position, the context in which the decision was rendered, as well as
internal inconsistencies within the majority's position, demonstrate the
weaknesses of its doctrinal position and of the Business as Usual model.
Three specific critiques are offered in this context. First, it is argued that the
nonworkability of Justice Davis's constitutional doctrine should have been
obvious in light of the experience of the Civil War itself and in light of
future developments that were apparent to judges who reiterated the words
of Justice Davis. In his opinion, Justice Davis wrote, "[F]or the
government, within the Constitution, has all the powers granted to it, which
are necessary to preserve its existence; as has been happily proved by the
result of the great effort to throw off its just authority."'
192 However, the
narrative of the use of war powers by President Lincoln casts much doubt
on the factual foundation for this assertion.
Second, the Supreme Court's own conduct during and after the Civil
War demonstrates the idealistic nature of Justice Davis's position.
Throughout that bloody period, the Court refrained from interfering with
189. ROBERT FRIDLINGTON, 4 THE SUPREME COURT 1N AMERICAN LIFE: THF
RECONSTRUCTION COURT 1864-1888, at 74 (George J. Lankevich ed., 1987).
190. For example, the decision was vehemently opposed by Republicans who feared that it
would obstruct the implementation of the Reconstruction program. For a general discussion of the
reactions to the Milligan judgment, see FAIRMAN, supra note 173, at 214-29. In a letter to his
brother-in-law, dated February 24, 1867, Justice Davis wrote:
Not a word said in the opinion about reconstruction & the power is conceded in
insurrectionary States, & yet the Republican press every where has denounced the
opinion as a second Dred Scott opinion, when the Dred Scott opinion was in the interest
of Slavery, & the Milligan opinion in the interest of liberty. I did not suppose the
Republican party would endorse such trials after the war is over. Yet they do it.... I
abide the judgment of time. The people are mad now, and, if they dont recover soon,
civil liberty will be entirely gone. During the war I was afraid it [would] be all gone. If
saved at all, I believe that two years longer of war [would] have buried it out of sight.
Letter from Justice Davis to Judge Rockwell (Feb. 24, 1867), in FA1RMAN, supra note 173, at 232,
232-33 [hereinafter Davis's Letter] (first emphasis added); see also BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A
HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 140 (1993). For the view that Milligan may have been directed
against the "Radical Congress" without risking a full showdown with that body, see John P.
Roche, Executive Power and Domestic Emergency: The Quest for Prerogative, 5 W. POL. Q. 592,
600-01 (1952).
191. See supra notes 178-180 and accompanying text.
192. Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 121 (emphasis added).
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military arrests and trials carried out by the Union Army, 193 demonstrating a
substantial deference to the Executive.' 94 Milligan was a bold decision, but
it was handed down more than a year after the end of the Civil War, when
the guns were silent and Lincoln dead. 95 The Court's decision was no
theoretical exercise; it had a very tangible impact on the life of Lambdin
Milligan, it set a clear legal rule regarding martial law powers, and it
seemed to fortify the protection of individual rights. Yet much of its fiery
rhetoric seems ironic, to say the least, in light of the Court's judicial role
during the war. The relevant facts in Milligan were not substantially
different from those in previous cases-such as Vallandigham196 -that had
been decided in 1863.' 9 Yet the outcomes were diametrically different. The
sense that the Court decided Milligan knowing all too well that its decision
would not jeopardize the war effort, while it refused to act when most
needed, durante bello, brought harsh criticism upon Milligan as a "mere
rhetorical jousting at accomplished wartime deeds."'1 98 Such examples of
courts' apparent inability to protect individual rights while extreme
violence is raging around them, compared with their greater willingness to
resume their role as guardians of human rights and civil liberties once the
crisis is over, have led some commentators to suggest that courts ought to
refrain from deciding cases pitting claims of individual liberty against
counterclaims of national security until the crisis is over.199
193. See Ex parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 243 (1863). But see Ex parte Merryman,
17 F. Cas. 144 (C.CD. Md. 1861) (No. 9487). Merryman was the only wartime case in which a
judicial attempt was made to restrain the Executive. However, in defiance of a court order to the
contrary, Merryman was not released.
194. See, e.g., The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1862) (holding that the President's
order to blockade ports in possession of persons in armed rebellion against the government was a
proper exercise of executive power).
195. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 190, at 139.
196. 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 243.
197. Commentators have noted that while the Milligan decision was handed down more than
a year after the end of the war, the Vallandigham ruling was rendered during the very early stages
of the war. See, e.g., ROSSITER & LONGAKER, supra note 95, at 37. The Court was apparently
aware of that fact when it stated:
During the late wicked Rebellion, the temper of the times did not allow that calmness in
deliberation and discussion so necessary to a correct conclusion of a purely judicial
question. Then, considerations of safety were mingled with the exercise of power; and
feelings and interests prevailed which are happily terminated. Now that the public
safety is assured, this question, as well as all others, can be discussed and decided
without passion or the admixture of any element not required to form a legal judgment.
Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 109.
198. ROSSITER & LONGAKER, supra note 95, at xi; see also id. at 38 ("It is one thing for a
Court to lecture a President when the emergency has passed, quite another to stand up in the
middle of the battle and inform him that he is behaving unconstitutionally."). But see Davis's
Letter, supra note 190, at 232 ("The opinion [would] have been worth nothing for future time, if
we had cowardly toadied to the prevalent idea, that the legislative dept of the govt can override
everything. Cowardice of all sorts is mean, but judicial cowardice is the meanest of all.").
199. See, e.g., MAY, supra note 96, at 268 (suggesting that, in light of judicial practice of
abdicating review of executive activities during an emergency, "courts should steer a middle
course and defer review until the emergency has abated"). Justice Rehnquist also noted:
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Finally, opponents of the Business as Usual model assail the internal
logic and consistency of the Milligan doctrine. A conflict seems to exist
between the Court's rhetorical assertions of constitutional perfection and
absolutism and its willingness to recognize certain circumstances in which
application of martial law may be lawful and proper.200 In those latter
situations, constitutional rights would not bar a full-fledged martial law
regime. Surely this cannot be reconciled with a Constitution that applies
"equally in war and in peace." 201
Thus, the Business as Usual model, as explicated in Justice Davis's
opinion in Milligan, came to be regarded as a rhetorical exercise that ought
to be, and inevitably will be, disregarded when "'subjected to the strain of
actual war."' 20 2 Indeed, the first major postbellum crisis that the United
States had to face resulted in a shift of the Court's majority toward the
doctrine proposed by the Milligan minority, which I call a doctrine of
accommodation.
B. Models ofAccommodation
1. "Each crisis brings its word and deed. ,203
Several constitutional models may be grouped together under the
general category of "models of accommodation." They all countenance a
certain degree of accommodation for the pressures exerted on the state in
times of emergency, while, at the same time, maintaining normal legal
principles and rules as much as possible. This compromise, it is suggested,
enables continued adherence to the principle of the rule of law and
faithfulness to fundamental democratic values, while providing the state
with adequate measures to withstand the storm wrought by the crisis.
Where the accommodation models differ is in their respective answers
to the question of which branch of government is going to perform best in
balancing the pressing security needs with preservation and protection of
If, in fact, courts are more prone to uphold wartime claims of civil liberties after the
war is over, may it not actually be desirable to avoid decision on such claims during the
war?
Lambdin Milligan... surely would answer no to this question. While the body of
case law might benefit from such abstention, those who are actually deprived of their
civil liberties would not. But a decision in favor of civil liberty will stand as a precedent
to regulate future actions of Congress and the Executive branch in future wars.
REHNQUIST, supra note 34, at 222.
200. See Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 127.
201. See Lobel, supra note 61, at 1387 & n.13.
202. NEELY, supra note 178, at 181 (quoting nineteenth-century political scientist John W.
Burgess).
203. John Greenleaf Whittier, The Lost Occasion, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Apr. 1880, at 448,
449.
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individual rights and liberties. A second question concerns the best means
to achieve this accommodation and balancing. Thus, despite their grouping,
each of the models below results from a fundamentally different view of the
functioning of existing constitutional institutions and structures.
a. Interpretative Accommodation
The first model of accommodation focuses on interpretation of existing
legal rules in a way that is emergency-sensitive. Existing laws and
regulations are given new understanding and clothing by way of context-
based interpretation without any explicit modification or replacement of
any of their provisions. Thus, the need for additional powers to fend off a
dangerous threat is accommodated by an expansive, emergency-minded
interpretative spin on existing norms through which various components of
the ordinary legal system are transformed into counter-emergency
facilitating norms. While the law on the books does not change in times of
crisis, the law in action reveals substantial changes that are introduced into
the legal system by way of revised interpretations of existing legal rules.
20 4
If the Business as Usual model seeks to apply ordinary rules in times of
crisis as in ordinary times (hence "Ordinary/Ordinary"), this model of
interpretative accommodation seeks to apply ordinary rules in times of
crisis, but to change the scope of such rules by way of emergency-minded
interpretation. It may thus be described in a shorthand form as
"Ordinary/Emergency."
William Stuntz has recently noted that the scope of protection
guaranteed by the Fourth and Fifth Amendments has shifted in response to
changes in crime rates.20 5 This ebb-and-flow model of criminal procedure
parallels in important parts the interpretative model of accommodation.0 6
Constitutional limitations on governmental powers are not seen as fixed and
immutable, but rather as designed to minimize the sum of the costs of crime
and the costs of crime prevention. 20' A trade-off must always be considered
204. While most would look to the courts to carry out such an interpretative task, others
would argue that the task of constitutional and legal interpretation is not the monopoly of the
judicial branch of government. On the role of other branches of government in interpreting the
Constitution and the law, see, for example, TRIBE, supra note 8, at 722-30; Alexander & Schauer,
supra note 161; Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Most Competent Branches: A Response to
Professor Paulsen, 83 GEO. L.J. 347 (1994); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous
Branch: Executive Power To Say What the Law ls, 83 GEO. L.J. 217 (1994); and Keith E.
Whittington, Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation: Three Objections and Responses, 80
N.C. L. REV. 773 (2002).
205. Stuntz, supra note 104, at 2138-39 (stating that higher crime rates lead to cutbacks in
restrictions imposed on law enforcement agencies while lower crime rates lead to the
strengthening of such restrictions and to their expansion).
206. Stuntz supports the ebb-and-flow model both as a descriptive tool and as a normative
one. See id. at 2144-50.
207. Id. at 2144-47.
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between police power-with its potential for abuse-and crime.20 8
Imposing restrictions on law enforcement agencies, while having the
benefits of stronger protections of individual rights, incurs costs in the form
of higher crime rates. As crime rates fluctuate, so does the need to change
the point of balance between the various risks. At the same time, such
changes may be introduced into the legal system by way of judicial
interpretation of existing constitutional provisions and legal rules. 9
Violent crises tend to be dealt with through the mechanisms of criminal law
and procedure. 210 Hence, in times of crisis, we can expect expansive judicial
interpretations of the scope of police powers, with the concomitant
contraction of individual rights.
2 1
1
This vision of constitutional fluidity and adjustment to changing
circumstances was offered by Chief Justice Chase in his opinion in Exparte
Milligan. Speaking for four Justices, the Chief Justice agreed with Justice
Davis that any construction of emergency powers must be constrained
within the existing constitutional framework.2 2 All the powers that might
be used by government in times of both peace and war were to be found,
directly or indirectly, in the Constitution. Where Davis saw continuity,
however, Chase saw expansion of powers and a parallel contraction of
constitutionally protected rights. When appropriately exercised, the war
powers of Congress may constitutionally curtail fundamental rights of the
individual in a manner that would be impermissible in normal times.2 13
Although in agreement with Justice Davis that the Constitution was the
exclusive source of governmental powers, the Chief Justice regarded the
scope of those powers (and, as a result, the scope of the rights guaranteed
under the Constitution) 14 to be contingent upon the circumstances in which
208. Id. at 2145.
209. Id. at 2150-56 (analyzing changes in Fourth Amendment doctrine).
210. See Roach, supra note 77, at 133 (pointing out the tendency to rely on criminal law in
response to horrific crimes in the belief that the criminalization of activity or the enhancement of
penalties for engaging in that activity will stop it from occurring in the future); Stuntz, supra note
104, at 2138 ("What happened on September 11, 2001 was, among other things, a crime
wave .... ").
211. Cf Stuntz, supra note 104, at 2155-56 (arguing that judges typically expand the scope of
police powers after a time of crisis, though usually after a significant time-lag). Stuntz suggests,
however, that at the time of writing, such changes may already have been taking place as a result
of the September 11 th attacks, despite the relatively short time that had passed since the attacks.
See id. at 2156-59.
212. See Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 141 (1866) (Chase, C.J., dissenting).
213. Thus, Chase believed that when Congress had lawfully invoked its war power, that
power would allow Congress (but not the President) to authorize the establishment of military
commissions that would try not only soldiers but also civilians in areas where, according to
Congress's judgment, there existed a great and imminent public danger. Under certain
circumstances, the war powers of Congress could prevail over, and limit the application of, certain
individual constitutional rights. Id. at 139-41.
214. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Individual Rights and the Powers of Government, 27 GA. L.
REV. 343, 344 (1993) (arguing that "'rights are conceptually interconnected with, and occasionally
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the nation found itself. The scope of constitutional rights was dependent
upon the shifting scope of the powers given to government. 215 Powers
expanded and rights contracted (but were not necessarily suspended) in
times of crisis. For Chief Justice Chase, this was the price to be paid by
society if it were to survive the crisis and retain its identity and
independence. 216
World War I gave the Supreme Court an opportunity to revisit and
ultimately reject, albeit without explicitly overruling Milligan, its position
on emergency powers that stemmed from the Davis-Chase debate. Those
two competing constitutional visions resurfaced once again in 1917 in
Wilson v. New.217 Faced with the prospect of a national general railroad
strike due to a labor dispute, Congress passed the Adamson Act at the
request of President Wilson. The Act imposed an eight-hour workday on
the railroad industry. In doing so, it accepted, in essence, the employees'
even subordinate to, governmental powers," with this interconnectedness facilitated by the
mediating concept of "interests").
215. Id. at 362 ("The conceptual limit of the constitutional right is not, in other words,
another right, but a power of government, supported and identified by reference to underlying
interests."). But see Frederick Schauer, A Comment on the Structure of Rights, 27 GA. L. REV.
415, 430-31 (1993) (arguing for the interaction rather than the interconnectedness of rights and
interests).
216. Another possible way to look at the divergence of opinion in Milligan would be to
pursue the following line of argument: Both sets of opinions are in agreement that the Constitution
is the sole source of governmental powers and that it contemplates all the powers that a
government may need in order to deal with any contingency. The sole point of disagreement
concerns the proper scope of the application of constitutional safeguards- The gap between the
two opinions concerns, therefore, the internal definition of constitutional rights. Whereas
according to Justice Davis's opinion such rights as the right to trial by jury apply under their own
internally defined scope of application, in both times of peace and of war, Chief Justice Chase
interpreted the same rights so as not to apply in certain circumstances arising out of a state of war
or a similar exigency. The fact that Congress might order military commissions to try civilians in
such circumstances does not violate the constitutional rights of civilians, since those rights, by
their own internal definition, are not intended to apply to such situations. "The Constitution itself
provides for military government as well as for civil government. And we do not understand it to
be claimed that the civil safeguards of the Constitution have application in cases within the proper
sphere of the former." Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 137 (Chase, C.J., dissenting). Thus, there was
no room for talking about the suspension of rights or, for that matter, of their curtailment. In times
of war, certain rights were simply not applicable to their fullest extent, not because of an external
limitation and derogation, but due to the internal definition of their scope of applicability.
217. 243 U.S. 332 (1917). The scholarly commentary on this and related World War I
"emergency" cases is extensive. See, e.g., Belknap, supra note 45, at 79-84. Other "emergency"
cases of that period are Highland v. Russell Car & Snow Plow Co., 279 U.S. 253 (1929)
(upholding the Lever Act and subsequent regulations that allowed the President to fix coal prices
on the grounds that they were a proper exercise of the government's war powers), Edgar A. Levy
Leasing Co. v. Siegel, 258 U.S. 242 (1922) (upholding rent-control statutes enacted to counter the
effects of housing shortages due to World War I mobilization), Marcus Brown Holding Co. v.
Feldman, 256 U.S. 170 (1921) (same), and Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 (1921) (same),
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position in the dispute. 218 The railroad companies challenged the
constitutionality of the legislation, arguing that it fell outside the boundaries
of the Commerce Clause power. The Supreme Court, in a five-to-four
decision, upheld the statute.
While agreeing with Justice Davis's Milligan decision that a state of
emergency could not create new governmental powers that did not exist
previously, Chief Justice White, speaking for the majority, asserted that a
crisis could alter the scope of existing governmental powers: "[A]lthough
an emergency may not call into life a power which has never lived,
nevertheless emergency may afford a reason for the exertion of a living
power already enjoyed." 219 Chief Justice White's opinion depicted an
expansion of governmental powers in times of emergency and a concurrent
contraction of the scope of constitutionally protected individual rights.
These phenomena would, in turn, enable the government to exercise its
emergency powers under the aegis of the Constitution in a way that under
normal circumstances might brand its action with a mark of
unconstitutionality. 220 Without explicitly overruling Milligan, the majority
in Wilson v. New embraced the constitutional emergency powers model
originally introduced by the Milligan dissent. Courts are able to apply an
emergency-sensitive interpretation to constitutional arrangements,
structures, powers, and rights. Governmental powers may expand, and the
scope of rights protection may contract, so that the crisis can be met
effectively. Importantly, when the crisis is over, a return to normalcy should
take place, as powers contract to their "normal" extent, and rights
concomitantly expand.
Justice Day's dissent tracked the Milligan majority opinion. For him,
"no emergency and no consequence, whatever their character, could justify
the violation of constitutional rights. The argument of justification by
emergency was made and answered in this court in Ex parte
Milligan .... ,221
The circumstances surrounding Wilson v. New seem to support the
claim that Milligan might have been decided differently had the Court's
decision been handed down during the war rather than after hostilities had
ended. Wilson v. New was decided on March 19, 1917, at a time when the
218. An Act To Establish an Eight-Hour Day for Employees of Carriers Engaged in Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, and for Other Purposes, Pub. L. No. 252, 39 Stat. 721 (1916); see also
Belknap, supra note 45, at 79-80.
219. New, 243 U.S. at 348.
220. See Belknap, supra note 45, at 81.
221. Nw, 243 U.S. at 370 (Day, J., dissenting); see also id. at 371-72 (stating that the
principle pronounced by the Milligan majority "is equally applicable today.... Constitutional
rights, if they are to be available in time of greatest need, cannot give way to an emergency,
however immediate, or justify the sacrifice of private rights secured by the Constitution."); id. at
377 (Pitney, J., dissenting) ("[A]n emergency can neither create a power nor excuse a defiance of
the limitations upon the powers of the Government.").
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United States was on the brink of war: Germany had recently announced
that it would resume unrestricted submarine warfare against any vessel
sailing in European waters, and the United States had severed its diplomatic
relations with Germany; on March 9th, President Wilson announced that
guns would be placed, and naval crews stationed, on American merchant
vessels, and, on March 18th, after three American vessels had been sunk by
German submarines, the railroad companies in fact agreed to the eight-hour
workday demand of the workers.222 Deciding the case when violence
loomed imminent, the Supreme Court majority adopted a prudential view,
balancing the costs and benefits of expanding governmental power and
curtailing individual rights in the context of the impending war.22 3
Seventeen years after Wilson v. New, the Supreme Court, in its first
New Deal case-Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdel1
224 -
strengthened the doctrinal foundations laid down in Wilson v. New.225 This
time, the Court handed down its decision against the backdrop of the Great
Depression. The issue before the Court concerned the Minnesota Mortgage
Moratorium Law that was challenged as violative of the Constitution's
Contract Clause, as well as its Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses.
The Minnesota Supreme Court held that the impairment of obligations
under mortgage contracts was within the state's police power, which had
been invoked to respond to the great economic emergency facing the state
and the nation. The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling. Writing for the
majority, Chief Justice Hughes, drawing upon Chief Justice White's
opinion in Wilson v. New, stated:
Emergency does not create power. Emergency does not
increase granted power or remove or diminish the restrictions
imposed upon power granted or reserved. The Constitution was
adopted in a period of grave emergency. Its grants of power to the
Federal Government and its limitations of the power of the States
were determined in the light of emergency ....
While emergency does not create power, emergency may
furnish the occasion for the exercise ofpower.226
222. Belknap, supra note 45, at 79-80 & n.91.
223. Cf PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 17 (1991) (stating that
prudential arguments, focusing on a cost-benefit balancing, are "likeliest to be decisive" in
emergencies).
224. 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
225. For a discussion of Blaisdell, see Edward S. Corwin, Moratorium over Minnesota, 82 U.
PA. L. REv. 311 (1934); and Note, Constitutionality of Mortgage Relief Legislation: Home
Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 47 HARV. L. REV. 660 (1934). See also BOBBITT, supra note
223, at 17 (suggesting that the Court "recognized the political expediency of the legislature's
action and acquiesced in it").
226. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 425-26 (emphasis added).
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The war power of the federal government "permits the harnessing of
the entire energies of the people in a supreme co6perative effort to preserve
the nation., 227 The majority was cautious to pay rhetorical homage to the
Milligan decision by citing it as precedent for the assertion that "even the
war power does not remove constitutional limitations safeguarding essential
liberties." 228 It presented the issue at hand as merely a question of proper
interpretation of constitutional provisions, thus avoiding any notion of
suspension of the Constitution under circumstances of emergency. The
rights guaranteed by the Constitution and the freedoms enshrined therein
were not abrogated. The limitations on governmental powers were not
swept aside. But, the scope of those rights, freedoms, limitations, and
powers was redefined in times of grave economic crisis so as to ensure that
the emergency would be overcome as soon as possible.229
b. Legislative Accommodation
Another method of accommodating security needs in times of crisis is
arrived at by way of introducing legislative amendments and modifications
into the existing ordinary legal terrain. While it is acknowledged that
existing legal rules do not supply a fully adequate answer to the acute
problems facing the community in crisis, the belief is that such answers
may still exist within the confines of some legal framework that does not
require a complete overhaul of the existing legal system. The exceptional
circumstances of crisis lead to an accommodation within the existing
normative structure of security considerations and needs. The ordinary
system is kept intact as much as possible; yet some exceptional adjustments
are introduced. In acute states of emergency, ordinary norms may be modified
230or supplemented by emergency-specific provisions.
This method of legislative accommodation may be further divided into
two distinct models.
227. Id. at 426.
228. Id.
229. The economic crisis of the late 1920s and early 1930s resulted in a flurry of legislation
and in far-reaching structural changes in government institutions. The expansion of federal
regulatory power was marked through the enactment of the National Industrial Recovery Act, ch.
90, 48 Stat. 195 (1933), the Agricultural Adjustment Act, ch. 25, 48 Stat. 31 (1933), and the
National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as well as through creation of the
Tennessee Valley Authority. Viewed as a threat on par with an actual foreign invasion, the crisis
also transformed the Supreme Court and its doctrine. Perhaps the most celebrated demonstration
of the interpretative model of accommodation came about in the context of interpreting the
Commerce Clause against the backdrop of the Great Depression and the New Deal. See, e.g.,
PETER H. IRONS, TiE NEW DEAL LAWYERS 52-54 (1982) (discussing the link between emergency
doctrine and the Commerce Clause in the New Deal).
230. See, e.g., Adrian A.S. Zuckerman, Coercion and the Judicial Ascertainment of Truth, 23
ISR. L. REV. 357, 372-73 (1989).
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i. Modifying Ordinary Laws
Under this model of legislative accommodation, the normal legal
system is maintained intact as much as possible during the period of
emergency. However, in order to facilitate the needs of security and the
state's safety, certain modifications are introduced into that ordinary
system. Legislative provisions that are bom out of the need to respond to an
emergency situation find their way into ordinary legislation and become
part and parcel of the ordinary legal system.13 1 Under this model-labeled
the "Emergency/Ordinary" model for its focus on inserting emergency-
driven legal provisions into existing ordinary legal rles and structures-the
legal framework used for applying emergency measures is the ordinary one
as so modified. However, the origin of such provisions reveals their close
link to the phenomenon of emergency. They are "ordinary" in name only;
in substance, they are emergency-driven.
ii. Special Emergency Legislation
This model also adheres to the notion that emergency must be met by
the state and its agents under the umbrella of the law. Yet, at the same time,
it deems ordinary legal norms to be inadequate for dealing with the pressing
needs emanating from the specific emergency. Rather than attempting to
modify existing legal norms (as is done under the previous model), the
effort is directed at creating replacement emergency norms that pertain to
the particular exigency (or to potential future exigencies). The term
"emergency legislation" is thus most at home under this model. Such
emergency legislation may, but need not, take the format of stand-alone
legislation: Emergency provisions may be included in specific "emergency"
legislation, but they may also be incorporated into an ordinary piece of
legislation while retaining their specific emergency features. Thus, for
example, a Special Senate Committee found:
The United States thus [had] on the books at least 470 significant
emergency powers statutes without time limitations delegating to
the Executive extensive discretionary powers, ordinarily exercised
by the Legislature, which affect the lives of American citizens in a
host of all-encompassing ways. This vast range of powers, taken
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together, confer enough authority to rule this country without
reference to normal constitutional processes.
232
Most of these quasi-emergency233 provisions would become operative
upon a declaration of war by Congress or in the event of a presidential
proclamation or an executive order in accordance with the National
Emergencies Act.
234
c. Executive Inherent Powers
President Lincoln's actions during the Civil War, especially in the first
twelve weeks between the bombardment of Fort Sumter, on April 12, 1861,
and the convening of Congress on July 4, 1861, have been the subject of
much study and debate. During this period Lincoln demonstrated perhaps
232. HAROLD RELYEA, A BRIEF HISTORY OF EMERGENCY POWERS IN THE UNITED STATES,
at v (Special U.S. Senate Comm. on Nat'l Emergencies & Delegated Emergency Powers,
Working Paper No. 36-612, 1974).
233. The term is taken from JOhN HATCHARD, INDIVIDUAL FREEDOMS & STATE SECURITY
IN THE AFRICAN CONTEXT: THE CASE OF ZIMBABWE 5 (1993), which notes that quasi-emergency
laws "give the government the sort of powers normally associated with a state of emergency," but
are passed "using the ordinary legislative process." Id.
234. 50 U.S.C. § 1621 (1994). The same may also apply, of course, to full-fledged emergency
legislation. Thus, for example, the International Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977
(IEEPA), 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706, allows the President, following his declaration of national
emergency, to regulate or prohibit transactions in foreign exchange, transfers of credit or
payments, or any dealings in property owned by a foreign state or national. A national emergency
may be declared when the President finds "any unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its
source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign
policy, or economy of the United States." Id. § 1701(a); see also Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453
U.S. 654 (1981); Beacon Prods. Corp. v. Reagan, 633 F. Supp. 1191 (D. Mass. 1986) (holding
that a challenge to President Reagan's embargo on Nicaragua, which claimed that Nicaragua did
not impose an "unusual and extraordinary threat" under § 1701(b), presented a nonjusticiable
political question), aff'd, 814 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1987); Harold H. Koh & John C. Yoo, Dollar
Diplomacy/Dollar Defense: The Fabric of Economics and National Security Law, 26 INT'L LAW.
715, 743-46 (1992).
The executive branch has declared numerous "national emergencies" pursuant to IEEPA,
followed by regulations including blocking the transfer of Iranian government property during the
hostage crisis, Exec. Order No. 12,170, 3 C.F.R. 457 (1979), imposing sanctions on South Africa,
Exec. Order No. 12,532, 3 C.F.R. 387 (1985), penalizing Libya for terrorist acts, including
freezing financial interests within the United States, Exec. Order No. 12,543, 3 C.F.R. 181 (1986),
Exec. Order No. 12,544, 3 C.F.R. 183 (1986), prohibiting trade and other transactions with the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), Exec. Order No., 12,808, 3 C.F.R. 305
(1992), and prohibiting trade and supply to Angola's UNITA, Exec. Order No. 12,865, 3 C.F.R.
636 (1993).
Finally, it has been argued that the existence of legislative provisions that authorize the
exercise of special or extraordinary powers by the Executive during a national emergency weighs
in favor of Congress's issuing official declarations of war as this may shed light on the domestic
costs of war resulting from the expansive executive powers available on the domestic front in
times of war or national emergency. See J. Gregory Sidak, To Declare War, 41 DUKE L.J. 27
(1991); J. Gregory Sidak, War, Liberty, and Enemy Aliens, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1402, 1424-31
(1992); see also Harold H. Koh, The Coase Theorem and the War Power: A Response, 41 DUKE
L.J. 122 (1991); J. Gregory Sidak, The Inverse Coase Theorem and Declarations of War, 41
DUKE L.J. 325 (1991).
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the most awesome display of executive power in American history. On
April 15th, Lincoln called for Congress to convene on July 4th-no later,
but also no sooner-ensuring wide leeway for presidential operation in the
meantime. Acting as the protector of the Union, Lincoln called forth the
militia, imposed a blockade on the ports of the Southern states, paid out
unappropriated funds to private persons unauthorized to receive such
payments, authorized the commander of the Army to suspend the writ of
habeas corpus in the area between the cities of Philadelphia and
Washington (and, later on, also in the area between Washington and New
York), and enlarged the army and navy beyond the limits set by
Congress.235 By the time Congress did convene, it was faced with extensive
faits accomplis, leaving it no real choice but to ratify them and give its
blessing to the President. Whereas some of these measures could be
construed as falling within the constitutional or statutorily delegated
presidential powers,236 others were more questionable. For example, the
President's unilateral enlargement of the armed forces violated an express
constitutional provision vesting in Congress the power to "raise and support
Armies" and to "provide and maintain a Navy., 2 37 Similarly, the power to
suspend the writ of habeas corpus was generally thought at the time to
belong exclusively to Congress. The Emancipation Proclamation, which as
Dan Farber notes, "[w]ith the stroke of a pen (backed, admittedly, by Union
guns) ... wiped out property rights worth many millions of dollars," was
also deemed unconstitutional when made.23 8
How may Lincoln's actions be explained? One possible explanation
considers such actions to be within the boundaries of the Constitution under
the doctrine of the "war powers" of the federal government.23 9 Thus,
235. See NEELY, supra note 178, at 3-31; see also ROSSITER, supra note 5, at 224-27.
236. As Dan Farber explains:
[T]he closer a given situation came to the heart of the war, the more likely that
Lincoln's actions were supportcd by precedent, and also the more likely that those
actions have later passed the test of time. The single most important factor is the
proximity between the action and specifically military concerns.
FARBER, supra note 165, at 163.
237. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 12-13.
238. FARBER, supra note 165, at 171. Farber argues that the Proclamation was justified as a
war measure under the laws of war because it fell within the President's role as a military leader,
id. at 171-76, and was "relatively unproblematic in terms of the separation of powers," id. at 176;
see also Sanford Levinson, The David C. Baum Memorial Lecture. Was the Emancipation
Proclamation Constitutional? Do We/Should We Care What the Answer Is?, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV.
1135.
239. President Lincoln stated:
It became necessary for me to choose whether, using only the existing means, agencies,
and processes which Congress had provided, I should let the Government fall at once
into ruin or whether, availing myself of the broader powers conferred by the
Constitution in cases of insurrection, I would make an effort to save it, with all its
blessings, for the present age and for posterity.
6 JAMES D. RICHARDSON, A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS
78 (1898) (emphasis added).
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Lincoln's wartime presidency ushered in a new theory of crisis government
based on the concept of inherent powers. 240 Since Lincoln's presidency,
arguments put forward in support of an Executive's resort to emergency
powers have invariably revolved around the claim that the President enjoys
a wide range of constitutionally inherent powers, including emergency
powers, and therefore acts legally and constitutionally, rather than outside
the constitutional and legal framework.
2. Challenges and Justifications
If the Business as Usual model can be charged with naivetd and out-of-
context idealism, the three models of accommodation present an answer in
the shape of constitutional and legal flexibility. Legal principles and rules,
as well as legal structures and institutions, may be adjusted to the needs of
meeting violent threats successfully. But, just as the prior model could be
charged with utopianism, the models of accommodation could be charged
with being unprincipled and apologetic.241 The claim is that these models
enable the authorities to mold and shape the legal system, including the
constitutional edifice, under the pretense of fighting off an emergency. In
addition, experience informs us that neither the judicial nor the legislative
branches function as meaningful guardians of individual rights and liberties
in times of great peril. 242 Thus, it seems extremely dangerous to allow any
modifications to the constitutional and legal terrain to take place at such
times, regardless of whether such changes are introduced by way ofjudicial
interpretation of existing legal and constitutional provisions, or by way of
new legislative initiatives.
On the other hand, if the Business as Usual model is closely linked to a
strategy of resistance, the alternative models adopt a strategy of
accommodation and flexibility. Under this strategy, one confronts the
inevitable by allowing it rather than by futilely resisting it.243 Recognizing that
240. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 682 (1952) (Vinson,
C.J., dissenting); TRIE, supra note 160, at 676; William C. Banks & Alejandro D. Carri6,
Presidential Systems in Stress: Emergency Powers in Argentina and the United States, 15 MICH.
J. INT'L L. 1, 42-46 (1993); Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Presidency, 93
COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1993).
241. See MARTTI KOsKENN1EMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT 40-50 (1989); Martti Koskenniemi, The Politics of
InternationalLaw, 1 EUR. J. INT'L L. 4, 31-32 (1990).
242. See KOH, supra note 62, at 117-49.
243. Schauer noted:
This strategy runs the risk that the message of allowance will be taken as saying
substantially more than it actually says, or allowing more than it actually allows. In
exchange for this risk, however, this strategy maintains the authority or legitimacy of the
norm structure at issue because, by allowing the inevitable, the inevitable need not violate
the norm structure in order to exist.
Schauer, supra note 123, at 1084.
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extraordinary powers are, in fact, going to be used in times of great peril, the
legal system ought to retain enough flexibility to allow such use within legal
confines rather than outside them. Over the long term, adherence to the rule of
law requires responding to crises from within the system rather than breaking
free of it, since a break may be hard, if not impossible, to repair later.244
In addition, the accommodation models may actually lead to less
draconian emergency measures. In the absence of legal permission to
employ special emergency powers (or in the event that the legally available
powers are insufficient), the government may be reluctant to take illegal
emergency measures. Its hesitation may force it to respond to the
emergency only at a later stage, when the crisis has further developed and
the danger escalated, and when more extreme actions are required to
overcome it. If emergency powers are part of the government's legal
arsenal, it may be able to use them to nip the emergency in the bud before it
gets out of hand.245
IV. THE ASSU!yIPTION OF SEPARATION
Each of the constitutional models of emergency powers suffers from
fundamental weaknesses. In times of emergency, such weaknesses are
especially dangerous because they open wide the door for abuse of power
or rule breaking without concomitant accountability. The main weakness of
the Business as Usual model lies in its rigidity in the face of radical
changes. The models of accommodation are susceptible to manipulation
and may start us down a slippery slope toward excessive government
infringement of individual rights and liberties.
In addition to these general concerns, a basic premise of all the
traditional models of emergency powers does not hold true in practice. The
assumption of separation is defined by the belief in our ability to separate
emergencies and crises from normalcy.246 This assumption makes it easier
244. This approach was suggested, for example, by the Landau Commission as the best available
method to balance the needs of state security with the protection of human rights and civil liberties in
the context of the GSS's interrogations of suspected terrorists. Describing its proposed solution as
"the truthful road of the rule of law," the Commission envisioned a state of affairs in which the
GSS and its members operate within the boundaries of the law, while the legal system accommodates
the needs of the security services as they arise in the fight against terrorism. See LANDAU REPORT,
supra note 135, at 184.
245. See Note, Recent Emergency Legislation in West Germany, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1704,
1710 (1969).
246. After World War I came to an end, Justice Brandeis confided in Felix Frankfurter:
I would have placed the Debs case on the war power-instead of taking Holmes' line
about "clear and present danger." Put it frankly on the war power... and then the
scope of espionage legislation would be confined to war. But in peace the protection
against restriction of freedom of speech would be unabated. You might as well
recognize that during a war.., all bets are off. But we would have a clear line to go
on ....
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for us to tolerate expansive governmental emergency powers and
counterterrorism actions, for it reassures us that once the emergency is
removed and terrorism is no longer a threat, such powers and actions will
also be terminated, and there will be a full (or at least nearly full) return to
normalcy.
Unfortunately, bright-line distinctions between normalcy and
emergency are frequently untenable, as they are constantly blurred and
made increasingly meaningless. In this Part, I argue that the exception is
hardly an exception at all. Fashioning legal tools to respond to emergencies
on the belief that the assumption of separation will serve as a firewall that
protects human rights, civil liberties, and the legal system as a whole may
be misguided. Since the assumption of separation is also closely linked to
the goals of the different models of emergency powers, and inasmuch as it
informs each of them, we must reassess the strength of the arguments
supporting each of the models.
Section A focuses on the relationship between periods of emergency
and periods of normalcy, and suggests that the former are conceptualized as
exceptions to the latter. In addition, I argue that the long-term success of
each of the traditional models of emergency powers depends on the
assumption of separation between normalcy and emergency. Success here is
measured not only in the ability to overcome immediate threats and
dangers, but also in the ability to confine the application of extraordinary
measures to extraordinary times, insulating periods of normalcy from the
encroachment of vast emergency powers.
The separation of emergency from normalcy is facilitated and sustained
by resorting to several mechanisms of separation that may be broadly
categorized as attempting to maintain temporal, spatial, or communal
divisions. Section B briefly discusses these mechanisms. I argue that each
mechanism is, in fact, problematic. I demonstrate the inherent limitations of
each mechanism by drawing upon historical experiences. Section C
suggests some specific patterns that further undermine the workability of
the assumption of separation and demonstrate the insidious ways in which
spillover takes place between counter-emergency measures and the ordinary
legal system.
A. Normalcy and Emergency:
The Discourse of Rule and Exception
Emergencies are conceptualized in terms of a dichotomized dialectic.
The term "emergency" connotes a sudden, urgent, usually unforeseen event
DAVID M. RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS 363 (1997) (quoting the personal
papers of Louis D. Brandeis) (emphasis added).
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or situation that requires immediate action, 24 7 often without time for
reflection and consideration. The notion of "emergency" is inherently
linked to the concept of "normalcy" in the sense that the former is
considered to be outside the ordinary course of events or anticipated
actions. To recognize an emergency, we must, therefore, have the
background of normalcy. Furthermore, in order to be able to talk about
normalcy and emergency in any meaningful way, the concept of emergency
must be informed by notions of temporal duration and exceptional
danger.248 For normalcy to be "normal," it has to be the general rule, the
ordinary state of affairs, whereas emergency must constitute no more than
an exception to that rule-it must last only a relatively short time and yield
no substantial permanent effects. 2 49 Traditional discourse on emergency
powers posits normalcy and crisis as two separate phenomena and assumes
that emergency is the exception.
Each of the constitutional models of emergency powers takes this
assumption of separation as its starting point. This may seem
counterintuitive at first glance, especially with respect to the Business as
Usual model. After all, that model is not concerned with the external
circumstances of crisis, since it holds a unitary vision of the legal order: If
regular legal norms are not subject to modification in times of exigency,
one cannot speak of a distinct emergency legal regime. Yet, even for the
Business as Usual model, the assumption of separation has significant
implications. The main challenge facing the model is its perceived
detachment from reality. The stronger that perception is, the stronger the
challenges to the model become, and the greater the likelihood of its
becoming irrelevant, if not outright detrimental, to the long-term prospects
of the community. This is where the assumption of separation plays a
significant role. Take, for example, the phenomenon of entrenched
emergencies, which clearly contradicts the assumption of separation. When
faced with situations of entrenched emergencies, the Business as Usual
model will undergo pressure to allow the legal system to fight off the threat
to the nation. The longer people live under the shadow of emergency, the
more likely they are to recognize the utopian nature of the model and to
247. See I THE NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 806 (Lesley Brown ed., 4th
ed. 1993).
248. Although it is widely agreed that no one definition of "emergency" is feasible, temporal
duration is a common starting point. See Questiaux Report, supra note 44, at 20 ("[A]bove and
beyond the rules [of emergency regimes,] ... one principle, namely, the principle of provisional
status, dominates all the others. The right of derogation can be justified solely by the concern to
return to normality.").
249. See, e.g., Heymann, supra note 15, at 451. The formula "normalcy-rule, emergency-
exception" may be replaced by a rebuttable presumption of normalcy where emergency
constitutes a rebuttal. See Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953, 963
(1995) ("A rule with necessity or emergency exceptions might be described, somewhat
imprecisely, as a strong presumption.").
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demand that the legal system accommodate the necessities of the situation.
Continued adherence to the Business as Usual model in those circumstances
presents the great risk that, in practice, the system will adjust and
accommodate such security considerations in ways that may be less
transparent and less obvious. Eventually, the system will reach a position
where significant portions of the "ordinary" legal system have, in fact, been
formulated as responses to the crisis. The longer the crisis, the greater the
possibility that such insidious changes will be made. To put it somewhat
differently, as the duration of emergencies increases, it becomes harder to
argue for a business-as-usual approach, for it is clear that much is not "as
usual." An example will illustrate this point. In 1984, the Republic of
Ireland's criminal justice system underwent a momentous paradigm shift,
when it replaced the Offences Against the State Act of 1939 with the
Criminal Justice Act of 1984.250 The move signified a shift from a "due
process" model to a "crime control" model of criminal process.251 That shift
was prompted by the reality of longstanding emergency legislation existing
side by side with the ordinary criminal law and procedure. Eventually, the
two were merged and brought together under the umbrella of the general
"ordinary" penal code.
For their part, the models of accommodation allow emergency powers
through either innovative interpretation of existing legal rules, specific
emergency provisions incorporated into ordinary legal rules, or distinct
emergency legislation and measures. Once again, the danger is that such
emergency-specific accommodation will become an integral part of the
regular legal system. In order to ensure that exceptional norms that find
their raison d'8tre in a state of emergency do not become confused with
ordinary legal rules in times of normalcy, it is essential to keep the two sets
of norms, authorities, and powers apart as much as possible. By definition,
emergency situations must be the exception to the general rule of normalcy.
Without separation, it is but a short step to conflate emergency powers and
norms with the "ordinary" and the "normal."
Thus, the dialectic of "normalcy-rule, emergency--exception" is
inherent in each of the models. 252 Each model is aimed at overcoming
specific crises and restoring normalcy.253 Under each model, application of
250. See Dermot P.J. Walsh, The Impact of the Antisubversive Laws on Police Powers and
Practices in Ireland: The Silent Erosion of Individual Freedom, 62 TEMP. L. REV. 1099 (1989).
251. Pye & Lowell, supra note 140, at 589-603 (criticizing a due-process-like model for law
enforcement during civil disorder, and proposing a model centered on restoring order): Walsh,
supra note 250, at 1128.
252. See Gross, supra note 4, at 440.
253. See, e.g., H.P. LEE, EMERGENCY POWERS 1 (1984) ("The remarkable trait of a
democratic country is that whilst the powers to cope with crises provide the potential for
dictatorial' rule such powers subside with the restoration of normalcy."); cf FRIEDRICH, supra note
46, at 568-70 (explaining that the goal of extraordinary powers is to restore normalcy). On
whether the return must be to the status quo ante or to a state of normalcy that may vary
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emergency powers is designed to be of a temporary nature, to serve as a
bridge between precrisis and postcrisis normalcy. With the termination of
the conflict, normalcy ought to be reestablished and the emergency regime
withdrawn.
The distinction between the two spheres of normalcy and emergency
and counterterrorism measures is facilitated and sustained by resorting to
several mechanisms of separation that may be broadly identified as aimed
at maintaining temporal, spatial, or communal divisions. The next Section
examines each of these mechanisms more closely and identifies their
shortcomings and limitations.
B. Four Degrees of Separation
1. Sequencing and Temporal Distinctions:
Separating the Best and the Worst of Times
Normalcy and emergency are often seen to occupy alternate, mutually
exclusive time frames. Normalcy exists prior to crisis and is reinstituted
after the emergency is over. Crises constitute brief intervals in the otherwise
uninterrupted flow of normalcy. Emergency powers are supposed to apply
only while the exigency persists. They are not to extend beyond that time
frame into ordinary times.
However, this view of the temporal relationship between normalcy and
emergency does not account adequately for the possibility that emergencies
will become entrenched and prolonged. 4 Rather than the exception, crises
may become the norm.2 5 Emergency regimes tend to perpetuate
themselves, regardless of the intentions of those who originally invoked
them. Once brought to life, they are not so easily terminable. Several
examples illustrate this point.
The State of Israel has been under an unremitting emergency regime
since its establishment in May 1948. As originally authorized, however, the
declaration of a state of emergency was considered a temporary necessary
substantially from that status quo, see, for example, FINN, supra note 91, at 40-43 (explaining the
possibility of constitutional reconstruction); and ROSSITER, supra note 5, at 7, 306 (describing the
return to the status quo ante).
254. See Oren Gross & Fionnuala Ni Aolain, From Discretion to Scrutiny: Revisiting the
Application of the Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Context of Article 15 of the European
Convention on Human Rights, 23 HUM. RTS. Q. 625, 644-47 (2001); Gross & Ni Aolain, supra
note 91, at 95-98 (describing the entrenched emergency in Northern Ireland).
255. See supra note 38 and accompanying text; see also Kanishka Jayasuriya, The Exception
Becomes the Norm: Law and Regimes of Exception in East Asia, 2 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL'Y J. 108,
110 (2001) (noting that regimes of exceptions have become the norm in Malaysia and Singapore);
cf H.A.L. FISHER, A HISTORY OF EUROPE, at v (1936) ("Men wiser and more learned than I have
discerned in history a plot, a rhythm, a predetermined pattern. These harmonies are concealed
from me. I can see only one emergency following upon another as wave follows upon
wave..").
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evil, a transition mechanism to be operative only as long as the War of
Independence was being fought.256 This temporary regime became,
however, a permanent feature in the life of the state, outliving the war that
gave it life. It is still an integral part of the Israeli legal terrain.
Similarly, when originally enacted by the British Parliament, the Civil
Authorities (Special Powers) Act (Northern Ireland) of 1922 was meant to
last for no more than one year.257 It was renewed annually until 1928, when
it was extended for a five-year period. Subsequently, the Act was made
permanent.25 8  The story of the series of Prevention of Terrorism
(Temporary Provisions) Acts (PTA) was much the same. Originally
introduced in Parliament in 1974, it was amended in 1975 and 1983, and
reenacted in 1984. In 1989, the PTA became a permanent part of the statute
books of the United Kingdom.259 Northern Ireland itself has been the
260subject of an emergency rule for a combined period of some thirty years.
Last, by the mid-1970s, the United States had experienced four
declared states of emergency in force spanning a period of more than forty
years. 261 As a direct result, more than 470 pieces of legislation, meant to
256. See MENACHEM HOFNUNG, DEMOCRACY, LAW AND NATIONAL SECURITY IN ISRAEL
52(1996).
257. The result of the emergency regime under the Act was that "the Government enjoyed
powers similar to those current in time of martial law." Claire Palley, The Evolution,
Disintegration and Possible Reconstruction of the Northern Ireland Constitution, I ANGLO-AM.
L. REv. 368, 400 (1972). The radical nature of this piece of legislation is best reflected in section
2(4), which provided that "[i]f any person does any act of such nature as to be calculated to be
prejudicial to the preservation of the peace or maintenance of order in Northern Ireland and not
specifically provided for in the regulations, he shall be guilty of an offence against those
regulations." The South African Minister of Justice was quoted, at the time, as referring to section
2(4) when he said that he "would be willing to exchange all the [South African] legislation of that
sort for one clause in the Northern Ireland Special Powers Act." COMM. ON THE ADMIN. OF
JUSTICE, No EMERGENCY, No EMERGENCY LAW 6 (1993).
258. See Gross & Ni Aolain, supra note 91, at 96 ("In 1973, following the bloodiest year of
the 'troubles' and the introduction of 'direct rule' over Northern Ireland in March 1972, the UK
Parliament enacted the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1973 (EPA) which repealed
the Special Powers Act.").
259. BRADLEY & EWING, supra note 7, at 682; WALKER, supra note 7, at 33-39.
260. See FIONNUALA Ni AOLAIN, THE POLITICS OF FORCE: CONFLICT MANAGEMENT AND
STATE VIOLENCE IN NORTHERN IRELAND 17-71 (2000). From 1971, the United Kingdom had a
nearly continuous derogation in place, linked to the Northern Ireland conflict. Derogation of 20
Aug. 1971, 1971 Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON H.R. 32 (Eur. Comm'n on H.R.); Derogation of 23 Jan.
1973, 1973 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON H.R. 24-26 (Eur. Comm'n on H.R.); Derogation of 16 Aug.
1973, 1973 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON H.R. 26-28 (Eur. Comm'n on H.R.); Derogation of 18 Dec.
1978, 1978 Y.B. EUR. CONV. ON H.R. 22 (Eur. Comm'n on H.R.); Derogation of 23 Dec. 1988,
1988 Y.B. EUR. CONY. ON H.R. 15-16 (Eur. Comm'n on H.R.). The United Kingdom withdrew
its derogation in February 19, 2001, see Clare Dyer, UK Finally Complies with Rights
Convention, GUARDIAN (London), Feb. 20, 2001, at 8, but on November 12, 2001, the British
government again declared a "state of emergency," see HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT
2002, at http://www.hrw.org/wr2k2/europe21.html. See generally Ni Aolain, supra note 98, at
106-26 (discussing derogations in the European system).
261. Between 1933 and 1972, four national emergencies were declared. See Proclamation No.
2039, reprinted in 2 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLN D. ROOSEVELT 24, 24-
26 (1938), and in 48 Stat. 1689 (1933) (ordering all banks to close from March 6, 1933, through
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apply only when a state of emergency has been declared, could have been
262used by the government.
2. It's a Bad World out There (i):
Spatial Distinctions
A further separation of emergency from normalcy is set around
geographic distinctions. Different legal principles, rules, and norms may be
applied in distinct geographical areas that belong to the same "control
system, ' 263 such as Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Israel and the
territories that came under its control after the 1967 war, or France and
Algeria. One part of such a "control system"-the controlling territory-
applies an emergency regime to the dependent territory. At the same time a
putative normal legal regime is maintained in the controlling territory itself.
Thus, the authorities of the controlling territory apply two legal regimes
contemporaneously. 264 The dependent territory becomes an anomalous zone
in which certain legal rules, otherwise regarded as embodying fundamental
policies and values of the larger legal system, are locally suspended.265
However, the claim is that the two realities and the two concomitant legal
regimes-that of emergency applicable to the dependent territory and that
of normalcy applicable to the controlling territory-are maintained
separately and do not affect each other. Maintaining a regime of legal
exception in the dependent territory does not adversely affect the form and
content of the normal legal order that governs the controlling territory. In
other words, there is no spillover from one legal regime to the other across
geographic boundaries.
Experience shows that such a position is untenable. Geographic
boundaries prove to be permeable, rather than integral, when emergency
powers are concerned.266 Gerald Neuman has already demonstrated that
March 9, 1933); Proclamation No. 2914, 3 C.F.R. 99 (1949-1953) (declaring a national
emergency in response to the Korean conflict); Proclamation No. 3972, 3 C.F.R. 473 (1970)
(declaring a national emergency in response to the Post Office strike); Proclamation No. 4074, 3
C.F.R. 80 (1971) (declaring a national emergency so that currency and foreign trade restrictions
could be implemented).
262. Glenn E. Fuller, Note, The National Emergency Dilemma: Balancing the Executive's
Crisis Powers with the Need for Accountability, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 1453, 1453 (1979).
263. Baruch Kimmerling, Boundaries and Frontiers of the Israeli Control System: Analytical
Conclusions, in THE ISRAELI STATE AND SOCIETY 265, 266-67 (Baruch Kinmerling ed., 1989).
264. See, e.g., A.W. BRIAN SIMiPsoN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE END OF EMPIRE: BRITAIN
AND THE GENESIS OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION (2001) (noting that the rule of law was aimed
at making Britons feel better about themselves at home, but that it was not designed to hinder the
management of the British Empire vis-A-vis its colonies, where the utilization of sweeping
emergency powers was the norm).
265. Gerald L. Neuman, Anomalous Zones, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1197, 1201 (1996).
266. Marcus Raskin noted that government officials
see no distinctions among geographic boundaries and are apt to operate in essentially
the same way against Americans and non-Americans. Thus, the attempt of the CIA to
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"anomalous zones" threaten to subvert fundamental values in the larger
legal system. 267 The belief in our ability to use the politically, legally, and
socially constructed anomaly in order to contain the exercise of emergency
powers and confine their use to that territory is, therefore, misguided. As
the story of the curtailment of the right to silence in the United Kingdom
clearly shows, sweeping powers that have been used in the dependent
territory find their way home to the controlling territory.268
Separation between normalcy and emergency along geographic lines
has once again been resorted to in the wake of the terrorist attacks of
September 11 th.
Operation Enduring Freedom resulted, among other things, in several
hundred suspected al Qaeda or Taliban members being detained by the
United States at its naval base at Guantanamo Bay. The base is leased by
the United States from Cuba. In a series of cases coming before U.S. district
courts, several of the detainees petitioned for writs of habeas corpus. The
district courts have, however, ruled that they lack jurisdiction to hear such
claims.2 69 Some have gone further to hold that aliens detained outside the
sovereign territory of the United States cannot use American courts to
pursue claims brought under the Constitution of the United States.
Obviously, the courts have not deemed the fact that the United States
exercises complete control over Guantanamo sufficient to find in favor of
the petitioners. 2 7  Thus, the anomalous nature of Guantanamo-
demonstrated in the 1990s in the context of detention of Haitian 27t and then
Cuban refugees27 2 -has been invoked once again.
The attacks have also sparked debate about the desirability of using
torture to obtain information from suspected terrorists when such
assassinate Patrice Lumumba in the Congo is directly analogous to the FBI's attempt to
destroy politically Martin Luther King, Jr. in the United States.
Marcus G. Raskin, Democracy Versus the National Security State, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Summer 1976, at 189, 200. Raskin also noted that American actions against
Salvador Allende were similar to the methods used by the Committee for the Reelection of
the President in Nixon's reelection campaign. Id. On the concepts of permeable, fragmental,
and integral boundaries and distinctions, see A.R. Luckham, A Comparative Typology of
Civil-Military Relations, GOV'T & OPPOSITION, Winter 1971, at 5.
267. Neuman, supra note 265, at 1227-28, 1231-33.
268. See infra notes 317-334 and accompanying text.
269. See, eg., Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55 (D.D.C. 2002) (dismissing petition for writ
of habeas corpus on the basis that aliens held outside the sovereign territory of the United States
could not use U.S. courts to pursue petitions for habeas corpus); Coalition of Clergy v. Bush, 189
F. Supp. 2d 1036 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (dismissing petition for writ of habeas due to lack of standing
by petitioners as next friend, while also holding that the court lacked jurisdiction to issue the writ
and that Guantanamo detainees had no right to a writ of habeas corpus); see also Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278 (4th Cir. 2002) (reversing a district court's order allowing counsel
unmonitored access to a Guantanamo detainee held on a U.S. brig).
270. See Neuman, supra note 265, at 1230.
271. Steven Greenhouse, As Tide of Haitian Refugees Rises, U.S. Uses Cuban Base, N.Y.
TIMES, June 30, 1994, at A3.
272. John Kifner, Flight from Cuba: The Refugees, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1994, at A17.
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information may be critical to foiling future terrorist acts. 273 Most relevant
to our discussion here are allegations that the United States has
"contracted" the torture services of other countries by way of extraditing
suspected terrorists to such countries where they would be subjected to
torture and the information extracted as a result would then be at the
disposal of the CIA and FBI.27 4 In the words of one FBI agent, "We are
known for humanitarian treatment, so basically we are stuck., 275 In other
words, foreign intelligence agents, less scrupulous than their American
counterparts and less concerned about their self-image with respect to
human rights, will do the work. We will enjoy the fruits of their work
without getting our hands dirty in the process.276 Once again, the
experiences of other countries demonstrate the danger that coercive
interrogation techniques used abroad will become part of the domestic
antiterrorist, and potentially even ordinary, criminal investigation
277process.
3. It's a Bad World out There (1J):
Domestic and Foreign Affairs
It is often asserted that in the area of foreign affairs, ordinary
constitutional schemes may be more relaxed. Greater deference than usual
is accorded the decisions and policies of the Executive. 278 This attitude
toward foreign affairs assumes that a clear separation between the "foreign"
and the "domestic" is maintainable and the two spheres can be held apart.
273. See, e.g., ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, WHY TERRORISM WORKS: UNDERSTANDING THE
THREAT, RESPONDING TO THE CHALLENGE 131-63 (2002); Sanford Levinson, "Precommitment "
and "Post-Commitment": The Ban on Torture in the Wake of September 11, 81 TEX. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2003); Walter Pincus, Silence of 4 Terror Probe Suspects Poses Dilemma for FBI,
WASH. POST, Oct. 21, 2001, at A6; Richard A. Posner, The Best Offense, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 2,
2002, at 28 (reviewing Dershowitz, supra); Eric Schmitt, There Are Ways To Make Them Talk,
N.Y. TIMEs, June 16, 2002, at D1.
274. See Duncan Campbell, September 11: Six Months on: US Sends Suspects To Face
Torture, GUARDIAN (London), Mar. 12, 2002, at 4; Rajiv Chandrasekaran & Peter Finn, U.S.
Behind Secret Transfer of Terror Suspects, WASH. POST, Mar. 11, 2002, at Al; Vicki Haddock,
The Unspeakable: To Get at the Truth, Is Torture or Coercion Ever Justified?, S.F. CHRON., Nov.
18, 2001, at D1; Pincus, supra note 273; Dana Priest & Barton Gellman, U.S. Decries Abuse but
Defends Interrogations, WASH. POST, Dec. 26, 2002, at Al.
275. Pincus, supra note 273.
276. Heymann, supra note 15, at 453-54.
277. See Oren Gross, Theoretical Models of Emergency Powers 314-16, 335-37 (1997)
(unpublished S.J.D. dissertation, Harvard University) (on file with author) (discussing British and
French examples).
278. See, e.g., FRANCK, supra note 96, at 11 (describing Chief Justice Marshall's conviction
that "there is something different about 'foreign affairs' that renders them particularly impervious
to judicial inquiry"); Louis Henkin, The United States Constitution in Its Third Century: Foreign
Affairs, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 713, 716 (1989) ("Foreign affairs are likely to remain constitutionally
'special' in the next century, as they have been in the past two."); Peter J. Spiro, Foreign
Relations Federalism, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1223, 1223 (1999) (noting the existence of a foreign
affairs differential).
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Trying to garner support for the proposed Constitution and alleviate fears of
a strong central government, James Madison suggested that "[t]he powers
delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government are few
and defined.... [They] will be exercised principally on external objects, as
war, peace, negotiation, and foreign commerce .. ,,279 However, Madison
himself was conscious of the difficulties associated with reliance on this
separation between foreign and domestic: "Perhaps it is a universal truth
that the loss of liberty at home is to be charged to provisions against danger,
real or pretended, from abroad.,
280
In his opinion in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,
2 8 1
Justice Sutherland stated that the federal government enjoyed inherent
powers in the realm of foreign affairs. 282 These powers are connected to
conceptions of nationality and external sovereignty and are not limited to
specific affirmative grants of authority found in the Constitution.
283
Moreover, within the federal government it is the President who is invested
with these inherent powers.
28 4
279. THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 292 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossitcr cd., 1961)
(emphasis added). A similar idea was conveyed by John Locke's separation between the
"executive power" and the "federative power." JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF
GOVERNMENT, in TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT § 148 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ.
Press 1988) (1690). Although both powers are to be held by the same organ (or organs) of the
community, they are distinct and separate. The executive power is the power to "see to the
Execution of the Laws that are made, and remain in force." Id. § 144. The federative power
contains "the Power of War and Peace, Leagues and Alliances, and all the Transactions, with all
Persons and Communities without the Commonwealth." Id. § 146. Locke also noted that
though this federative Power in the well or ill management of it be of great moment to
the commonwealth, yet it is much less capable to be directed by antecedent, standing,
positive Laws than the Executive; and so must necessarily be left to the Prudence and
Wisdom of those whose hands it is in, to be managed for the publick good. For the
Laws that concern Subjects one amongst another... may well enough precede them.
But what is to be done in reference to Foreigners, depending much upon their actions,
and the variation of designs and interests, must be left in great part to the Prudence of
those who have this Power committed to them, to be managed by the best of their Skill
for the advantage of the Commonwealth.
Id. § 147.
280. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (May 13, 1798), quoted in THE
COMPLETE MADISON: HIS BASIC WRITINGS 258 (Saul K. Padover ed., 1953).
281. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
282. Id. at 315-16, 318.
283. Id. at 318.
284. Id. at 319. This power is not confined to express constitutional grants of power or to
statutory delegations of authority; it also encompasses
[t]he very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of
the federal government in the field of international relations-a power which does not
require as a basis for its exercise an act of Congress, but which, of course, like every
other governmental power, must be exercised in subordination to the applicable
provisions of the Constitution.
Id. at 320.
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In the past six decades, Justice Sutherland's opinion has been the
subject of much heated debate.285 Whatever the criticisms levied against it,
the notion of inherent plenary foreign affairs powers has continued to
appeal to the Executive and has had significant impact upon subsequent
judicial decisions.28 6 Precisely because of the great influence that Curtiss-
Wright has had in the area of foreign affairs, it is interesting to note the
pains to which Justice Sutherland went in order to distinguish between
issues of foreign affairs and foreign policy, and the realm of domestic
affairs. His opinion starts by noting:
It will contribute to the elucidation of the question if we first
consider the differences between the powers of the federal
government in respect of foreign or external affairs and those in
respect of domestic or internal affairs. That there are differences
between them, and that these differences are fundamental, may not
be doubted.2" 7
He goes on to state, more than once, that the powers of the federal
government with respect to "external affairs" are wholly different than the
powers it may exercise in "internal affairs." Thus, "[t]he broad statement
that the federal government can exercise no powers except those
specifically enumerated in the Constitution, and such implied powers as are
necessary and proper to carry into effect the enumerated powers, is
categorically true only in respect of our internal affairs."
288 Federalism, 289
separation of powers, and the delegation of powers doctrine 290 do not apply
to the powers of the President over the whole range of foreign affairs issues.
285. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v, Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 n.2 (1952) (Jackson,
J., concurring) (characterizing most of Curtiss-Wright as "dictum"); David M. Levitan, The
Foreign Relations Power: An Analysis of Mr. Justice Sutherland's Theory, 55 YALE L.J. 467, 490
(1946) (noting Justice Sutherland's "sharp departure from the accepted canons of constitutional
interpretation and assumptions as to the nature of the American system of government"). See
generally FRANCK, supra note 96, at 14-18; LOUIS HENK1N, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE
CONSTITUTION 19-26 (1972); KOH, supra note 62, at 93-95; Charles A. Lofgren, United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation: An Historical Reassessment, 83 YALE L.J. 1, 3 (1973)
(stating that no consensus existed as to the meaning of Curtiss-Wright).
286. See KOH, supra note 62, at 134-46; see also FRANCK, supra note 96, at 16
("Sutherland's words succeeded in capturing a widely shared public preference for rallying
around the president in the face of foreign threats. Many Americans... may still believe that not
only politics but also the writ of the law should stop at the water's edge.").
287. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 315.
288. Id. at 315-16 (emphasis added).
289. See, e.g., United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 233 (1942) ("Power over external affairs
is not shared by the States; it is vested in the national government exclusively."); THE
FEDERALIST No. 42, at 264 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("This class of powers
[which regulate the intercourse with foreign nations] forms an obvious and essential branch of the
federal administration. If we are to be one nation in any respect, it clearly ought to be in respect to
other nations.").
290. See generally TRIBE, supra note 8, at 977-1011.
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However, such bright-line separation between foreign and domestic
affairs has proven problematic. The external and the internal have
increasingly converged. In an era of globalization, the interdependence
among nations causes virtually every issue of domestic affairs to bear on
the external affairs of the nations involved and on their national security
policies. The significance of geographical boundaries, of the "water's
edge," is greatly diminished. In his 1993 inaugural address, President
Clinton expressed this idea when he said that "[t]here is no longer a clear
division between what is foreign and what is domestic. The world
economy, the world environment, the world AIDS crisis, the world arms
race-they affect us all., 291 A former dean of Stanford Law School
suggested the term "intermestic" to describe the large array of issues that
are at the same time domestic and international, noting that while in the past
these types of issues, although existing, formed a mere exception within the
foreign relations agenda, "the exceptional has now become
preponderant." 92
Not only does such entanglement of foreign and domestic occur, but
when it does, often the realities of foreign affairs and national security
policy have the more pronounced impact upon the ultimate outcome of the
interaction. Thus, for example, the movement of expansive presidential
powers from the area of foreign affairs to domestic affairs has been well
documented. In The Imperial Presidency, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., notes:
[T]he imperial Presidency received its decisive impetus, I believe,
from foreign policy ....
291, William J. Clinton, We Force the Spring, Presidential Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 1993),
quoted in Slaughter Burley, supra note 96, at 1980. Franck also noted:
Foreign affairs have become inextricably interwoven with the fabric of American life
and ought to be treated holistically ....
. .. [I]n a world so interdependent that the flow of persons, goods, and ideas
between states is almost as ordinary as between states of our Union, no "affair" is any
longer exclusively denominable as "foreign."... The elements of these mixed
domestic-foreign affairs often cannot be disentangled even in theory, let alone in
practice .... [T]here is now scarcely such a thing as a discrete "foreign-affairs"
enterprise ....
FRANCK, supra note 96, at 8-9.
292. Bayless Manning noted:
The issues of the new international agenda strike instantly into the economic and
political interests of domestic constituencies.
... [E]very jiggle in the pattern of the international economy is likely to pinch
some local group in the United States and convert it immediately into a vocal
group.... The international agenda itself has changed so that modem diplomacy is
increasingly taken up with homespun economic subjects like fishing limits and
commodity prices, as to which one or another set of domestic interests are deeply
concerned ....
Bayless Manning, The Congress, the Executive and Intermestic Affairs: Three Proposals, 55
FOREIGN AFF. 306, 309 (1977).
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... [I]f the President were conceded these life-and-death
decisions abroad, how could he be restrained from gathering unto
himself the less fateful powers of the national polity? For the
claims of unilateral authority in foreign policy soon began to
pervade and embolden the domestic Presidency.
29r
Nor should this come as a surprise. As nations become increasingly
interdependent, there are growing domestic pressures on national
governments to protect the public against the perceived deleterious effects
of globalization on jobs, security, and national identity. Interdependence
also accelerates the pace of the shifting of crises from one nation to another,
carried over the transmission belts of global trade and commerce, as
demonstrated by the East Asian currency crisis of 1997, as well as by the
more recent decline of the world's economies into recession.294 As crises
move more rapidly from one country to another, the time available to
national governments to respond to such exigencies is dramatically reduced.
Events such as the attacks of September 11 th strengthen the sense that the
world has become a less secure place. If in the past the enemy was clearly
known, today's foes are invisible and may be lurking anywhere. They may
strike at any time and at any place. Concepts such as "national security"
have transformed from being fundamentally military-related to
encompassing many other areas of human endeavor.295 Secrecy, dispatch,
and access to broad sources of information-the attributes that have
293. ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY, at ix (1989). For a different
assessment, see FRANCK, supra note 96, at 126 (recognizing that bringing foreign and domestic
affairs closer together will result in the beneficial outcome of eliminating the political question
doctrine from the jurisprudence of American courts when dealing with issues involving foreign
affairs); and TRIBE, supra note 8, at 636 ("The constitutional role for the Executive in domestic
matters is thus largely ancillary to that of Congress. And the more the foreign and domestic
spheres tend to merge, the more this principle will apply to all executive action.").
294. See, e.g., Joseph Kahn, The World's Economies Slide Together into Recession, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 25, 2001, at A6.
295. See, e.g., R.N. BERKI, SECURITY AND SOCIETY: REFLECTIONS ON LAW, ORDER AND
POLITICS (1986); ROBERT MANDEL, THE CHANGING FACE OF NATIONAL SECURITY: A
CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS (1994); Oren Gross, The Normless and Exceptionless Exception: Carl
Schmitt's Theory of Emergency Powers and the "Norm-Exception" Dichotomy, 21 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1825, 1857-63 (2000); Daniel J_ Kaufman et al., How To Analyze National Security: A
Conceptual Framework, in U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY: A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS 3, 3-26
(Daniel J. Kaufman et al. eds., 1985); Moshe Lissak, Civilian Components in the National
Security Doctrine, in NATIONAL SECURITY AND DEMOCRACY IN ISRAEL 55 (Avner Yaniv ed.,
1993); Frank N. Trager & Frank L. Simonie, An Introduction to the Study of National Security, in
NATIONAL SECURITY AND AMERICAN SOCIETY: THEORY PROCESS AND POLICY 35 (Frank N.
Trager & Philip S. Kronenberg cds., 1973); Developments in the Law-The National Security
Interest and Civil Liberties, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1130, 1133 (1972); see also Peter M. Sanchez, The
"Drug War ": The U.S. Military and National Security, 34 A.F. L. REV. 109, 151 (199 1) ("[I]f the
drug problem is perceived as a national security threat, will any social problem become a national
security threat in the future?").
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traditionally been considered to put the Executive in the best position with
respect to the conduct of foreign and national security policies296 -are more
likely to be introduced into the domestic scene.
4. Communal Divisions: Us vs. Them
Counterterrorism measures and emergency powers are often perceived
as directed against a clear enemy of "others." The contours of conflict are
drawn around groups and communities rather than individuals. Such
communal distinctions need not be taken as given; counterterrorism
measures often actively produce and construct a suspect community.297 One
is either with "us" or with "them."2 98 There is no middle way.
In times of crisis, when emotions run high, the dialectic of "us versus
them" serves several functions. It allows people to vent fear and anger in
the face of actual or perceived danger, and direct negative emotional
energies toward groups or individuals clearly identified as different. The
same theme also accounts for the greater willingness to confer emergency
powers on the government when the "other" is well-defined and clearly
separable from the members of the community. 299 The clearer the
distinction between "us" and "them" and the greater the threat "they" pose
296. THE FEDERALIST No. 64, at 392-93 (John Jay), No. 75, at 451-52 (Alexander Hamilton)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
297. HILLYARD, supra note 92, at 257 (noting that the most important feature of the series of
Prevention of Terrorism Acts in Britain has been the way in which they have constructed a
suspect community in Britain: the Irish community living in Britain or traveling between Britain
and Northern Ireland); see also Macklin, supra note 48, at 398 (noting the role of law in general,
and criminal law in particular, in producing "the alien within").
298. Soon after the attacks of September 11 th, President Bush declared, "Either you are with
us or you are with the terrorists." President Bush's Address on Terrorism Before a Joint Meeting
of Congress, supra note 31; see also David W. Chen & Somini Sengupta, Not Yet Citizens but
Eager To Fight for the U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2001, at Al (reporting on legal permanent
resident enlistment in the armed services post-September 1 th due in part to 'an us versus them
thing [as]... children of immigrants feel a need to assert which side of the line they are on'
(quoting Hunter College sociologist Philip Kasinitz, who studies assimilation issues facing
children)).
299. See supra note 103; see also Macklin, supra note 48, at 396. The link between the
perception of the threat and its sources as exogenous to the community as well as the public's
willingness to accept the use of increasingly sweeping emergency powers by the government, has
led some to suggest that the government may seek to target "foreign" enemies in order to enhance
its domestic popularity and solidify public support behind it (especially if it is faced with strong
domestic criticisms on issues such as the economy). See, e.g., Jack S. Levy, The Diversionary
Theory of War: A Critique, in HANDBOOK OF WAR STUDIES 259 (Manus I. Midlarsky cd., 1989);
see also Jack M. Balkin, The Most Dangerous Person on Earth, HARTFORD COURANT, Sept. 22,
2002, at C1 (asserting that "by shifting the nation's forces from one military offensive to another,
[Bush] can divert attention from domestic failures and foreign policy blunders"); Mark Matthews
& Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Bush Warns U.N. Not To Be Fooled by Iraq, BALT. SUN, Sept. 18,
2002, at IA (quoting Senate Majority Whip Harry Reid as stating that "[tihe president could be
doing this to divert attention from domestic issues" and characterizing Reid as "suspicious of the
administration's motives in focusing such intense pre-election national attention on Iraq").
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to "us," the greater in scope the powers assumed by government and
tolerated by the public become.
A bright-line separation between "us" and "them" allows for piercing
300the veil of ignorance. ° We allow for more repressive emergency measures
when we believe that we are able to peek beyond the veil and ascertain that
such powers will not be turned against us. Furthermore, the portrayal of the
sources of danger as "foreign" and terrorists as "others" who are endowed
with barbaric characteristics and who are out to destroy us and our way of
life is used to prove the urgent need for radical measures to meet the threat
head on.
30 1
Take, for example, the issue of racial and ethnic profiling. In the past,
an overwhelming majority of the American public considered racial and
ethnic profiling wrong. The terrorist attacks of September 11 th brought
about a dramatic reversal in public opinion on this issue.3 °2 This change in
public attitude is attributed to the fact that the September 11 th terrorists
were all Arab Muslims. That fact, coupled with the high stakes involved in
foiling future terrorist attacks, convinced many that "it [was] only common
sense to pay closer attention to Arab-looking men boarding airplanes and
elsewhere., 30 3 The belief that profiling practices were only going to be
targeting "Arab-looking" persons, or more broadly, foreigners, made easier
the shift from objection to support of racial and ethnic profiling. After all,
most Americans did not need to worry about such measures. They were not
the intended targets and their rights were unlikely to be infringed. If
ordinary Americans considered themselves potential targets of such
measures, their willingness to support them might have been mitigated.
This certainly seems to be the case if complaints, mostly of the "why me?"
variety, by "ordinary Americans" selected for special security checks at
airports are anything to go by.
30 4
Certainly, the distinction between us and them is not unique to the
sphere of emergency powers. Such notions are fundamental to the
300. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 102-07 (rev. ed. 1999).
301. Ileana Porras notes:
The terrorist is transformed through... rhetoric from an ordinary deviant into a
frightening, "foreign," barbaric beast at the same time that extra-normal means are
called for to fight terrorism. Since terrorists are never imagined as anything other
than terrifying, blood-thirsty barbarians, ordinary law is understood to be deficient or
insufficient to deal with them. In the face of terrorism, extra-ordinary law, it seems, is
required. Terrorism literature emphasizes, through its choice of metaphors, that the
situation is one of "us" or "them." To survive, we must destroy them. To fail to
destroy them is to destroy ourselves.
Porras, supra note 103, at 121-22.
302. See JAMES X. DEMPSEY & DAVID COLE, TERRORISM AND THE CONSTITUTION 168
(2002) (noting that before September I 1th, about eighty percent of the American public rejected
racial profiling, whereas afier September 11 th, sixty percent supported such practice).
303. Id.
304. Cf Stuntz, supra note 104, at 2165-66 (supporting group searches and seizures).
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understanding of both our individual and group consciousness. An integral
part of our definition as individuals or as members of certain distinct groups
is tied to drawing boundaries between the ins and the outs. Group
consciousness is, to a large extent, about an affirmative, internal,
organizing, communitarian symbol that serves as the core around which the
identity of the group is constructed. 5 It is also about distinguishing those
who are in-members of the group-and those left outside.
30 6
However, crises lead to heightened individual and group
consciousnesses. Allegiance to the community and the willingness to
sacrifice for the community's sake-in certain situations, the willingness
even to sacrifice one's own life-receive a higher premium and attention in
times of peril that endanger the group. 307 The lines of ins and outs are more
clearly and readily drawn.3 °8 Stereotyping often is employed with respect
both to insiders and to outsiders, emphasizing good, noble, and worthy
attributes of the former, and negative traits of the latter. Collective
derogatory name calling and identification of the others as "barbarians" are
symptoms of that trend.30 9 Internal conformities within the community are
exaggerated, while divergence from "outsiders" is emphasized t °
As far as politicians are concerned, targeting outsiders is less costly,
and hence more politically desirable, than targeting larger groups that
include citizens. While the benefits, perceived or real, of fighting terrorism
and violence seem to spread among all the members of society, the costs
seem to be borne by a smaller, and ostensibly "other," group of people.
Under such circumstances, the danger is that political leaders will tend to
impose too many costs on the target group without facing much resistance
(and, in fact, receiving strong support) from the general public.
311
305. Frederick Schauer, Community, Citizenship, and the Search for National Identity, 84
MICH. L. REV. 1504, 1513-17 (1986).
306. See ELLIOTT, supra note 103, at 6-10; id. at 8 ("People only display attitudes of us due
to an acquired sense of we-ness determined largely by a sense of they-ness in relation to others.
So-called ingroup and outgroup behaviour therefore merely reflects the two sides of group
consciousness.").
307. Schauer noted:
[A] meaningful sense of community exists only insofar as the individuals who comprise
that community are willing to take actions on behalf of the community not only that
they would not take on their own behalf, but that are quite possibly detrimental to their
own interest.... [W]e cannot think about a meaningful sense of community without
thinking of some sense of sacrifice.
Schauer, supra note 305, at 1504; see also Quarantelli & Dynes, supra note 99, at 143 (noting the
effect of emergencies on the strengthening of community identification).
308. Quarantelli & Dynes, supra note 99, at 144 ("The increase in solidarity within the
community is accompanied by an increase in hostility towards outsiders.").
309. ELLIOTT, supra note 103, at 9 (mentioning the use of such epithets as Krauts, Nips,
Wops, Wogs, and Gooks by the Allies during World War It); see also J GLENN GRAY, THE
WARRIORS: REFLECTIONS ON MEN IN BATTLE 157-202 (1973).
3 10. See ELLIOTT, supra note 103, at 9.
311. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
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However, reliance on the separation between "us" and "them" may
prove illusory. Natural as the "us-them" discourse may seem to be, the
dangers that it presents are disregarded too easily and its long-term costs are
often ignored.3" 2 Thus, a search for an appropriate trade-off between
individual liberties and security needs may lead to results that do not reflect
adequately the true costs and benefits involved.
Two interrelated major costs can be identified in this context. First,
there is the danger that extraordinary measures that are employed at present
against "them" will be turned against "us" in the future. This may happen
for several reasons. First, with time there may be a redefinition of the
boundaries of the relevant groups. Some who are today an integral part of
the "us" group may find themselves outside the redefined group tomorrow,
leaving within its circumference a smaller number of people. Second,
exceptional emergency measures may be acceptable when premised on the
understanding that they will only be exercised outward, outside the
boundaries of the group consensus. However, in the rush to avail the group
of such measures, it is oftentimes the case that no adequate guarantees are
installed to ensure that the tide does not turn and that the same mechanisms
do not operate inward, i.e., against "us." Indeed, that such measures ought
to be used solely against outsiders may be so clear to everyone within the
community that there will seem to be no real need to express that implicit
consensus explicitly in legislation or otherwise. Third, even if current
emergency measures do explicitly refer, for example, to foreignness as an
operative term for the applicability of new legal provisions, it may well be
that with time such limitations on the scope of the measures will be
removed and abandoned, with the measures applying to a much larger
group than had been originally intended.313
A second and closely linked danger in relying on the us-versus-them
discourse relates to the possibility that the growing schism between "us"
and "them" will result not only in the alienation of different groups in the
population, but in the dehumanization of the outsider or consideration of
him or her as inferior.3 t4 A dichotomy may be created where the enemy is
regarded as immoral, cruel, and evil, while "our" people are of the highest
morality and fight for a just cause.31 5 This may lead, in turn, to debasement
of the fundamental values of the community and its members, as they come
to ignore the same values when dealing with those who are not part of their
own group.
316
312. See, e.g., Blown Away?, supra note 103, at 2091.
313. For specific examples, see Cole, supra note 103, at 989-1004.
314. DEMPSEY & COLE, supra note 302, at 170; ELLIOTT, supra note 103, at 96.
315. ELLIOTT, supra note 103, at 96.
316. Elliott noted, however, that
strong sense of group identity with feelings of us and them removes any sense of
contradiction and has always tended to occlude humanitarian feelings towards an
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The story of the curtailment of the right to silence in the United
Kingdom exemplifies many of the different mechanisms of separation
discussed above, and their eventual blurring or collapse. On August 25,
1988, in response to escalating terrorist attacks-including an August 20th
bombing in County Tyrone, Northern Ireland, of a military bus that left
eight British soldiers dead and twenty-eight injured 317-the British
government decided to adopt a series of security measures. The package
included a measure to limit the right to silence of suspects and defendants,
both with respect to their interrogation by the police and with respect to
their silence in court during trial. 318 The government's argument for the
proposed deviation from a well-established principle was that the wide and
systematic lack of cooperation with the police by those suspected of
involvement in terrorist activities in Northern Ireland was critically
hampering interrogations. 319 The factual background against which the new
limitations on the right to silence were introduced, as well as specific
declarations made by senior public officials, created a clear impression that
the measures were designed to bolster the state's powers needed to wage a
comprehensive war on terrorism in Northern Ireland.32°
The public debate on the new order focused on "terrorist activities.
321
The general perception was that the proposed measures were necessary in
the fight against paramilitary terrorism in Northern Ireland.322 Furthermore,
enemy, once group fear or anger is aroused. Then the foe are [sic] not regarded as being
"true" human beings at all. This may indeed, like stereotyping, be part of a primitive
defence mechanism.
Id. at 97.
317. Steve Lohr, I.R.A. Claims Killing of 8 Soldiers as It Steps Up Attacks on British, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 21, 1988, atAl.
318. Charles Hodgson & Raymond Hughes, King Curbs Right To Remain Silent, FIN. TIMES
(London), Oct. 21, 1988, at 28.
319. See 140 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (1988) 184 (comments of Tom King, Secretary of
State for Northern Ireland).
320. Explaining the reasoning behind the government's decision, the minister responsible for
Northern Ireland, Tom King, emphasized:
[1]t will help in convicting guilty men. I don't think it will undermine standards of
justice. In Northern Ireland, the whole system of justice is under sustained attack by
terrorists and their aim is to destroy the whole system. They intimidate and murder
witnesses and judges and they train people not to answer any questions at all.
Ed Moloney, Britain Seeks To Abolish Key Civil Liberty in Ulster: London's Move Aimed at
Thwarting IRA, WASH. POST, Oct. 21, 1988, at AI (emphasis added); see also Charles Hodgson,
Plan To Curb Right to Silence Approved, FIN. TIMES (London), Nov. 9, 1988, at 15.
321. SUSAN EASTON, THE CASE FOR THE RIGHT TO SILENCE 60 (2d ed. 1998) ("The debates
of the early seventies focused on the 'abuse' of the right to silence by professional criminals, but
by the late eighties this concern was overshadowed by anxieties over professional terrorists, such
as members of the Irish Republican Army and other sectarian para-military groups.").
322. See, e.g., THE VISCOUNT COLVILLE OF CULROSS, REVIEW OF THE OPERATION OF THE
PREVENTION OF TERRORISM (TEMPORARY PROVISIONS) ACT 1984, 1987, Cmnd. 264, at 51
(declaring Viscount Colville's support for the annulment of the right to silence, on the grounds
that terrorists were using this right to hide behind a wall of silence, thus causing difficulties for
police interrogators and prosecutors in bringing terrorists to justice).
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such measures were supported on the assumption that they were going to
target an easily definable group. Not only were they to be limited in their
geographic application to Northern Ireland, but even within this territorial
framework they were to be aimed only at "terrorists." Thus, we have an
example not just of geographic separation, but also separation along
religious, national, and ideological lines. The separation was meant to be
between "here" and "there," and between "us" and "them." Claims that
similar measures might eventually find their way into the criminal law and
procedural rules of the rest of the United Kingdom received little
attention.
323
Despite repeated declarations and assurances to the effect that the new
limitations were meant to strengthen law enforcement authorities in their
war on terrorism, once the Criminal Evidence Order (Northern Ireland) of
1988 was approved, its language was not confined to acts of terrorism.
324
Moreover, the Order was not enacted within the framework of emergency
legislation that already existed in Northern Ireland, but rather as ordinary
criminal legislation. Any mention or indication of the Order's relation to
terrorist acts disappeared. Thus, the Order's jurisdiction and the restrictions
it set on the right to silence were not limited to those suspected of serious
crimes related to terrorism, 325 but were expanded and interpreted as relating
to every criminal suspect or defendant in Northern Ireland.326
Denouncing the Thatcher government's decision to ban radio and
television broadcasting of interviews with persons connected to certain
organizations, 327 the Labour Party's spokesman on Northern Ireland, Kevin
McNamara, blamed the government for using Northern Ireland as "an
323. Steven Greer, The Right to Silence: A Review of the Current Debate, 53 MOD. L. REV.
709, 716-17 (1990); Edward Rees, Guilty by Inference, GUARDIAN (London), Apr. 11, 1995, at
11.
324. Susan Easton noted:
It was also expected that any changes to the right to silence in Northern
Ireland... would be incorporated into emergency legislation, and restricted to terrorist
offences, rather than becoming part of the ordinary criminal law.... [I]t seems unlikely
that this route will be taken now that the curtailment of the right to silence is a fcature
of the English criminal justice system applicable to all suspects.
EASTON, supra note 321, at 69.
325. ANTONIO VERCHER, TERRORISM IN EUROPE: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE
LEGAL ANALYSIS 121-25 (1992).
326. See, e.g., Gregory W. O'Reilly, England Limits the Right to Silence and Moves Towards
an Inquisitorial System of Justice, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 402, 425 (1994). It is also
worth noting that the Order was approved by the British Parliament in an expedited fashion,
forsaking traditional legislative procedures. Michael Mansfield, Reform That Pays Lip Service to
Justice, GUARDIAN (London), Oct. 6, 1993, at 22; see also EASTON, supra note 321, at 68-69;
Andrew Ashworth & Peter Creighton, The Right of Silence in Northern Ireland, in LESSONS FROM
NORTHERN IRELAND 117, 122-25 (Jon Hayes & Paul O'Higgins eds., 1990).
327. These measures were introduced as part of the antiterrorism package in 1988. Graham
Zellick, Spies, Subversives, Terrorists and the British Government: Free Speech and Other
Casualties, 31 WM. & MARY L. REv. 773, 775-82 (1990); Craig R. Whitney, Civil Liberties in
Britain: Are They Under Siege?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 1988, at A 18.
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experimental laboratory for draconian measures." 328 Six years after
beginning its "experiment" regarding the right to silence in Northern
Ireland, the British government decided that the time was ripe to extend the
experiment to the rest of the United Kingdom.
In November 1994, Parliament approved the Criminal Justice and
Public Order Act (CJPOA).32 9 Articles 34 through 37 of the Act
reproduced, almost verbatim, the relevant provisions of the 1988 Northern
Ireland Order.330 In fact, when proposing and explaining the new Act, the
British Home Secretary relied specifically on the example of that Order.
Once again, the government claimed that the new legislation was necessary
because terrorists were abusing the right to silence.331 As with its Northern
Ireland prototype, the CJPOA was presented as part of a more
comprehensive plan for a war against terrorism and organized crime. As
with the Northern Ireland Order, these new limitations on the right to
silence were incorporated into criminal legislation and were expanded to
apply to every suspected offender, not just those accused of terrorist
activities.
The significant change, in comparison to 1988, was the intensity of
objections expressed in 1994 against the CJPOA.332 However, the
opponents of the proposed legislation found themselves fighting an uphill
battle that was doomed to failure. Many found themselves opposing the
provisions that they had not previously contested in the case of Northern
Ireland.333 Those who did not object when the 1988 Order curtailed the
right to silence in one part of the United Kingdom could not oppose
successfully setting the same limitations on their own rights at home. The
right to silence, which in the past had been considered one of the basic
tenets of the English criminal justice system, no longer enjoyed such status
in 1994. The damage that this right had suffered in Northern Ireland six
years earlier undermined it in other parts of the country. The British public
328. Andrew Phillips, Gagging the IRA: Thatcher Imposes a Controversial Crackdown,
MACLEAN'S, Oct. 31, 1988, at 34.
329. See PAUL TAIN, CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND PUBLIC ORDER ACT 1994: A PRACTICAL
GUIDE (1994).
330. See, e-g., J.D. Jackson, Curtailing the Right of Silence. Lessons from Northern Ireland,
CRIM. L. REV. 404, 405-06 (1991).
331. In his speech to the annual convention of the Conservative Party on October 6, 1993,
Home Secretary Michael Howard announced:
The so-called right to silence is ruthlessly exploited by terrorists. What fools they must
think we are. It's time to call a halt to this charade. The so-called right to silence will be
abolished. The innocent have nothing to hide and that is exactly the point the
prosecution will be able to make.
Alan Travis, Right to Silence Abolished in Crackdown on Crime, GUARDIAN (London), Oct- 7,
1993, at 6 (emphasis added); see also Heather Mills, Tougher Policies Aimed at Helping Victims
of Crime, INDEPENDENT (London), Nov. 19, 1993, at 6.
332. EASTON, supra note 321, at 69 ("The changes in Northern Ireland attracted far less
criticism than the proposals for changes to the right to silence for England and Wales.").
333. Editorial, The Judges' Fourth Front, GUARDIAN (London), Jan. 20, 1994, at 21.
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had been hearing debates on curtailment of the right to silence for over half
a decade. The public began to accept that this right might be limited without
causing grave harm to the nation's democratic character, and it could no
longer be convinced that one of the most important individual rights was at
stake.1
4
C. The Breakdown of the Normalcy-Emergency Dichotomy
The belief in our ability to separate emergency from normalcy,
counterterrorism measures from the ordinary set of legal norms, is
misguided and dangerous. It undermines our vigilance against excessive
transgressions of human rights and civil liberties. It focuses our attention on
the immediate effects of counterterrorism measures, while hiding from view
their long-term costs. When added to the inherent problems that times of
crisis pose in striking an appropriate balance between individual rights and
national security needs, 335 this militates against our ability to make accurate
calculations of the relevant costs and benefits with respect to governmental
emergency powers.
The previous Section highlighted the general mechanisms used to keep
emergency and normalcy separate and the failures of these mechanisms.
This Section is designed to serve as a brief road map to some of the ways in
which the line between emergency and normalcy has been blurred.
1. Normalization of the Extraordinary
Under the traditional understanding of the relationship between
normalcy and emergency, the latter is understood to be no more than a
transient phenomenon. Emergency powers should be available to the
government only for short, well-defined periods. Such legislation must not
extend beyond the termination of the emergency. Even in cases where some
334. Gareth Peirce noted:
Any concept that we in England may once have had of inalienable individual human
rights has been repeatedly jettisoned in the face of pragmatic demands and may never
be reclaimed. Where it has suited us, we have invoked the Northern Ireland conflict for
excuses, but we have acted blindly and lost our one opportunity for reclaiming our soul.
Gareth Peirce, Now for Some Civil Rights, GUARDIAN (London), Oct. 19, 1994, at 22.
Opposition to the CJPOA was further decimated in light of the government's open efforts to
link the new legislation with efforts to curb terrorist activity. Colin Brown & Patricia Wynn
Davies, Ministers Want Silent Suspects To Be Filmed, INDEPENDENT (London), Feb. 18, 1992, at
2 (quoting a minister who stated: "You can't force people to speak, but the terrorists are carefully
trained not to say anything when they are in a police cell. They just stare at the wall. This would
show juries how they have acted.") (emphasis added). The government enjoyed a comfortable
majority in Parliament. The main opposition party, the Labour Party, chose to abstain in the vote
over the bill. Alan Travis, Labour Attacks Justice Bill over End of Right to Silence, GUARDIAN
(London), Jan. 12, 1994, at 6.
335. See supra Part II.
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transition period beyond the emergency must precede a return to
normalcy,33 6 such a period must be as brief as possible, and the effects of
the emergency must not spill over into the restored normalcy.
However, as already noted, temporary arrangements in this area have a
peculiar tendency to become entrenched over time and thus normalized and
made routine. Time-bound emergency legislation is often the subject of
future extensions and renewals, despite Lord Devlin's caution that "[i]t
would be very unfortunate if the public were to receive the impression that
the continuance of the state of emergency had become a sort of statutory
fiction which was used as a means of prolonging legislation initiated under
different circumstances and for different purposes. 337 It is commonplace to
find on the statute books legislative acts that had originally been enacted as
temporary emergency or counterterrorism measures, but that were
subsequently transformed into permanent legislation.338 Furthermore, the
longer that emergency legislation, broadly understood, remains on the
statute books, the greater the likelihood that extraordinary powers made
available to government under this legislation will become part of the
ordinary, normal legal system.339
The maintenance of emergency powers may be accompanied by
expansion over time of the scope of such powers. At the same time, built-in
limitations on the exercise of emergency authority and powers tend to
wither away. Thus, for example, Harold Koh and John Yoo have identified
a trend of Presidents sidestepping congressional statutory restrictions
incorporated into legislation such as the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act of 1977340 and thus gaining access to broad statutory grants of
authority without the built-in limitations on the use of that authority. 34
2. Increasing Dosages
Governmental conduct during a crisis creates a precedent for future
exigencies as well as for "normalcy." Whereas in the "original" crisis, the
336. For a discussion of transition periods between war and peace, see, for example,
Christopher D. Gilbert, "There Will Be Wars and Rumours of Wars": A Comparison of the
Treatment of Defence and Emergency Powers in the Federal Constitutions of Australia and
Canada, 18 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 307, 320-24 (1980).
337. Willcock v. Muckle, 2 K.B. 844, 853-54 (1951) (Devlin, J.).
338. This should lead to concerns regarding whether the much fought over inclusion of sunset
clauses in the USA PATRIOT Act will make a significant difference when the time comes to
assess whether powers ought to be retained or left to expire.
339. See Joe Sim & Philip A. Thomas, The Prevention of Terrorism Act: Normalising the
Politics of Repression, 10 J.L. & Soc'Y 71 (1983); Walsh, supra note 250 (describing the move in
the Republic of Ireland from the emergency-type Offences Against the State Act of 1939 to the
regular criminal code, the Criminal Justice Act of 1984).
340. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706(1977).
341. Koh & Yoo, supra note 234, at 742-46; see also Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S.
654 (1981).
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situation and powers of reference were those of normalcy and regularity, in
any future crisis, government will take as its starting point the experience of
extraordinary powers and authority granted and exercised during previous
emergencies. What might have been seen as sufficient "emergency"
measures in the past (judged against the ordinary situation) may not be
deemed enough for further crises as they arise. Much like the need to
gradually increase the dosage of a heavily used medication in order to
experience the same level of relief, so too with respect to emergency
powers: The perception may be that new, more radical powers are needed
to fight impending crises. In turn, new extraordinary emergency measures
confer an added degree of ex post legitimacy and respectability, as well as a
sense of normality, to previously used, less drastic emergency measures.
What were deemed exceptional emergency actions in the past may now
come to be regarded as normal, routine, and ordinary, in light of more
recent and more dramatic emergency powers.
A related phenomenon pertains to the transformation of the previously
unthinkable into the thinkable. I have already noted the shift in public
opinion in the United States with respect to racial and ethnic profiling as a
result of September 11 th. 342 This is but one example of a more general
pattern. When faced with an acute exigency, public officials and
decisionmakers, as well as the general public, are often willing to resort to
measures and mechanisms that they themselves had rejected in the past.
Consider the following example. In September 1945, the British Mandatory
Power in Palestine promulgated the Defence (Emergency) Regulations
(DER), which established "a virtual regime of martial law., 34 3 The Jewish
community in Palestine, against whom the brunt of the regulations was
directed, decried the measures as creating a "police state" in Palestine
3 4 4
and as "undermining the foundations of the law and constituting a grave
danger to an individual's life and freedom and imposing an arbitrary
regime., 345 When the State of Israel was established much of the mandatory
legislation then in effect stayed on as part of the Israeli legal system,
346
including the DER.3 47 The challenges to the DER did not stop in 1948. On
several occasions these regulations were denounced by leading figures
across the political spectrum. For example, in 1951, the then-opposition
342. See supra notes 302-304 and accompanying text.
343. Alan Dowty, The Use of Emergency Powers in Israel, 21 MIDDLE E. REV. 34, 35
(1988).
344. BERNARD JOSEPH, BRITISH RULE IN PALESTINE 222 (1948).
345. 3 HAPRAKLIT 62, 62 (1946) (setting out resolutions accepted by the assembly of Jcwish
lawyers in Palestine on Feb. 7, 1946).
346. 1 RuBINsTEIN, supra note 9, at 63-82.
347. Attempts to attack the absorption of the DER into Israeli law in 1948 have been rejected
by the Supreme Court sitting as the High Court of Justice. See, e.g., H.C. 5/48, Leon v. Gubemik,
1 P.D. 58 (1948).
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leader, M.K. Menachem Begin, argued that the DER, "the law that [the
government] used[J is Nazi, it is tyrannical, it is immoral: and an immoral
law is also an illegal law." 348 Yet, the DER have remained in effect almost
in their entirety to this day. Almost all the attempts to abolish the
regulations, in whole or in part (including, early on, a government proposal
to that effect), have failed. The continued use of the DER became
acceptable; it came to be considered as an evil perhaps, but an evil that one
had to live with because of external circumstances imposed on the nation.
At first, the regulations were considered a necessary stopgap measure
allowing the new state to deal with the critical situation it faced. At later
stages, different reasons militated against abolishing the regulations.349 It is
interesting to note that in the official commentary to the Emergency Powers
(Detention) Bill-which, as a law passed by the Knesset, is still the most
significant reform of the DER since 1948 35 0 -Menachem Begin's
government declared:
[I]n the state of siege to which the State is subject since its
establishment, one cannot relinquish special measures designed to
ensure adequate defense of the State and the public against those
who conspire to eliminate the State. Still, one should not be content
with the existence of those radical regulations .... 351
Perceived necessity made thinkable what had previously been considered
unthinkable.
3. One Can Get Used to This
As crisis prolongs, emergency powers and legislation tend to pile up.
352
A related phenomenon concerns the use of emergency and counterterrorism
legislation for purposes other than those for which it was originally
promulgated. The likelihood of such use directly correlates with the age of
that particular piece of legislation. The farther we get from the original
situation that precipitated its enactment, the greater are the chances that the
norms and rules incorporated therein will be applied in contexts not
originally intended. The use of the Feed and Forage Act of 186113 to
348. D.K. (1951) 1807.
349. See Amos Shapira, Judicial Review Without a Constitution: The Israeli Paradox, 56
TEMP. L.Q. 405,450-52 (1983).
350. 1 RUBINSTEIN, supra note 9, at 263-70.
351. Id. at 263 (quoting Minister of Justicc, Shmuel Tamir).
352. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
353. 41 U.S.C. § 11 (a) (1994 & Supp. 1999). The Feed and Forage Act was also invoked on
September 14, 2001, by the President. Exec. Order No. 13,223, 66 Fed. Reg. 48,201 (Sept. 14,
2001).
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allocate funds for the invasion of Cambodia in 1971 is but one such
example.
354
Government and its agents grow accustomed to the convenience of
emergency powers. Once they have experienced the ability to operate with
fewer restraints and limitations, they are unlikely to be willing to give up
such freedom.355 "So it always happens that whenever a wrong principle of
conduct, political or personal, is adopted on a plea of necessity, it will be
afterwards followed on a plea of convenience."
356
In Israel, for example, the authority to issue emergency regulations
under article 9(a) of the Law and Administration Ordinance of 1948 was
originally used mainly in the context of security issues and in a relatively
restrained fashion.357 During the period spanning the 1950s through the
early 1970s, there were few cases in which article 9(a) powers were used.
However, this pattern changed dramatically after the Yom Kippur War of
1973.358 Since 1974, emergency powers have been exercised in an almost
routine fashion in situations relating to labor disputes and monetary
issues. 359 After surveying the history of applying article 9(a) in the context
of labor disputes, one scholar concluded that the emergency-related
mechanism of compulsory work orders had been frequently used in
situations where no special urgency was present or when other, less drastic
means had been available. The availability of such a relatively easy to use
mechanism to solve labor disputes has had a "narcotic effect" on
government officials, allowing them to bypass the more burdensome
process of negotiations between employers and employees.360 Indeed, this
pattern of legislation passed against the backdrop of a violent threat, which
then serves as a blueprint for similar, perhaps even identical legislation
designed to deal with other situations, is a well-established one.
There is yet another pernicious effect entailed in the "getting used to"
phenomenon, to wit, the tranquilizing effect that it has on the general
354. Fuller, supra note 262, at 1453 n.4.
355. Walsh analyzes a similar pattern in Ireland. First, emergency legislation designed to deal
with a terrorist threat is put in place. Second, law enforcement agencies stretch the scope of
application and coverage of that legislation and of the powers given them in it while still carrying
out those powers in the context of their counterterrorism activity. Third, both the general public
and the legal profession (and, more importantly, the judiciary) give their seal of approval to such
activity and to such claims of authority- Fourth, the law enforcement agencies exercise their broad
emergency powers in contexts that are nonemergency-for example, when dealing with
"ordinary" criminals. Finally, the legislature "enacts reality," inasmuch as it normalizes those
special emergency powers by explicitly incorporating them into ordinary legislation such as the
criminal code. Walsh, supra note 250, at 1112-14.
356. Julliard v. Greenman, 110 U.S. 421, 458 (1884) (Field, J., dissenting).
357. I. Hans Klinghofer, On Emergency Regulations in Israel, in JUBILEE TO PINCHAS
ROSEN 86 (Haim Cohen ed., 1962).
358. HOFNUNG, supra note 256, at 55-59.
359. Id. at 59-60.
360. Mordechai Mironi, Back-to-Work Emergency Orders: Government Intervention in
Labor Disputes in Essential Services, 15 MISHPATIM 350, 380-86 (1986).
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public's critical approach toward emergency regimes. Society can only
disregard at its own peril the warning made by John Stuart Mill:
Evil for evil, a good despotism, in a country at all advanced in
civilization, is more noxious than a bad one; for it is far more
relaxing and enervating to the thoughts, feelings, and energies of
the people. The despotism of Augustus prepared the Romans for
Tiberius. If the whole tone of their character had not first been
prostrated by nearly two generations of that mild slavery, they
would probably have had spirit enough left to rebel against the
more odious one.
361
Instances of crossing the line that separates emergency from normalcy
(assuming for the moment its existence) may go unnoticed. The rush to
legislate means that it is not unusual that when emergency legislation is
initially adopted, no meaningful debates over it take place. Once
introduced, however, emergency provisions may then pass into the ordinary
legal system without invoking further debate and discussion.
362
4. Persistence of Judicial Precedents
Court rulings in emergency-related issues may be subsequently used as
precedents and their impact expanded to other matters.363 "Concessions
made to necessity in a special, largely unknown context might be later
generalized to apply to other contexts. ' ,364 Emergency-related precedents
may be generalized and applied to "normal" cases. Considering that the
scope of "national security" and "emergency" has increased substantially
6
and that "[i]t would, it seems, have to be a manifestly hopeless claim to
361. JOHN STUART MILL, THREE ESSAYS-ON LIBERTY, REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT,
THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN 185 (Oxford Univ. Press 1975) (1861).
362. See, e.g., Walsh, supra note 250, at 1129 (noting that the Criminal Justice Act-enacting
reality-passed with hardly any notice of the incorporation of emergency-related provisions into
ordinary criminal law).
363. George Alexander noted:
In evaluating the role of courts in emergencies it is important to consider not only the
fact that bad decisions such as Korematsu may infest law long after the emergency has
passed, but also the fact that they provide an imprimatur for military-executive
decisions which might otherwise draw more political disfavor. The absence of court
approval, as for example during the war in Vietnam, allows the questions of legitimacy
full sway in public discussion.
Alexander, supra note 97, at 26-27; see also Kinglsey R. Browne, Title VII as Censorship:
Hostile-Environment Harassment and the First Amendment, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 481, 538 (1991)
("Of one thing we may be certain: any precedents established 'just this once' to permit regulation
of racist and sexist speech will later be called upon to support regulation of other speech.").
364. Harold Edgar & Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Curtiss-Wright Comes Home: Executive Power
and National Security Secrecy, 21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 349, 389 (1986).
365. Gross, supra note 295, at 1857-63.
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national security before the courts would turn nasty," 366 the potentially vast
impact of such precedents can be fully appreciated.
The link between emergency-related precedents and ordinary legal
rules is even more pronounced and direct where the same rules and norms
are applied in both ordinary and emergency contexts. The
"transsubstantive" nature of many constitutional limitations-the fact that
they apply to "ordinary" criminals and to suspected terrorists, for
example-has two important implications in this context. 367 First, judicial
decisions made in the context of fighting terrorism will also apply in the
more general (and regular) context of criminal law and procedure. Second,
when judges decide "ordinary" criminal cases, they will take into
consideration the impact of their rulings on the fight against terrorism.
36
5. Structural and Institutional Changes
Institutional and structural modifications that are installed as essential
for crisis management may continue long past the termination of the
original crisis. In times of emergency, governments enjoy unparalleled
concentration and expansion of powers. More often than not the executive
enjoys substantial, if not overwhelming, support from the public and from
the other branches of government. Surely, the aggrandizement of executive
power is not solely the product of emergency. The growing complexity of
modem society and the needs of its members have played an important role
in the expansion of executive authority, as has the inability to regulate the
multifaceted aspects of modem life solely through legislative action.
However, emergencies have led to quantum leaps in this process of
aggrandizement. Past examples include the explosions of executive powers
accompanying the "economic war" against the Great Depression 369 (and
366. Graham Zellick, Official Information, National Security and the Law in Britain, 98
STUDI SENESI 303, 317 (1986).
367. See Stuntz, supra note 104, at 2140-41.
368. Id. ("One cannot read Fourth Amendment cases from the 1980s without sensing judicial
attention to the pros and cons of the war on drugs-even when the cases did not involve drug
crime. Crack dealers were the most salient crime problem a dozen years ago; now, terrorists
occupy that place.").
369. The fight against the Great Depression was thought of, and spoken about, in terms of
"war" and "emergency." See Belknap, supra note 45, at 70-76; William E. Leuchtenburg, The
New Deal and the Analogue of War, in CHANGE AND CONTINUITY IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY
AMERICA 81, 81-82 (John Braeman et al. eds., 1964). In his first inaugural address, President
Franklin Roosevelt set the tone for regarding the economic crisis as analogous to the war against
the German army in World War I. See Inaugural Address of President Roosevelt (Mar. 4, 1933),
in 1933 PUB. PAPERS I1. The New Deal resulted in an enhancement of presidential power and
authority vis-A-vis the other branches of the federal government, as well as the strengthening of
the federal government at the expense of the states. Executive leadership in the legislative process
and the creation of numerous administrative actors are two of the main outcomes of that period.
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later on, World War 11)370 in the United States, the transformation from the
Fourth to the Fifth Republic in France (closely linked to the Algerian
War),371 and the fundamental changes in the governmental structure of
Great Britain during and after World War 1.372
September 11 th provides yet another example of a similar institutional
and structural change. Just before this Article went to print, the largest U.S.
governmental reorganization in fifty years-the establishment of the new
Department of Homeland Security-was approved by the Congress.
373
V. THE EXTRA-LEGAL MEASURES MODEL
The assumption of separation underlies both the Business as Usual
model and the different models of accommodation. As shown above,
however, historical evidence belies this critical belief in our ability to
isolate ordinary legal norms and institutions from emergency rules and
powers. The bright-line distinctions that are used to sustain the separation
are, by and large, untenable in the long run.
Emergencies present decisionmakers with a tension of tragic
dimensions. 374 Democratic nations faced with serious threats must maintain
and protect life and the liberties necessary to a vibrant democracy. Yet,
emergencies challenge the most fundamental concepts of constitutional
democracy. How ought this tragic choice be resolved? Each of the two
general categories of constitutional emergency models is open to strong
challenges. The Business as Usual model's appeal is in its insistence on
clear rules. However, it is open to charges of inflexible, dogmatic
utopianism. The strength of the models of accommodation inheres in their
flexibility in the face of great calamities and in their accommodation of the
shifting and expanding powers needed to meet such exigencies. Their
shortcoming is that such flexibility is innately susceptible to manipulation.
They are labeled unprincipled, apologetic, and without a significant
normative restraining force. The models of accommodation seem
370. See CORWIN, supra note 63, at 35-77; ROSSITER, supra note 5, at 265-87. Expansion of
the power and authority of the Executive has been facilitated by the following means: first,
expansive presidential claims of inherent constitutional emergency powers; second, broad
delegations of power from Congress to the President; third, the establishment of various war
agencies under the President's assumed constitutional war powers; finally, legislative leadership
by the President.
371. See, e.g., ALISTAIR HORNE, A SAVAGE WAR OF PEACE: ALGERIA 1954-1962, at 543-44
(1977); IAN S. LUSTICK, UNSETTLED STATES, DISPUTED LANDS: BRITAIN AND IRELAND, FRANCE
AND ALGERIA, ISRAEL AND THE WEST BANK-GAZA 239-99 (1993).
372. RosSITER, supra note 5, at 151-70 (noting the rise of the Cabinet's power and prestige
and the parallel decline in the Parliament's power and prestige).
373. See David Firestone, Senate Votes, 90-9, To Set Up a Homeland Security Dept. Geared
To Fight Terrorism, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2002, at Al.
374. See Lahav, supra note 58, at 531.
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unsatisfactory in that any act of balancing during an emergency is likely to
disadvantage the values that we normally hold as fundamental. Regardless
of judicial reiteration of exercising caution in such times so as not to
infringe unduly on individual rights and liberties, it is clear that the judicial
branch does not present the executive with too great an obstacle in choosing
the nation's response to the particular emergency. Changes to the legal
system in times of emergency under these models have the tendency to
become permanent features beyond the termination of the crisis. Yet, even
if we were to impose categorical prohibitions on certain governmental
activities, it seems likely that these prohibitions would not restrain the
government from acting in a way that runs afoul of such prohibitions. This
is because such actions are deemed to be necessary for the preservation of
the nation or for the advancement of its significant interests. To believe
otherwise is to be naive or a hypocrite.
In this Part, I suggest an alternative model, the Extra-Legal Measures
model, which combines the strengths of the two prior models: It permits the
maintenance of rules, while supplementing those rules with highly
circumscribed, but effective, escape mechanisms.
I suggest that there may be circumstances where the appropriate
method of tackling extremely grave national dangers and threats entails
going outside the legal order, at times even violating otherwise accepted
constitutional principles. Political realists often argue that when dealing
with acute violent crises, democracies ought to forgo legal and
constitutional niceties. Terrorists, it is argued, do not observe the rule of
law; neither should we. They are not playing by the rules; neither should
we. Legal principles, rules, and norms are deemed irrelevant when dealing
with emergencies. In endeavoring to preserve enduring fidelity to the law,
the Extra-Legal Measures model embraces a diametrically opposite
approach. Going completely outside the law in appropriate cases may
preserve, rather than undermine, the rule of law in a way that constantly
bending the law to accommodate emergencies will not.
Allow me to sketch out this third model's general contours. First,
assume we agree on these three points: (1) Emergencies call for
extraordinary governmental responses, (2) constitutional arguments have
not greatly constrained any government faced with the need to respond to
such emergencies, and (3) there is a strong probability that measures used
by the government in emergencies will eventually seep into the legal
system even after the crisis has ended. Now, let us contemplate an extreme
case.3 75 The police have in custody a person who they are absolutely certain
375. The scenario described below is known as the "ticking bomb" paradigm. See, e.g.,
Daniel Statman, The Absoluteness of the Prohibition Against Torture, 4 MISHPAT UNIMSHAL 161,
170-74 (1997). In 1989, the Israel Law Review published a collection of essays discussing this
topic. See 23 ISR. L. REV. 192, 192-406 (1989).
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has planted a massive bomb somewhere in a bustling shopping mall. The
bomb may go off at any moment, and there may not be enough time to
evacuate the market. Should the bomb go off, thousands of people may
perish. The only lead that the police have to locate the bomb is the person in
custody, but she will not reveal the location of the bomb. Police
investigators are certain, beyond any doubt, that the only way of getting the
information from her is by torturing her. They are also confident that if
torture is applied the suspect will divulge correct information about the
location of the bomb, thus giving the bomb squad a better chance of
disarming it in time. 6 Finally, let us assume, in what I believe to be an
accurate description of what is likely to happen in this scenario, that the
investigators are going to apply torture to the suspect in order to get the
information about the bomb.377
What is likely to happen next? When faced with the charges that it
tortured people, the police may deny the charges by arguing that its
investigators engaged in no such activity or, alternatively, that the
interrogation techniques actually used, while certainly not the ones used in
usual criminal investigations, fall short of torture. The police may also
argue that their activities have not been illegal because the necessity of the
situation justified or excused their actions. 378 They may also try to preempt
future challenges by applying for a "torture warrant," i.e., an ex ante
judicial authorization to apply torture in a specific case. 379 Thus, as a
practical matter, the police are likely to either deny their actions or argue
that, in the circumstances, using torture was legal. In any event, it is clear
that torture will be used in this scenario.
How will the Extra-Legal Measures model deal with this situation?
Under the model, categorical rules are possible and may be desirable with
376. Each of the elements of this story may be heavily contested and challenged. (For
example, how would the police be certain that the person actually planted the bomb or otherwise
knows of its location? How can they be confident that information disclosed under torture will be
correct? And so on.) As I do not wish to focus here on the issue of torture, but rather to use this
example as a way of discussing the Extra-Legal Measures model, I do not need to deal with such
challenges here. For now, it may be sufficient to note that such questions are likely to emerge and
be discussed in the context of public ratification (or rejection) of police activities in the "ticking
bomb" scenario.
377. See, e.g., Yale Kamisar, Physician Assisted Suicide: The Problems Presented by the
Compelling, Heart wrenching Case, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1121 (1998).
378. For a general discussion of the distinction between excuse and justification, see, for
example, GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW §§ 10.1-10.3 (1978); Joshua
Dressier, New Thoughts About the Concept of Justification in the Criminal Law: A Critique of
Fletcher's Thinking and Rethinking, 32 UCLA L. REv. 61 (1984); Kent Greenawalt, The
Perplexing Borders of Justification and Excuse, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1897 (1984); Michael S.
Moore, Causation and the Excuses, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1091 (1985); and Kent Greenawalt,
Distinguishing Justifications from Excuses, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1986, at 89.
379. See, e.g., DERSHOWITZ, supra note 273, at 158-61; Aharon Barak, The Supreme Court
2001 Term-Foreword. A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy, 116
HARV. L. REV. 16, 157 (2002).
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respect to various important values. Thus, for example, a categorical
prohibition on the use of torture, whatever the circumstances, may be
desirable in order to uphold the symbolism of human dignity and the
inviolability of the human body. At the same time, the proposed model also
recognizes that such emergency tactics, in limited circumstances, will be
employed. When great calamities (real or perceived) occur, governmental
actors tend to do whatever is necessary to neutralize the threat. Yet, as I
have suggested, it is extremely dangerous to provide for such eventualities
within the framework of the legal system (as the models of accommodation
may suggest) because of the large risks of contaminating and manipulating
that system, and the deleterious message involved in legalizing such
actions.
Instead, the Extra-Legal Measures model calls upon public officials to
act outside the legal order while openly acknowledging their actions. They
must assume the risks involved in acting extralegally. It is then up to the
people to decide, either directly or indirectly (e.g., through their elected
representatives in the legislature), how to respond ex post to such extralegal
actions. The people may decide to hold the actor to the wrongfulness of her
actions, demonstrating commitment to the violated principles and values.
Alternatively, they may act to approve retrospectively her actions.
The people may determine that such activities are abhorrent,
unjustified, and nonexcusable. In such a case, the acting official may be
called to answer for her actions and make legal and political amends
therefor. Thus, for example, she may need to resign her position,380 face
criminal charges or civil suits, or be subjected to impeachment proceedings.
Politically speaking, she may jeopardize her chances for reelection and may
be characterized as someone who is willing to act illegally and, perhaps,
immorally. Alternatively, the people may approve the actions and ratify
them. Such ratification may have direct legal ramifications (as, for example,
when the people's representatives pass legislation designed to immunize
public officials from any potential civil or criminal liability) or indirect
legal effects (as, for example, when a president who personally authorized
the use of torture is reelected by a substantial majority in free and
democratic elections, in which the issue of torture constituted a major part
of the public agenda prior to the elections).
Significantly, the Extra-Legal Measures model calls for an ethic of
responsibility not only on the part of public officials but also the general
public. To be able properly to invoke the Extra-Legal Measures model,
public officials will need to acknowledge openly the nature of their actions.
The public will then need to decide whether to ratify those extralegal
actions. In the process of deciding that latter question, each member of the
380. Butsee Frederick Schauer, The Questions ofAuthority, 81 GEO. L.J. 95, 102-03 (1992).
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public becomes morally and politically responsible for the decision. Once
the extralegal nature of actions taken by governmental agents is made
public, each member of the public is called upon to take a stand on the issue
through whatever democratic channels she has available to her. Inaction is
also imbued with moral and political significance.
The proposed model separates, therefore, the question of what actions
may be taken from the assessment of the legal, political, social, and moral
implications of such actions. It distinguishes between two types of inquiries
that need to be pursued: the "obvious question" and the "tragic question.
381
Faced with the need to decide how to proceed in order to prevent or
overcome a crisis, the first inquiry asks, "What shall we do?" Here we seek
to ascertain the right thing to do from a pragmatic standpoint: how to
promote the greatest good for the greatest number of people. Many tend to
stop the inquiry here. For them, the question of what moral value ought to
be attached to actions by government in times of crisis is irrelevant and
rather uninteresting. A somewhat more nuanced inquiry conflates the
"obvious question" with what Martha Nussbaum calls "the tragic
question"--the question as to whether any alternative open to government
is free from serious moral wrongdoing 382 -in that it identifies the outcome
of the pragmatic, balancing, cost-benefit analysis with moral value. When
government acts in a certain way that is deemed necessary to protect and
safeguard the nation, then its actions are imbued with affirmative moral
value, i.e., they are morally legitimate. If acting extralegally is the right
thing to do (pragmatically), then it is the right thing to do whichever way
you look at it.
The Extra-Legal Measures model seeks to distinguish between the
obvious and the tragic questions. It also suggests that both are highly
pertinent to our discussion. Even when counter-emergency actions are
deemed necessary under the obvious question, such actions may still be
considered unjustified or nonexcusable from a moral or legal perspective,
as they run afoul of a community's fundamental principles and values.
While doing the right thing from a pragmatic perspective, the acting
agent has committed not only a moral wrong but also acted outside the law.
How should such wrongfulness be addressed? The answer to that is left, in
practical terms, in the hands of the general public. Under the model, we
may recognize situations where we may conclude that acting in a certain
way may be the right thing to do to promote the greatest good for the
greatest number of people, but may decline to approve such action from
legal, political, social, or moral standpoints. The Extra-Legal Measures
381. Martha C. Nussbaum, The Costs of Tragedy: Some Moral Limits of Cost-Benefit
Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1005, 1005 (2000).
382. Id.
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model does not completely bar the possibility that such actions will be
taken by public officials and that such actions may even be later ratified by
the public. By separating the issues of action and ratification/rejection (with
the possibility of sanctions), conceptually as well as chronologically, we
add an element of uncertainty to the decisionmaking calculus of public
officials. That uncertainty raises the costs of pursuing an extralegal course
of action. Indeed, even if there is a very good chance that ex post
ratification will be forthcoming, there may still be significant costs attached
to acting extralegally. Take our ticking bomb example. Even if the public
eventually ratifies the decision to torture in that particular case, there may
be personal implications for the officials involved in the decision
(including, but not limited, to the fear that ratification will not follow), as
well as broader implications for the nation as a whole. 383 In addition, such
ratification need not, necessarily, prevent the victims of torture from
obtaining compensation.
The argument below is divided into several parts. Section A discusses
historical and theoretical precedents for the Extra-Legal Measures model. It
begins with a discussion of John Locke's theory of the prerogative power.
This theory was accepted by many of the American Founding Fathers and
their contemporaries as a foundation for a theory of extralegal powers. It
has also been invoked as a model by those wishing to recognize the
possibility of stepping outside the legal order in times of emergency. I
argue that while Locke's prerogative power may be seen as a prototype of
the Extra-Legal Measures model, it is deficient in at least one crucial
respect. It seeks to merge the two issues that the Extra-Legal Measures
model seeks to separate: doing the pragmatic right thing, and deciding what
is legally, politically, and morally the right thing to do. In conflating the
two issues, the Lockean model fails to impose an ethic of responsibility on
the public. Moreover, to the extent that it accepts the legitimacy of actions
promoting the general good and welfare for the greatest number of people,
it also fails to advance an ethic of responsibility among public officials and
does not create strong enough barriers against the easy use of extralegal
powers by such officials. I then move to discuss the theory that underlies
my Extra-Legal Measures model focusing specifically on the problem of
383. For example, the fact that the prohibition against torture is absolute and nonderogable
under international law means that involvement in acts of torture exposes the state to the
possibility of civil suits, as well as of civil and criminal proceedings against the acting officials on
both the international level and before domestic courts of other nations. See, e.g., International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 132, art. 4, S. Exec. Doc. E, 95-2, at 24, 999
U.N.T.S. at 174-75; id. art. 7, S. Exec. Doc E, 95-2, at 26, 999 U.N.T.S. at 175; European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 132, art.
3, 213 U.N.T.S. at 224 (prohibition on torture absolute and nonderogable); id. art. 15, 213
U.N.T.S. at 232 (derogation clause); see also Winston P. Nagan & Lucie Atkins, The
International Law of Torture: From Universal Proscription to Effective Application and
Enforcement, 14 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 87 (2001).
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the "dirty hands." Next, I discuss examples of the (partial) invocation of the
Extra-Legal Measures model by Thomas Jefferson. That discussion, taken
together with the exposition of the underlying theory, reveals the critical
ingredients of the proposed model. I deal specifically with two important
elements of the Extra-Legal Measures model, namely the nature of the ex
post ratification and the possibility that public officials will be called upon
to make reparations. Following that discussion, Section B deals with both
criticisms and arguments marshaled in support of the model. It
demonstrates that resorting to the Extra-Legal Measures model in
appropriate cases may prove more beneficial than applying the
constitutional models in maintaining adherence to fundamental principles
such as the rule of law.
A. Ethic of Political Responsibility
1. Locke's Theory of the Prerogative Power
In his Second Treatise of Government, John Locke introduces the idea
of the "prerogative" power vested in the executive branch of government.
For Locke, prerogative is "nothing but the Power of doing publick good
without a Rule."385 The executive is entrusted with the power "to act
according to discretion, for the publick good, without the prescription of the
Law, and sometimes even against it."386 Such prerogative power is deemed
necessary in order to deal with situations when strict and rigid observation
of the laws may lead to grave social harm.387 The criterion as to whether the
prerogative power was appropriately used in any given case is a functional
one. It focuses on the purpose for exercising the power: Was it directed at
promoting the public good?388 Government cannot have any legitimate ends
apart from promoting the good of the community. Governmental power
384. LOCKE, supra note 279, §§ 159-68.
385. Id. § 166.
386. Id. § 160 (emphasis added). The power of prerogative encompasses executive discretion,
the power to act without the prescription of positivist law (and in appropriate cases, even against
it), and the power of pardon. The power of pardon can be used to mitigate the severity of the law,
where, under the circumstances, a strict observation of the laws might have done more harm. The
law may make no distinction between criminal offenders, on the one hand, and persons who,
although they broke the law, deserve reward and pardon. See Christine Noelle Becker, Clemency
for Killers? Pardoning Battered Women Who Strike Back, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 297 (1995);
Victoria J. Palacios, Faith in Fantasy: The Supreme Court's Reliance on Commutation To Ensure
Justice in Death Penalty Cases, 49 VAND. L. REV. 311 (1996).
387. LOCKE, supra note 279, §§ 159-60. Explaining his reasons for vesting the prerogative
power with the executive, he argues that the legislature cannot anticipate in advance and regulate
by statute all that may be, at any point in the future, beneficial to society, and that lawmaking
power may be too slow to adapt adequately to exigencies and necessities of the times. See id.
388. Id. § 161 ("But if there comes to be a question between the Executive Power and the
People, about a thing claimed as a Prerogative; the tendency of the exercise of such Prerogative
to the good or hurt of the People, will easily decide that Question."); see also id. §§ 163, 164, 168.
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used for any purpose other than the public good is properly regarded as
tyrannical389 and may justify, under certain circumstances, a popular
revolution to restore the people's rights and to limit the government's resort
to such arbitrary power.
390
But what if, in applying the functional test proposed by Locke, it
appears that the executive used its prerogative power in an appropriate
manner? What if, in other words, despite violating the law, such violation
has been contemplated and pursued for the greatest social good? How
should we evaluate the actions so taken? For Locke the answer is
straightforward, namely: "Prerogative can be nothing, but the Peoples
Permitting their Rulers, to do several things of their own free choice, where
the Law was silent, and sometimes too against the direct Letter of the Law,
for the publick good; and their acquiescing in it when so done. 391 When
the ruler applies her prerogative power for the public good, such action is
considered the right thing to do whichever way one looks at it.392 Thus, if
the answer to the obvious question is an appropriate one by Lockean
standards, then the answer to the tragic question follows suit. An
appropriate exercise of the prerogative power is legitimate per se and ex
ante due to the implicit acquiescence of the public to any such exercise (not
necessarily to the specific use of the prerogative power in the circumstances
of any particular crisis). There is no need for any further public
involvement. In fact, Locke gives the executive the benefit of the doubt.393
If there are allegations that the ruler's use of the prerogative power has not
389. Id. § 199 ("Tyranny is the exercise of Power beyond Right, which no Body can have a
Right to. And this is making use of the Power any one has in his hands; not for the good of those,
who are under it, but for his own private separate Advantage."); see also id. § 202 ("Where-ever
Law ends, Tyranny begins, if the Law be transgressed to another's harm.").
390. Id. §§ 203-209. Where the ruler abuses the prerogative power and uses it to serve her
own interests and purposes rather than to further the public good, the people have no remedy
available from any "Judge on Earth," and their sole recourse is "to appeal to Heaven" or, when
the majority of the people feels wronged, to revolt against the oppressive ruler. Id. § 168. Locke's
ideas were certainly influenced by such events as the abuses of power during the reign of the
Stuarts and the controversy between King James I and Sir Edward Coke on the subject of the
Crown's prerogative. See GEOFFREY DE Q. WALKER, THE RULE OF LAW 104-17 (1988). Of
special relevance to understanding the historical influences on Locke's theory of the right of
revolution is the question of whether the Two Treatises of Government was written before or after
the Glorious Revolution of 1688. The exact year in which Locke's Treatises was originally
published is a matter of some controversy. While convention dates his Treatises to 1689 or 1690,
an alternative view pushes the publication back by almost a decade, circa 1680. Mark Goldie,
Introduction to Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, at xv, xix-xxi (Mark Goldie ed., 1993) (1690).
391. LOCKE, supra note 279, § 164 (emphasis added).
392. Of course, this may only shift the debate to inquiring what it is that we mean by "the
public good," as different conceptions of the good may bear differently on assessment of the
ruler's actions.
393. As is usually the case with Locke, much faith is put in human reason and rationality as
mitigating and limiting factors on the exercise of prerogative power. See LOCKE, supra note 279,
§§ 163-164,
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been for the purpose of promoting the public good, the only remedy that the
public has is resorting to revolution. This is a tall order indeed.
Locke's theory of the prerogative power reveals a substantial degree of
trust in government in general, and particularly in times of emergency. This
need not be necessarily condemned. But if we are worried that it is
precisely in such periods of stress that governments may be willing too
easily to resort to their prerogative power at the expense of individual
rights, freedoms, and liberties, then Locke's answer to the tragic question
ought to concern us. This, I argue, is an important point of departure for the
Extra-Legal Measures model vis-d-vis Locke's theory. Both answer the
obvious question in similar terms. Both recognize the possibility of
stepping outside the legal system in appropriate circumstances. However,
whereas Locke seems to put his trust in an implicit, general, ex ante public
acquiescence in the exercise of such power, I would argue that an explicit,
particular, ex post ratification (or rejection) of the same is preferable.
2. Theory: Searching for "Moral Politicians"
In his essay on politics as a vocation,394 Max Weber promotes what he
calls the "ethic of responsibility" over the "ethic of ultimate ends."
395
Political leaders-those who choose politics as a vocation-must stand
ready to violate even fundamental principles and values if such violation is
genuinely for the good of the community at large. 396 However, even if their
actions have been genuinely for the public good, they may still be required
to pay the price of acting in violation of such principles and values.
Thus, a separation is presented between the treatment of the obvious
and tragic questions. The fact that a public official did the right thing as far
as the first question is concerned does not mean that she did the right thing
with respect to the second question. The two are distinct and must be
resolved as such. It is no longer enough to argue that the public permitted
such actions ex ante as part of its implicit acquiescence in the application of
the prerogative power in appropriate circumstances. More is needed if the
official is not to be held liable for her actions and to be relieved from
making reparations for her wrongful acts.3 97
394. Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 77
(H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds. & trans., 1946). 1 thank Sanford Levinson for reminding me
of this essay and its relevance to this present discussion. See Levinson, supra note 273.
395. Weber, supra note 394, at 120-2t.
396. Id. at 123 ("[lIt is not true that good can follow only from good and evil only from evil,
but that often the opposite is true. Anyone who fails to see this is, indeed, a political infant.").
397. See Robert Nozick, Moral Complications and Moral Structures, 13 NAT. L.F. 1, 35 n.46
(1968) (stating that even when one breaks a rule for good reasons one may still have a duty to
make reparations).
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Michael Walzer takes a similar position398 with respect to what is
known as "the problem of the dirty hands., 399 He asks how one recognizes
a "moral politician" and answers, "by his dirty hands."'4 ° Walzer favors a
distinction between doing the right thing in utilitarian terms and the moral
value of such actions .401 There is no need to choose between upholding an
important moral principle and avoiding national catastrophe. Both continue
to be applicable at the same time. Government ought to avoid disasters and
to overcome them as soon as possible once they occur. This is the right
thing to do. But "right" in this context must not be confused with moral
rightness. We must not attach moral praise to such actions if they
contravene moral principles. They are morally wrong but practically
necessary-hence Walzer's question and answer above. A moral person
who is not a political leader would refuse to act in an immoral way. She
would keep her hands clean. A politician who is immoral would merely
pretend that her hands were clean. A moral politician would do the right
(pragmatic) thing to save the nation, while openly acknowledging and
recognizing that such actions are (morally) wrong-that is, openly
admitting that her hands are indeed dirty. The question then becomes not
whether a political leader will act in this way in the face of a moral
principle to the contrary (for it is clear that she will act), but rather what
moral judgment should be attached to such action.
Under both Weber's ethic of responsibility and Walzer's moral
politician paradigms, answering the obvious question by saying that
extralegal action was appropriate under the circumstances does not, in and
of itself, absolve the politician from her moral culpability. Both Weber and
Waizer stop their inquiry at this stage. The Extra-Legal Measures model
takes their inquiry one step further. It seeks to operationalize the previous
insights by exploring the circumstances in which politicians who have done
the right thing may actually be absolved from legal liability for their
extralegal actions. For that to happen, the model informs us, it is not enough
that there is a general agreement that the actions taken were the right thing
to do at the relevant time. Something more is needed-and that something
more is the public's explicit, particular, and ex post ratification. Before
addressing this point further, it may be useful to consider some real-life
examples of claims similar to those made under the Extra-Legal Measures
model.
398. Michael Walzer, Political Action: The Problem of Dirty Hands, in WAR AND MORAL
RESPONSIBILITY 62 (Marshall Cohen et al. eds., 1974),
399. See, e.g., THOMAS NAGEL, MORTAL QUESTIONS 75 (1979); Bernard Williams, Politics
and Moral Character, in MORAL LUCK 54 (1981).
400. Walzer, supra note 398, at 70.
401. Id. at 63.
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3. Practice: "Casting Behind Metaphysical Subtleties"
In 1810, Thomas Jefferson wrote:
A strict observance of the written laws is doubtless one of the
high duties of a good citizen, but it is not the highest. The laws of
necessity, of self-preservation, of saving our country when in
danger, are of a higher obligation. To lose our country by a
scrupulous adherence to written law, would be to lose the law itself,
with life, liberty, property and all those who are enjoying them with




During his term in office, President Jefferson was presented with
opportunities to pursue this "liberal tradition of emergency powers." 40 3 On
several occasions, when he considered the nation to be facing a grave
emergency, he saw it to be his duty to act in a manner that could only be
regarded as extralegal.4 °4 One example of such action was the 1803
Louisiana Purchase.40 5 Although the President was actively supported in
this matter by Congress and did not act solely on the basis of the
constitutional powers of his office,406 Jefferson himself believed the
purchase and annexation of a new territory to be utterly outside the
constitutional powers of the federal government.a 7 Yet, believing that the
situation constituted a national emergency, Jefferson was of the opinion that
it called for extralegal powers in order to execute the purchase. Jefferson
acknowledged the extralegal nature of his actions by writing:
402. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John B. Colvin (Sept. 20, 1810), in THOMAS
JEFFERSON, WRITINGS 1231, 1231 (1984).
403. Lobel, supra note 61, at 1392. Jefferson's approach toward the use of extralegal powers
by the executive does not contradict his general opposition to granting broad powers to that
branch of government (or, indeed, to the federal government as a whole). It is precisely this
general opposition to a strong executive that explains Jefferson's support for the extralegal powers
doctrine. Without such a doctrine of emergency powers, the only way to enable the government to
protect the nation in times of crisis would have been the concession of sweeping, permanent
constitutional powers to the federal government and the President, allowing them to meet each
and every emergency that might arise. The liberal theory of emergency powers facilitated a vision
of more limited powers vested in the national government, for truly exceptional crises could be
met by the use of those extralegal powers going beyond the strict lines of law. See, e.g.,
ABRAHAM D. SOFAER, WAR, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND CONSTITUTIONAL POWER: THE ORIGINS
226-27 (1976). Such extralegal powers could not serve as precedents that would support the
expansion of governmental powers in times of normalcy.
404. SOFAER, supra note 403, at 226 (explaining that under Jefferson's theory of emergency
powers, "a President is permitted to violate the Constitution in an emergency, though he does so at
the risk of having his judgment rejected by the legislature or the people").
405. See BREST ET AL., supra note 8, at 73-75; JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS, THE VINEYARD
OF LIBERTY 172-78 (1982); 4 DUMAS MALONE, JEFFERSON AND His TIME 311-32 (1978).
406. Cf Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-38 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
407. MARC LANDY & SIDNEY MILKIS, PRESIDENTIAL GREATNESS 79 (2000); SCHLESINGER,
supra note 293, at 23-25.
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The Executive in seizing the fugitive occurrence which so
much advances the good of their country, have done an act beyond
the Constitution. The Legislature in casting behind them
metaphysical subtleties, and risking themselves like faithful
servants, must ratify and pay for it, and throw themselves on their
country for doing for [the people] unauthorized what we know they
would have done for themselves had they been in a situation to
act.
408
And, on another occasion some five years later, he suggested both that
"[t]here are extreme cases where the laws become inadequate even to their
own preservation, and where the universal recourse is a dictator, or martial
law" 409 and that "on great occasions every good officer must be ready to
risk himself in going beyond the strict lines of law, when the public
preservation requires it; his motives will be a justification. 4 10
In other words, there are situations in which it is the duty of "every
good officer" to act in a manner not prescribed by the laws of the land.41'
Such an approach must be carefully limited and well-restricted lest it be
interpreted as permitting official lawlessness. Basing his position on the
laws of necessity and self-preservation, Jefferson sought to limit the
incidents in which such an illegal action might be taken by claiming that
such action was justified if, and only if, three conditions materialize: (1) the
occurrence of certain objective circumstances that amount to "extreme
cases" and "great occasions, 412 (2) actions by the public official that
408. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Breckenridge (Aug. 12, 1803), quoted in DANIEL
P. FRANKLIN, EXTRAORDINARY MEASURES: THE EXERCISE OF PREROGATIVE POWERS IN THE
UNITED STATES 45 (1991) (emphasis added). It is debatable, however, to what extent Jefferson
lived up to his own professed standards in this matter. After all, he acknowledged the nature of his
actions in a private letter rather than publicly. See id.
409. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Brown (Oct. 27, 1808), at
http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/mtjhtml/mtjser1.html.
410. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William C.C. Claiborne, Governor of Orleans Territory
(Feb. 3, 1807), at http://memory.loc.gov/arnmem/mtjhtmlmtjserl .html.
411. Thomas Jefferson noted:
The officer who is called to act on this superior ground, does indeed risk himself on the
justice of the controlling powers of the constitution, and his station makes it his duty to
incur that risk.... The line of discrimination between cases [where such action is
necessary and where it is not] may be difficult; but the good officer is bound to draw it
at his own peril, and throw himself on the justice of his country and the rectitude of his
motives.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John B. Colvin, supra note 402, at 1233.
412. That such "great occasions" were to be rare indeed can be learned from President
Madison's refusal to ratify the controversial actions of General Jackson in New Orleans in early
1815. Jackson was fined $1000 for contempt of court for ignoring a writ of habeas corpus issued
by Judge Dominick Hall and for imprisoning the judge himself. Jackson paid the fine out of his
own pocket. It took Congress twenty-nine years before it repaid the fine (with interest) to Jackson.
See SOFAER, supra note 403, at 333-36; George M. Dennison, Martial Law: The Development of
a Theory of Emergency Powers, 1776-1861, 18 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 52, 61-65 (1974); Jonathan
Lurie, Andrew Jackson, Martial Law, Civilian Control of the Military, and American Politics: An
Intriguing Amalgam, 126 MIL. L. REV. 133 (1989); Abraham D. Sofaer, Emergency Power and
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advance the good of the country, and (3) the ex post approval of these
actions by the American people (directly or through their representatives in
Congress).41 3 For that final and most crucial condition to apply, there ought
to be open and public acknowledgment of the unlawful nature of such
actions and of the necessity that called for committing them in the first
place. According to Jefferson, such measures were taken for the sake of
preserving the life, liberty, and property of the people, and the people ought
to determine whether the actions should be ratified.41 4
Jefferson, like most of his contemporaries, was heavily influenced by
Locke's ideas in general, and his theory of the prerogative power in
particular. 415 However, whereas Locke's theory assumes the existence of an
implicit, general, ex ante public acquiescence to the exercise of the
prerogative power, Jefferson's approach requires an explicit, particular, ex
post public ratification if the illegal actions of public officials, taken for the
advancement of the public good, are to be considered legitimate. In the
absence of such ex post ratification, or, in the case of an outright public
rejection, the actor may be subject to legal sanctions for violating the
dictates of the law, albeit for what are arguably the noblest of reasons.
Public officials who act in violation of the law in order to fend off great
the Hero of New Orleans, 2 CARDOZO L. REV. 233 (1981); see also Lucius Wilmerding, Jr., The
President and the Law, 67 POL. SCI. Q. 321, 326-27 (1952) (discussing the heated debate in 1807
in the House of Representatives concerning the actions of General Wilkinson at New Orleans and
noting that all parties were practically united in agreement that certain circumstances may arise in
which an illegal suspension of the writ of habeas corpus would be justified and proper).
413. For example, following an attack (during a congressional recess) by a British frigate, the
Leopard, on a United States ship, the Chesapeake, President Jefferson spent unappropriated funds
for munitions to strengthen certain United States strongholds in the face of a possible war with
England. He later asked Congress for a retroactive approval of this expenditure, explaining:
To have awaited a previous and special sanction by law would have lost occasions
which might not be retrieved.... I trust that the Legislature, feeling the same anxiety
for the safety of our country, so materially advanced by this precaution, will approve,
when done, what they would have seen so important to be done if then assembled.
Wilmerding, supra note 412, at 323-24. Wilmerding notes that in the congressional debates that
ensued, a general agreement with the above statement prevailed across political parties. Id. at 327-
28; see also SCHLESINGER, supra note 293, at 24.
414. Discussing the charge that the Philadelphia Convention exceeded its powers, James
Madison rejected the allegation but added that even
if they had exceeded their powers, they were not only warranted, but required as the
confidential servants of their country, by the circumstances in which they were placed
to exercise the liberty which they assumed; and .. if they had violated both their
powers and their obligations in proposing a Constitution, this ought nevertheless to be
embraced, if it be calculated to accomplish the views and happiness of the people of
America.
THE FEDERALIST No. 40, at 254-55 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
415. See SCHLESrNGER, supra note 293, at 25 (noting Locke's influence on the Framers);
Wilmerding, supra note 412, at 324 ("[T]his doctrine was accepted by every single one of our
early statesmen .. "). For expressions of adherence to Locke's doctrine, see Wilmerding, supra
note 412, at 323-29. But see FRIEDRICH, supra note 68, at 111-12 (arguing that Locke's theory of
prerogative power was not viewed as an extralegal power but rather as a power inherent in the
constitutional order, i.e., as a legal, albeit exceptional, power).
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threats assume the risk of being found criminally and civilly liable for their
illegal actions. They must openly and boldly disclose the nature of their
actions and the reasons for taking them and "throw [themselves] on the
justice of [their] country. '4 16 This is the ethic of responsibility at its zenith.
The circumstances surrounding Little v. Barreme4 17 illustrate the
distinctions between action and ratification. During a period of hostilities
between the United States and France, a merchant vessel, the Flying Fish,
flying the Danish flag, was captured by two American vessels on suspicion
of violating an act of Congress prohibiting commerce with France. Under
the relevant provision, the President had been authorized to instruct naval
commanders to seize any vessel on the high seas bound or sailing to any
French port. The order issued by President Adams instructed the
commanders to seize vessels bound to or sailing from French ports. When
captured, the Flying Fish was sailing from France to Denmark, a neutral
state in this conflict. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's
decision to grant damages against Captain George Little, the commanding
officer of the U.S.S. Boston, for the seizure and detention of the Danish
vessel. Speaking for a unanimous Court, Chief Justice Marshall held that
the President could not give lawful instructions that ran contrary to express
congressional legislation. The commander's actions could not be legalized
by such a presidential order. The instructions of the executive order could
not "change the nature of the transaction, nor legalize an act which, without
those instructions, would have been a plain trespass." 418 The Court did not
doubt Captain Little's motives. Yet, despite the fact that his actions were
undertaken for the good of the country (as not only he but also the President
saw it), the Supreme Court held such actions illegal and imposed penalties
on the officer.
This judicial decision was not, however, the end of the story. After the
Supreme Court had ruled on the matter and after damages had been
416. Wilmerding, supra note 412, at 322-24, 329. Wilmerding describes the doctrine in these
words:
Imperious circumstances may sometimes require the high officers of government to act
outside the law; but when such action is taken, the causes of it ought to be truly
imperious, and ought to be stated immediately to Congress, who is the only judge of the
propriety of the measure, and not the man who has usurped its decision. If it shall
appear, after full investigation, that the officer has acted honestly, under the pressure of
such urgent necessity as he professes, then it becomes the duty of the Congress to
sanction his illegal act .... On the contrary, if it shall turn out that the officer has acted
unnecessarily and wantonly, from malice or resentment, Congress may decide to let
him suffer the consequences,
Id. at 324; see also Lobel, supra note 61, at 1396.
417. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804).
418. Id. at 178. In another case, Justice Paterson, while riding circuit, held that "[t]he
president of the United States cannot control the statute, nor dispense with its execution, and still
less can he authorize a person to do what the law forbids." United States v. Smith, 27 F. Cas.
1192, 1230 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1806) (No. 16,342).
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recovered from Captain Little, Congress reimbursed him for his damages,
interest, and charges with money from the United States Treasury.4 19 While
the action taken by Captain Little was ruled illegal, the "justice of his
country" dictated that he should not bear the brunt for that action.42 ° While
recognizing that Captain Little's actions were the right thing to do in the
circumstances, the Supreme Court found them to be illegal, thus separating
the answer to the obvious question from the response to the tragic one. It
was only with the ex post ratification of Little's actions by Congress that
the gap between the two answers was, for practical purposes, closed. This
was by no means a foregone conclusion. Therefore, the commanding officer
of the U.S.S. Boston undertook a double risk: (1) that his actions would, as
they indeed were, be found illegal as a matter of law, and that he may need
to make reparations, both civil and penal, for such actions, and (2) that ex
post ratification would not take place. The potential absence of such
ratification would have meant that no reimbursement would have been
made, and, perhaps more significantly, that the moral and public
vindication of Captain Little would not have been forthcoming. Such
substantial risks are not lightly taken and their existence militates against
acting in a way that falls outside the legal order, although it does not
completely bar the possibility of such actions taking place.
Jefferson's approach to emergency powers may be compared with the
constitutional vision presented by President Lincoln during the Civil War.
As noted above,421 one possible reading of Lincoln's assertions of special
powers during the war sees the President as having appealed to special
emergency powers that are inherent in the constitutional framework and
that are available to the Executive in times of great peril and risk. There are,
however, other possible readings of Lincoln's claims to such powers that
bring his actions closer to the Extra-Legal Measures model. Thus, when
explaining to Congress the extraordinary measures that he had taken prior
to July 4, 1861, Lincoln said that those measures, "whether strictly legal or
not, were ventured upon, under what appeared to be a popular demand, and
a public necessity; trusting, then as now, that Congress would readily ratify
them. It is believed that nothing has been done beyond the constitutional
competency of Congress. ' '422 On other occasions, however, Lincoln seems
to have been of the opinion that the necessity and exigency of the times
made constitutional and legal that which in other circumstances might not
have been so, without any further need for any form of ex post ratification
419. Wilmerding, supra note 412, at 324 n.6 (referring to the Act of Jan. 17, 1807).
420. For an account of Congress's decision to restore the fine paid by General Jackson in
response to Judge Hall's order twenty-nine years after Jackson had paid it, see SOFAER, supra
note 403, at 335-36; and Lurie, supra note 412, at 142-44.
421. See supra Subsection IlI.B.l.c.
422. Lincoln, supra note 6, at 429 (emphasis added).
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by either Congress or the general public.423 The subsequent ratification and
affirmation of Lincoln's emergency actions by Congress 424 and the
Supreme Court425 made the question of the legality of those actions
practically a moot one.
42 6
4. Ex Post Ratification
What, then, are the characteristics of the Extra-Legal Measures model?
In appropriate circumstances, the government may deviate from existing
legal principles, rules, and norms. For such an action to be appropriate,
however, it must be aimed at the advancement of the public good and must
be openly, candidly, and fully disclosed to the public. Once disclosed, it is a
matter for the general public, either directly or through its elected
representatives, to ratify, ex post, those actions that have been taken on its
423. Lincoln asserted:
[M]y oath to preserve the constitution to the best of my ability, imposed upon me the
duty of preserving, by every indispensable means, that government-that nation-of
which that constitution was the organic law. Was it possible to lose the nation, and yet
preserve the constitution? ... I felt that measures, otherwise unconstitutional, might
become lawful, by becoming indispensable to the preservation of the constitution,
through the preservation of the nation.
Letter from Abraham Lincoln to Albert Hodges (Apr. 4, 1864), in 7 COLLECTED WORKS, supra
note 6, at 281, 281; see also SOTRIiOS A. BARBER, ON WHAT THE CONSTITUTION MEANS 191-92
(1984) ("Lincoln... was also correct to the extent that he admitted before Congress that
circumstances can force departures from the Constitution. He erred later in suggesting that forced
departures can be formulated as norms thereafter to be regarded as parts of the Constitution,"). But
see FARBER, supra note 165, at 220 (suggesting that Lincoln followed Jefferson's approach to
emergency powers inasmuch as Lincoln was not arguing for the legal power to take emergency
extralegal actions; rather, he saw such actions as unlawful but argued that Congress might elect to
ratify them).
424. On August 6, 1861, Congress ratified all of the President's actions related to the armed
forces and the militia. See FARBER, supra note 165, at 220. In 1863, Congress passed a more
general immunity legislation. An Act Relating to Habeas Corpus, and Regulating Judicial
Proceedings in Certain Cases, ch. 81, §§ 4, 7, 12 Stat. 755, 756-58 (1863).
425. Mitchell v. Clark, 110 U.S. 633 (1884) (upholding the 1863 Act relating to habeas
corpus); see also The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 668-70 (1862) (holding that the
President had the ight to impose a blockade on the ports of the Confederate states).
426. But see Levinson, supra note 238. It should be noted, however, that of all the possible
readings of Lincoln's actions, the argument from inherent powers has been the most influential.
Since Lincoln's presidency, arguments for resorting to emergency powers have invariably
revolved around the claim that the President enjoys a wide range of constitutionally inherent
powers, including emergency powers, and therefore acts legally and constitutionally rather than
outside the constitutional and legal framework. For Presidents, the possibility of arguing that their
actions are constitutional is desirable. For the citizens, the notion that a valiant public official out
to save the nation may be forced to employ illegal means and "throw himself on the electorate's
judgment" is difficult to accept. Id. at 1155. The obvious discomfort that Chief Justice Marshall
felt in deciding against Captain Little was but one reflection of such sentiments: "I confess the
first bias of my mind was very strong in favor of the opinion that though the instructions of the
executive could not give a right, they might yet excuse from damages." Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S.
(2 Cranch) 170, 179 (1804). The upsurge in the number and scope of statutory delegations of
powers from Congress to the President-including a wide array of emergency powers-all but
made superfluous the need for any claims of extralegal emergency powers.
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behalf and in its name, or to denounce them.427 If the public elects to
denounce those actions or, indeed, decides "not to decide," these
government actors may need to make legal amends by way of civil and
even criminal sanctions that may be imposed on them. Thus, the
requirement of ex post ratification ensures that public officials are not
above the law. Even when acting to advance the public good under
circumstances of great necessity, such actors remain answerable to the
public for their extralegal actions.428
In a sense, then, the Extra-Legal Measures model puts the burden
squarely on society to decide, ex post, the consequences of official
extralegal action. Schauer's thesis of the asymmetry of official authority
supports this aspect of the proposed model.429 According to that thesis, it is
possible that strict obedience to authority (including legal authority) will be
deemed irrational or immoral from the perspective of the subject, while at
the same time it is expected and demanded by the imposer of such
authority. If, again following Schauer, we consider the role of the authority
to be filled by society and identify the public official as the subject of
authority, 430 we can understand the possibility of having the latter action
outside, and even against, the legal authority in particular cases. Society
retains the role of making the final determination whether the actor ought to
be punished and rebuked, or rewarded and commended for her actions.4 3 1 A
conceptually similar idea underlies the Supreme Court's decision in Bivens
v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics.432 Due to
the principle of sovereign immunity, existing doctrine bars bringing tort
claims for constitutional violations against the federal government, unless
Congress has specifically made such a claim available. In Bivens, the Court
held that such constitutional violations might be remedied by way of money
damages recovered in suits brought against government officials in their
427. Jefferson analogized extralegal actions taken by public officials on great occasions to
acts of a guardian who is making an advantageous, albeit unauthorized, transaction on behalf of
her minor ward. When the minor comes of age, the guardian must explain her actions thus: "I did
this for your good; I pretend to no right to bind you: you may disavow me, and I must get out of
the scrape as I can: I thought it my duty to risk myself for you." Letter from Thomas Jefferson to
John C. Breckinridge (Aug. 12, 1803), in JEFFERSON, supra note 402, at 1136, 1138-39.
428. See FARBER, supra note 165, at 219.
429. Schauer, supra note 380, at 110-14.
430. Id. at 112.
43 1. Put as an empirical question, Schauer suggests:
[American] society presently strikes this balance pursuant to a procedure under which
ex post justified acts of disobedience to the law on the part of officials are punished
quite mildly, if at all, while ex post unjustified acts of disobedience to the law are
punished somewhat more heavily than those same acts would have been punished
merely for being bad policy.
Id. at 114.
432. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
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individual capacities.433 Individual responsibility of government officials
has thus been established as a mechanism to enforce constitutional rights.
434
A public official who acts extralegally may be exposed to having a Bivens
claim brought against her and to being found liable for damages to persons
whose constitutional rights were violated by her actions. Such threats, even
if practically remote,435 play a role in providing added deterrence from
acting extralegally. 436 Of course, the possibility that the government will
actually pay the costs of judgments or settlements of Bivens claims is
foreseeable. 437  However, despite the fact that such governmental
indemnification has become practically guaranteed to public officials, 438 it
is the conceptual framework established in Bivens that is of interest here.
The possibility of governmental indemnification may be regarded as
analogous to the possibility of ex post ratification. The fact that it has
become practically automatic may be the subject of criticism, but this does
not detract from its characterization as a ratification of extralegal actions
previously taken by public officials. The Bivens claims system may not be
working optimally, and it certainly poses practical difficulties. 439 This,
however, need not obscure its basic logic-that of using individual liability
as a mechanism to deter constitutional violations by public officials.
What if the public does ratify ex post the extralegal actions taken by
public officials in times of emergency? How are we to understand the status
433. 403 U.S. at 388; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) (permitting actions against state
officials for violation of the Constitution and federal statutes, but providing no similar legislative
mechanism against federal officials).
434. See, e.g., AKHiL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST
PRINCIPLES 40 (1997); Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity,
and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1733, 1822 (1991). Amar's elaborate system of
entity liability for constitutional torts resonates with the Extra-Legal Measures model. Unlike
Amar's position, the Extra-Lcgal Measures model focuses on the individual liability of
government officials rather than on the direct liability of the government itself. However, the
model does also recognize the possibility of an entity liability as part of the ex post ratification
process and considers such entity liability in the general framework of remedies for constitutional
wrongs.
435. See, e.g., Cornelia T.L. Pillard, Taking Fiction Seriously: The Strange Results of Public
Officials' Individual Liability Under Bivens, 88 GEO. L.J. 65, 66 (1999) (noting the low rate of
successful Bivens claims); id. at 76-77 (noting that the government indeinifies its employees for
the costs of judgment, or the settlement, of Bivens claims).
436. See, e.g., Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 21 (1980); Janell M. Byrd, Rejecting Absolute
Immunity for Federal Officials, 71 CAL. L. REV. 1707, 1718-21 (1983); John C. Jeffries, Jr., In
Praise of the Eleventh Amendment and Section 1983, 84 VA. L. REv. 47, 51 (t998).
437. See AMAR, supra note 434, at 40.
438. Pillard, supra note 435, at 77.
439. Among such difficulties we may count the various doctrines developed as corollaries to
the Bivens rule-first and foremost the doctrine of qualified immunity-that, in practice, bar
successful claims against public officials who have acted extralegally, except in rare cases where,
among other things, the official's actions were in violation of "clearly established" law. See
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818-19 (1982) (discussing the doctrine of qualified
immunity). On the doctrine of qualified immunity and other doctrines that have evolved as
barriers to Bivens claims, see, for example, Pillard, supra note 435, at 79-90.
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of those actions once ratified? Does ratification render legal that which
previously had been illegal, or does it excuse the acting official from
liability for her extralegal actions without making such actions legal? Much
would depend on the nature of the ratification. The answer to such
questions would be made on a case-by-case basis. Thus, for example, it is
quite clear that Congress's decision to indemnify Captain Little did not
reveal an intention to make his otherwise unlawful actions legal. Indeed, the
Supreme Court itself recognized the possibility of Congress's acting on the
political level to "correct" decisions made by the judicial branch.44 °
However, an act of ratification may also bear the characteristics of informal
(and possibly even formal) constitutional and legal amendment.44' The
combination of a grave crisis, the illegal response to it by the government,
the open acknowledgment of the nature of the actions taken to counter the
exigency, and the subsequent popular ratification may form a constitutional
moment that will lead to a constitutional shift on the issue at hand.
44 2
Ratification can also be made in the form of an explicit constitutional or
statutory change that seeks to legalize and bring within the ambit of the
legal system actions that were previously considered outside the boundaries
of that system.
In any event, even where the illegal actions performed by public
officials are taken to preserve and protect the nation, that alone does not
make those actions legal. Necessity does not make legal that which
otherwise would have been illegal. It may excuse the actor from subsequent
legal liability, but only subsequent ratification may (but does not have to)
justify such extralegal conduct.443
Two methods of ratification have already been pointed out. The
legislative branch may ratify use of extralegal powers by the executive,
either by way of meting out an individualized remedy as in the case of
Captain Little, or by passing broader acts of indemnity that are designed to
immunize governmental agents against the possibility of being hauled into
court as civil or even criminal defendants.444 Another mechanism of public
ex post ratification may be the returning to office of elected officials who
have acted extralegally and who have openly and candidly disclosed the
nature of their actions to the public.
Other mechanisms attenuate the tension that arises from the Extra-
Legal Measures model's separate treatment of the obvious and tragic
questions. If the extralegal activities performed in the name of the public
440. The Apollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362, 366-67 (1824).
441. See 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 320-21 (1991).
442. lid.
443. Lobel, supra note 61, at 1390-97.
444. See, e.g., BRADLEY & EWING, supra note 7, at 677, 679-80 (discussing the Acts of
Indemnity passed by the British Parliament).
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are considered through the prism of the criminal law, then, for example,
prosecutors may decide to exercise their discretion and refrain from
bringing criminal charges against the official.445 Where criminal charges are
brought, juries may exercise their power of nullification.4 6 If the actor is
nevertheless convicted, then the institution of pardon and clemency may be
used to "correct" that outcome.447
B. Challenges and Justifications
1. A Nation Worth Saving?
Several general and interrelated critiques of the Extra-Legal Measures
model may be pointed out. The first line of attack on the model argues that the
protection of the community is legitimate only so long as that community
itself is worth saving. A despotic, authoritarian, and oppressive society is not
worth the effort. A democracy may lose the battle against its enemies either by
physically crumbling before them or by collapsing inward when it abandons
its fundamental principles in the heat of battle. It is, indeed, a tension of tragic
dimensions. A weak, hesitant action against an impending threat may cause
irreparable damage to the state's body. On the other hand, the instinct of self-
preservation may lead to a transformation of the very nature of that society
and to the loss of its soul. As Paul Wilkinson puts it:
It is a dangerous illusion to believe one can "protect" liberal
democracy by suspending liberal rights and forms of government.
Contemporary history abounds in examples of "emergency" or
"military" rule carrying countries from democracy to dictatorship
with irrevocable ease. What shall it profit a liberal democracy to be
delivered from the stress of factional strife only to be cast under the
iron heel of despotism?
448
Similarly, Carl Friedrich observes: "For any community built upon such a
faith, the task of survival and of security becomes one of defending the
inner-most self as well as that of defending the outer-most boundary, when
confronted with an enemy .... 449 "To make [man's] innermost self
445. The literature on prosecutorial discretion is vast. For a recent publication dealing
generally with the broad powers of prosecutorial discretion, see Peter Krug, Prosecutorial
Discretion and Its Limits, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 643 (2002).
446. See generally WAYNE LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1027-28 (3d ed. 2000)
(discussing jury nullification).
447. For a recent publication, see Paul J. Haase, Note, "Oh My Darling Clemency": Existing
or Possible Limitations on the Use of the Presidential Pardon Power, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1287
(2002).
448. WILKINSON, supra note 7, at 122-23.
449. FRIEDRICH, supra note 68, at 13.
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secure," he continues later in the same work, "is more vital to the security
and survival of a constitutional order than any boundary or any secret. It is
the very core of constitutional reason of state. It is the reason why a
constitutional state is founded and is maintained. ' '450 "If we do not preserve
the rule of law zealously in this area as well," commented the Landau
Commission, "the danger is great that the work of those who assail the
existence of the State from without will be done through acts of self-
destruction from within, with 'men devouring each other." 45' Adherence to
the rule of law is a necessary element in a nation's security and safety. No
security exists in a democratic society without the rule of law.452
A second challenge to the model takes a swipe at the purported
rationale of the Extra-Legal Measures model, especially its claim to serve
better the long-term interests of the rule of law because, in appropriate
circumstances, violating the law may be more beneficial in that respect than
any of the alternatives. The force of the law as regulating behavior is, to a
significant extent, a function of a cultivated habit of obedience to its
dictates and an established ethos of its supremacy. Preventing lawlessness
is one of the fundamental goals of the rule of law in a democratic society, a
principle agreed upon by adherents of both procedural and substantive
approaches to the concept of the rule of law. Violating the law deviates
from that pattern of obedience. When such violation is perpetrated by the
authorities, it is all the more pernicious. As Justice Brandeis wrote in
Olmstead v. United States:
Decency, security and liberty alike demand that government
officials shall be subjected to the same rules of conduct that are
commands to the citizen.... Our Government is the potent, the
omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people
by its example. Crime is contagious. If the Government becomes a
law-breaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to
become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. To declare that in the
administration of the criminal law the end justifies the means-to
declare that the Government may commit crimes in order to secure
450. Id. at 119.
451. LANDAU REPORT, supra note 135, at 183.
452. See H.C. 428/86, Barzilai v. Gov't of Israel, 40(3) P.D. 505, reprinted in 6 SELECTED
JUDGMENTS, supra note 134, at 42. The majority held:
National Security too is based on the rule of law, both by ensuring domestic
arrangements and assisting in creating the mechanisms which allow fighting hostile
elements. There can be no organized activity of any unit of people, and there can be no
discipline without normative prescriptions deriving from the binding legal dictate.
Barzilai, 40(3) P.D. at 555; see also id., reprinted in 6 SELECTED JUDGMENTS, supra note 134, at
104 (Barak, P., dissenting) ("[T]here is no security without law, and the rule of law is a
component of national security.").
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the conviction of a private criminal-would bring terrible
retribution 453
If government may deviate from the principle of the rule of law in some
cases, would it not be able to do so in others? And why should the citizens
hold the rule of law in any higher regard than their government? Once the rule
of law ceases to be thought of as an absolute immovable rule, further
incursions are likely to take place into its domain.454 Violation of the law by
public officials may lead to similar conduct by private individuals taking
their cue from the government. It may also further breed and perpetuate the
attitude of lawlessness among public officials. Government officials, seeing
that they can get away with violating the law and being intoxicated by the
immense powers that such conduct confers upon them, may seek to
reproduce similar patterns of behavior even after normalcy has been
restored. In order to justify the retention of such powers, they may claim
that the emergency has not yet terminated, or that new dangers gather over
the horizon, thus perpetuating a crisis mentality among the members of the
community.
Thus, some may prefer to allow the normal legal system to stretch and
be bruised, rather than let it become ineffective altogether.455 Emergency
legislation and expansionist interpretation of existing laws can be, in due
course, uprooted and replaced by norms approximating the preemergency
legal system. But once a habit of lawlessness and disobedience has
developed, the point of no return may have been crossed.
Opposition to the Extra-Legal Measures model is rooted in the fear of
totalitarianism and authoritarianism that the model seems to enable. If we
accept the desirability, in extreme cases, of governmental actions that are
extralegal so long as they are taken to advance the public good, there can be
no constitutional or legal limitations on such governmental exercise of
power. If we accept that the executive may act outside the law in order to
avert or overcome catastrophes, what is there to prevent the wielder of such
awesome powers from exercising it in violation of any constitutional and
legal limitations on the use of such power? 456 Extralegal power can only
453. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
454. See, e.g., Liat Collins, GSS Agent Involved in Death of Harizat Transferred from Post,
JERUSALEM POST, May 1, 1995, at 1 (.'[A]nyone who allows himself widescale activities in the
twilight zone is likely to find himself operating in total darkness."' (quoting Knesset Foreign Affairs
and Defense Committee Member Benjamin Ze'ev Begin)).
455. See Monaghan, supra note 240, at 26 (arguing that extraconstitutional powers would
allow the President "a vehicle for temporarily suspending constitutional limitations," which would
be all the more troubling as "the political process almost invariably will sustain popular
presidential conduct even though it sacrifices an individual interest or that of some 'discrete and
insular' group").
456. Indeed, it may be argued that despite the centrality of the requirement of open
acknowlcdgment and candor to the Extra-Legal Measures model, nothing in the model prevents
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mean an unlimited power, constrained neither by any legal norms nor by
principles and rules of the constitutional order!
45 7
A final objection to the model contends that much like the traditional
constitutional models of emergency regimes, it is premised on the
assumption of separation. In fact, the model relies on that false assumption
to a greater extent than the alternative models. The notion of total
separation between normalcy and emergency, of impermeable boundaries
between the two realities, enables proponents of the model to claim that the
ordinary legal system will not be tarnished by the necessities of emergency
and will remain intact and ready to be resumed to its fullest extent when the
emergency is over. But, if we accept that such clear separation between the
two realities is unattainable and that "it is impossible to isolate any one State
authority from the overall social structure, and rot in one place is liable to
spread and engulf the entire structure, '4 58 then the model may result in more
damage than any of the constitutional models.
2. Acting upon Great Occasions
a. Warning: You Are Now Entering an Emergency Zone.
Usual Categories of Judgment No Longer Apply!
The proposed Extra-Legal Measures model distinguishes between the
obvious and the tragic questions. The latter is left for the discretion of the
public. It is up to the public to decide whether to ratify extralegal actions
taken by public officials who acted for the advancement of the public good.
It is, then, up to the people, as the sovereign, to determine whether the
values, principles, rules, and norms that were violated by such actions are
so important, and the social commitment to them so strong, as not to accept
any deviation from them. If this is the conclusion that is reached, then the
actor must accept whatever sanctions may be imposed on her by the
community. Her motivations for violating the law may have been noble, but
the final assessment of her deeds (and the concomitant legal implications of
such violations) is in the hands of the public.
The obvious question, namely what to do in the face of great calamity,
calls for pragmatic, prudential reasoning.4 59 This is the question, to use
that very obligation from being overridden by the acting officials. See Schauer, supra note 380, at
103.
457. See, e.g., BARBER, supra note 423, at 188-90; Joseph M. Bessette & Jeffrey Tulis, The
Constitution, Politics, and the Presidency, in THE PRESIDENCY fN THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER
3, 24-25 (Joseph M. Bessette & Jeffrey Tulis eds., 1981).
458. LANDAU REPORT, supra note 135, at 183-84.
459. BOBBITT, supra note 223, at 17 (stating that prudential arguments, focusing on a cost-
benefit balancing, are "likeliest to be decisive" in emergencies); MORTIMER R. KADISH &
SANFORD H. KADISH, DISCRETION To DISOBEY 33 (1973) ("In the facilitation, toleration, or flat
prohibition of rule departures, the issue is social utility.").
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Walzer's terminology, that the politician who wishes to promote the public
good must answer. 46 0 However, the cost-benefit analysis necessary in this
context does not attempt to determine where to balance security
considerations against protection of individual rights and liberties in any
particular case. Rather, the attention is directed to the selection of the tools
by which such future balancing may be calibrated. Should these tools be
confined to the existing legal system (whether modified or not) or can they
be found outside that system?
Before taking up prudential and pragmatic arguments in support of the
Extra-Legal Measures model, we should note that catastrophes present
special difficulties not merely to advocates of pragmatic arguments. Take,
for example, Charles Fried. In Right and Wrong,461 he develops the general
argument that rights may be absolute within their scope of application. He
soon acknowledges, however, that this argument runs into difficulties when
applied to a case "where killing an innocent person may save a whole
nation. ' 'A62 Fried concedes that "[i]n such cases it seems fanatical to
maintain the absoluteness of the judgment, to do right even if the heavens
will in fact fall., '463 The regular norms that ought to apply in ordinary times
lead to a "fanatical" result when an attempt is made to apply them in such
exceptional situations. Fried resolves the tension between the general
absolutist view of rights and the relativist approach taken in such "extreme
cases" by appealing to the notion of the "catastrophic" case and regarding it
as "a distinct concept just because it identifies the extreme situations in
which the usual categories ofjudgment (including the category of right and
wrong) no longer apply. 46 4 It is precisely for this reason that Fried speaks
of categorical norms of right and wrong, rather than of absolute norms.
46 5
Both Ronald Dworkin and Robert Nozick follow a similar line of argument,
recognizing the extreme case as exceptional, and as one to which general
theory does not apply, in order to maintain their theories intact for all cases
that do not amount to the extreme. 466 The Extra-Legal Measures model
460. See supra notes 398-401 and accompanying text.
461. CHARLES FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG (1978).
462. Id. at 10.
463. Id.
464. Id. (emphasis added).
465. Id. at 10-11. This type of argument enables Fried to claim that although extreme cases
may invoke conduct that does not comport with the relevant categorical right, that fact, in and of
itself, does not prove the absence of an absolute, central core of that right. Id. at 10, 31.
466. See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 30 (1974) ("The question of
whether.., side constraints are absolute, or whether they may be violated in order to avoid
catastrophic moral horror, and if the latter, what the resulting structure might look like, is one I
hope largely to avoid."); Ronald Dworkin, The Rights of Myron Farber, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Oct.
26, 1978, at 34. Both are cited and discussed in Schauer, supra note 215, at 423-25. Dworkin
recognizes that cases of genuine catastrophe set limits on the otherwise valid preemption of a
claim of policy by a claim of right. Dworkin, supra.
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works in a similar way. It is the safety valve that allows application of a
general theory to normal cases.
The argument about the extreme case implicitly acknowledges that
legal norms presuppose the existence of a "normal" state of affairs and
remain applicable as long as this state of affairs continues to exist.
Accordingly, "[t]his effective normal situation is not a mere 'superficial
presupposition' that a jurist can ignore; that situation belongs precisely to
[the norm's] immanent validity. '467 In the extreme case, when this
underlying normal state of affairs is fundamentally interrupted, the relevant
legal norm may no longer be applicable as is and cannot fulfill its ordinary
regulatory function. "For a legal order to make sense, a normal situation
must exist .... ,468 General norms are limited in their scope of application
to those circumstances in which the normal state of affairs prevails. Crises
undermine this factual basis. As the spectrum of possible extreme cases is
indefinite and cannot be comprehensively anticipated, a priori general rules
cannot, as such, regulate the exception. The exception "cannot be
circumscribed factually and made to conform to a preformed law.
' 4 69
A similar notion is promoted by catastrophe theory. 47" This
mathematical theory deals with complex systems whose behavior generally
follows a smooth, continuous, "normal" pattern but which, at certain
points-known as cusps-breaks away from that continuous pattern and
exhibits a discontinuity, a singularity, or a "jump change., 411 The theory
does not tell us much with regard to when to expect a discontinuity to occur
or what to expect once such a jump change has taken place. The theory
A similar approach may have motivated Justice Black's implicit retreat from his usual
absolutist rights approach in several wartime cases. Writing about Black's position in Korematsu
v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), James Simon notes that "Captain Black, the military man,
completely dominated the debate with Justice Black, the civil libertarian." JAMES F. SIMON, THE
ANTAGONISTS 148 (1989). On a later occasion, Justice Black is quoted to have said that "[tihere's
a difference between peace and war.... You can't fight a war with the courts in control." Id. at
155.
Schauer critiques Fried's, Nozick's, and Dworkin's approaches, challenging them as not
giving an adequate answer to instances when rights are overridden by other interests in cases that
are less than catastrophic. He, too, recognizes the possibility that the "unexpected and truly
horrific case[]" serves as an exception to any theory about the categorical nature of rights:
[A]lthough catastrophe theory may provide the resources to deal with why the total
stringency of Kantian categorical rights must give way in unexpected and truly horrific
cases, it does not seem to have the resources to deal with the possibility that
deontologically conceived rights may have to be overridden when interests would
otherwise have to be sacrificed to a very large, but short of catastrophic, extent.
Schauer, supra note 215, at 424.
467. CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF
SOVEREIGNTY 13 (George Schwab trans., MIT Press 1985) (1922).
468. Id.
469. Id. at 6.
470. Schauer applied catastrophe theory in a related context. See Schauer, supra note 215, at
422-25.
471. VLADIMIR [. ARNOL'D, CATASTROPHE THEORY 114 (3d rev. cd. 1992).
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
1120 [Vol. 112: 1011
Chaos and Rules
does reveal, however, that the mathematical, physical, structural, and
organizational rules that describe the system's behavior in its normal
functioning are not applicable to that same system when a singularity
occurs.
4 7 2 If principles such as the rule of law define the pattern of the
social-legal-political complex system that is the society in which we live,
catastrophic times may constitute a singularity, an exception, when normal
principles, rules, and norms are not fimctional and are replaced by others.
Taking this argument to its logical terminus, one may conclude,
following Carl Schmitt, that "[t]here exists no norm that is applicable to
chaos., 4 73 As I argue below, however, this ultimate conclusion is neither an
inevitable nor a necessary outcome of the willingness to recognize the
possible existence of extreme cases and the descriptive and normative
significance of such events.
4 74
b. The (Not So) Obvious Case for Rule Departures
There are strong arguments to suggest that there may be extreme
circumstances when the application of the Extra-Legal Measures model
may be better suited than the use of the alternative constitutional models to
maintain legal principles, rules, and norms as well as constitutional
structures in the long run. In a sense, the strongest case for the Extra-Legal
Measures model can be made by recognizing the fact that it combines the
strengths of both categories of constitutional models. It combines the
benefits of the strategy of resistance with some room for flexibility that is
needed when dealing with emergency. Consider, for example, the models of
constitutional accommodation of emergency powers. Each of these models
takes into account such considerations as emergency-related necessity. One
method of achieving this goal is by limiting the scope of applicability of
individual rights and liberties by way of reading exceptions into their
scopes of protection. The "clear and present danger" doctrine 47 5 and the
doctrine developed in Brandenburg v. Ohio476 are examples of such a
limitation on the scope of First Amendment protection. Now take the Extra-
Legal Measures model. That model offers a wider scope of individual
rights' protection. Courts need not be concerned with the prospect of taking
472. P.T. SAUNDERS, AN INTRODUCTION TO CATASTROPHE THEORY 1 (1980). See generally
ARNOL'D, supra note 471; ANTAL MAJTHAY, FOUNDATIONS OF CATASTROPHE THEORY (1985);
PETER W. MICHOR, ELEMENTARY CATASTROPHE THEORY (1985); ALEXANDER WOODCOCK &
MONTE DAVIS, CATASTROPHE THEORY (1978).
473. SCHMITT, supra note 467, at 13.
474. See Gross, supra note 295 (arguing that while Schmitt's theory of the exception is
normatively unsound, it has certain descriptive validity).
475. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (adopting the "clear and present
danger" test).
476. 395 U.S. 444, 448-49 (1969) (offering the modem "incitement test").
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an expansive view of constitutional rights coming back to haunt the nation
when faced with critical threats and dangers that call for limitations on the
exercise of such rights. The courts need not worry because if the situation is
serious enough, there is always the possibility of government officials
acting extralegally to protect the nation and its citizens. Thus, the Extra-
Legal Measures model permits the judicial branch to fulfill its role as
protector of individual rights without having to fear that by doing so it
compromises the security of the state. At the same time, the executive
would be charged with the task of protecting the state's national security
interests, even by acting extralegally. The possibility of extralegal action
reduces the pressures for incorporating built-in exceptions to protected
rights.477
A similar point was made by Justice Story in The Apollon:
It may be fit and proper for the government, in the exercise of
the high discretion confided to the executive, for great public
purposes, to act on a sudden emergency, or to prevent an
irreparable mischief, by summary measures, which are not found in
the text of the laws. Such measures are properly matters of state,
and if the responsibility is taken, under justifiable circumstances,
the Legislature will doubtless apply a proper indemnity. But this
Court can only look to the questions, whether the laws have been
violated, and if they were, justice demnands, that the injured party
should receive a suitable redress.
478
i. Crossing the Threshold
(and Giving Reasons for It)
The Extra-Legal Measures model is challenged over its perceived
inability to impose any meaningful legal or constitutional restraints on
public officials. If a state of emergency permits taking unlawful actions,
how can we be sure that such actions would not be taken as a matter of
477. See Eisgruber, supra note 204, at 361-62.
478. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362, 366-67 (1824) (emphasis added). Similarly, in Public
Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Government of Israel, the President of the Israeli Supreme
Court stated:
Deciding these applications has been difficult for us. True, from the legal perspective,
the road before us is smooth. We are, however, part of Israeli society. We know its
problems and we live its history. We are not in an ivory tower. We live the life of this
country. We are aware of the harsh reality of terrorism in which we are, at times,
immersed. The fear that our ruling will prevent us from properly dealing with terrorists
troubles us. But we are judges. We demand that others act according to the law. This is
also the demand that we make of ourselves. When we sit at trial, we stand on trial.
H.C. 5100/94, Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. Gov't of Israel, 53(4) P.D. 817, 845,
quoted in Barak, supra note 379, at 162.
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simple political expediency? And if a time of crisis permits stepping outside
the legal system, how can we set limits on how far such deviations would
go and how wide in scope they would be?
In a democratic society, where such values as constitutionalism,
accountability, and individual rights are entrenched and are traditionally
respected, we can expect that the public would be circumspect about
governmental attempts to justify or excuse illegal actions even if such
actions have been taken, arguably, in the public's name. 4 79 For the moment,
however, we may focus on the actors themselves, i.e., those public officials
who are faced with the decision whether to violate the law for the greater
good of the nation. We can and should expect those public officials to feel
quite uneasy about possible resort to extralegal measures even when such
actions are deemed to be for the public's benefit.4 80 This feeling of
uneasiness would be even more pronounced in nations where the
"'constitution is old, observed for a long time, known, respected, and
cherished.' ' '48' The knowledge that acting in a certain way means acting
unlawfully is likely to have a significant restraining effect on government
agents even during the emergency itself This may be the case even if no
further explanation to the public is required or if there is a presumption
working in favor of the actor, as is the case under Locke's theory of the
prerogative power. When we add the specter of having to give reasons for
one's illegal actions to the public after the crisis is over, it seems likely that
the mere need to cross the threshold of illegality would serve, in and of
itself, as a limiting factor against a governmental rush to assume
unnecessary powers.
The need to give reasons ex post, i.e., the need to justify or excuse
one's actions before the people, is a critical ingredient of the Extra-Legal
Measures model. By requiring transparency, it facilitates public
accountability of government agents. Furthermore, the very need to give
reasons may limit the government's choice of measures ex ante. The
commitment to giving reasons, even ex post, adds another layer of
479. But see Schauer, supra note 380, at 106.
480. Cf Paulsen, supra note 204, at 224 (discussing the role of political pressure, public
accountability, and the moral and persuasive force of judgments made by other branches of
government).
481. GuY HOWARD DODGE, BENJAMIN CONSTANT'S PHILOSOPHY OF LIBERALISM: A
STUDY IN POLITICS AND RELIGION 101 (1980) (quoting Benjamin Constant). Even a strong
supporter of the Business as Usual model such as Benjamin Constant recognized that in nations
where the constitutional experience is as described in the excerpt from the text, the constitution
"can be suspended for an instant, if a great emergency requires it." He distinguishes this case from
the following: "[l]f a constitution is new and not in practice nor identified with the habit of a
people, then every suspension, either partial or temporary, is the end of that constitution." id.; see
also Gabriel L. Negretto & Jose Antonio Aguilar Rivera, Liberalism and Emergency Powers in
Latin America: Reflections on Carl Schmitt and the Theory of Constitutional Dictatorship, 21
CARDOZO L. REv. 1797, 1800-03 (2000) (discussing Constant's theory of "self-defeating
dictatorships").
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limitations on governmental action.482  Moreover, the public
acknowledgment of the nature of emergency actions taken by government
may contribute not only to reasoned discourse and dialogue between the
government and its domestic constituency, but also between the
government and other governments as well as between the government and
nongovernmental and international organizations. Thus, the need to give
reasons is not confined to the domestic sphere. It also has international
implications, both political and legal.
48 3
The need to "throw oneself on one's country '48 4 also involves very real
political and legal consequences for the acting official. With the need to
obtain ex post ratification from the public, the official who decides to act
illegally takes a significant risk. That risk is based on the uncertain
prospects for subsequent public ratification. The risk is that her actions
would not eventually be ratified because the public disagrees in hindsight
with her assessment of the situation or with her assessment of the need to
step outside the legal system in order to meet the exigency. The public may
also determine that the actions under consideration violated values and
principles that are too important to be encroached upon as a matter of
general principle or in the circumstances of the particular case. The higher
the moral and legal interests and values infringed upon, the less certain the
actor should be of the probability of securing ratification. In fact, it may
also be that the public just gets it wrong for whatever reason. Legally
speaking, the actor would then face the possibility of civil claims, and
perhaps even criminal charges brought against her. Hence, the uncertain
prospect of ex post ratification in any given case should also be considered
as having a deterrent effect on government officials contemplating
482. See Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REv. 633, 656-57 (1995); see also
FINN, supra note 91, at 30-36 (advancing the reasons requirement as a constitutive principle of
constitutionalism); Bessette & Tulis, supra note 457, at 10 (arguing that the need for public
justification may influence the choice of political acts). For the argument that the requirement of
reasoned judgment can constrain judicial power, see, for example, David L. Shapiro, In Defense of
Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L. REV. 731,737 (1987).
483. Thus, for example, states that are party to the major human rights conventions may
derogate from certain otherwise protected human rights under situations amounting to a "public
emergency threatening the life of the nation." See supra notes 132, 143. The derogating state's
claim that an emergency existed, that the situation justified derogating from rights safeguarded by
the conventions, and that the measures undertaken in any particular case complied with the
requirements imposed by the derogation regime are then subject to scrutiny not merely by other
governments and nongovernmental bodies, but also by judicial and quasi-judicial bodies such as
the European Court of Human Rights, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, and the United
Nations Human Rights Commission. On the international legal regime pertaining to the protection
of human rights in times of emergency, see, for example, JOAN FITZPATRICK, HUMAN RIGHTS IN
CRISIS: THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM FOR PROTECTING RIGHTS DURING STATES OF EMERGENCY
(1994); JAIME ORAA, HUMAN RIGHTS IN STATES OF EMERGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
(1992); and Ni Aolain, supra note 98. For the idea of two-level games in international relations,
see Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, 42
INT'L ORG. 427 (1988).
484. See supra note 408 and accompanying text.
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extralegal action. In extreme cases, however, such doubts do not present
those officials with an insurmountable obstacle to such actions. While the
element of uncertainty adds significantly to the costs of acting extralegally,
it still permits taking extralegal action where the stakes are sufficiently
high.485
I believe that Justice Jackson was right when he suggested that "[t]he
chief restraint upon those who command the physical forces of the
country... must be their responsibility to the political judgments of their
contemporaries and to the moral judgments of history.- 486 This accords with
Biddle's sobering observation that the Constitution never greatly bothered
any wartime President.487 At the end of the day, it is those political, moral,
and-one may add to the list-legal judgments of the public that serve as
the real restraint on public officials. A sense of self-indignation when rules
are violated (which is the result of the social, political, and legal ethos of
the community), coupled with uncertainty about the chances of ratification,
militates against too easy a rush to use extralegal powers. Finally, the fact
that specific emergency powers used by the government are extralegal, and
perhaps also extraconstitutional, preserves the need not only to give reasons
for such actions, but also to give reasons that go beyond pure pragmatic
excuses or justifications for the specific conduct in question. 8 Once again,
this is the point of keeping separate our investigation into the obvious and
tragic questions. Pragmatic reasoning may be persuasive with respect to
answering the former (and to convincing the public that the government's
approach is defensible), 489 but it falls short of providing an adequate
response to the latter.490 The task of giving reasons requires the actor to
present publicly various types of arguments-prudential, pragmatic, and
moral. 49' This, again, serves to check a possible rush to use extralegal
powers. Furthermore, the mere fact that governmental agents acted in
violation of the law in a given case (or even a series of cases) in order to
485. See FARBER, supra note 165, at 191; Eisgruber, supra note 204, at 359-64. Eisgruber
suggests that a presidential power to disregard judicial mandates may exist in extraordinary
circumstances, but that the exercise of such power ought not to be endorsed in the abstract. He
argues that keeping the existence of such power as a mere possibility, rather than a certainty,
serves as a check against inviting abuses of power once it is acknowledged to exist. See Eisgruber,
supra note 204, at 363; see also Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1523
(1984).
486. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 248 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
487. See supra note 40.
488. But see Eisgruber, supra note 204, at 360 (arguing that Jackson's dissent in Korematsu
suggests that the executive branch does not have to offer reasons beyond the pragmatic).
489. For examples of the application of pragmatic reasoning in related areas, see, for
example, Posner, supra note 273, at 29-3 1.
490. See Nussbaum, supra note 381, at 1007-08.
491. See KADISH & KADISH, supra note 459, at 5-12 (distinguishing between the justification
of an action and the justification for undertaking an action).
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respond to an acute crisis does not do away with their general obligation to
obey the law and act within its boundaries.
492
Governmental agents must decide how to answer both the obvious
question and the tragic question in times of emergency. However, the
ultimate decision concerning both questions is not in the hands of the actor.
This is particularly significant with regard to the decision concerning the
tragic question. Surely, the actor must face that question as a moral agent,
but her grappling with the question is then followed by a public assessment
of that same question. In this instance, however, the answer carries not only
moral significance, but the potential for very real and tangible legal effects
in the form of sanctions that would be imposed on the actor when the public
fails to ratify her illegal actions. 93
ii. Open and Informed Public Deliberation
The Extra-Legal Measures model calls for public deliberation and,
eventually, for the taking of responsibility by each and every member of the
community. Once a crisis forces itself on the nation, government and its
agents are faced with the need to decide how best to respond to the crisis.
One possible answer to that dilemma, as suggested by the Extra-Legal
Measures model, is that in truly catastrophic cases, officials may consider
the possibility of acting extralegally when devising measures to counter the
threat. A crucial element of the model calls on the public to evaluate the
government's actions and determine whether to ratify them, in whole or in
part, ex post. The need for ratification, with the concomitant demand for
transparency and candid acknowledgment of what has been done, forces the
public to become vested in the outcome. It also promotes public
deliberation and discourse about the actions that have been taken on the
people's behalf. Such deliberation is important both as a deterrent against
governmental agents rushing too easily to exercise unlawful powers and as
492. Schauer, supra note 380, at 103 (suggesting "the idea of overridable obligations that
survive the override despite being overridden in a particular case").
493. Note, for example, Walzer's observation concerning the difference between legal and
moral rules pertaining to the "dirty hands" problem. See supra note 398-401 and accompanying
text. He acknowledges that if moral rules were enforced,
dirty hands would be no problem. We would simply honor the man who did bad in
order to do good, and at the same time we would punish him. We would honor him for
the good he has done, and we would punish him for the bad he has done.
Walzer, supra note 398, at 81. Mechanisms of legal enforcement thus serve to "set the stakes or
maintain the values." Id. at 82. The images of Captain Little and General Jackson come to mind.
We should note, however, that Walzer seems to consider only the twin possibilities of no
enforcement (moral rules) or full enforcement (legal rules). It may well be, of course, that less-
than-full enforcement in all cases is more socially desirable, as it encourages public officials to
violate the law in appropriate cases.
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a means of providing opportunity for an open discussion of such matters in
light of the recent crisis and in anticipation of possible future ones.
Open and candid acknowledgment by the authorities of the need to
resort to extralegal measures keeps the public alert against usurpation of
power by the government. In addition, such acknowledgment-and the
subsequent need for ratification by the public-forces the community as a
whole to come to grips with the reality of the emergency and with the hard
choices that the community's leaders had to make. It forces each and every
member of the community to take a stand and commit herself to a moral,
political, and legal position.494
The philosopher David Hartman stated:
The notion that we don't do things like torture is the greatest danger
to our moral health.... We have to stop looking at our great moral
past and start looking at ourselves as we behave in the present. If
we always see ourselves as victims, we will never see ourselves as
we really are and never be able to change when we need to.
495
Maintaining a veneer of normality and legalities allows citizens to avert
their eyes and minds from the crude reality surrounding them. They are not
pushed to take any affirmative moral, legal, or political action on this issue
and are content with letting things continue just the way they are. This, in
essence, is the charge of hypocrisy that is leveled at the Business as Usual
model. The Extra-Legal Measures model does not fall into the trap of
complacency that allows the public to turn a blind eye. 496 As the difficult
questions are put forth squarely and openly for public debate and decision,
members of the public can no longer make such claims as "I was not told"
or "I did not know.'A9 7 By requiring ratification based on adequate
governmental disclosure, the Extra-Legal Measures model seeks not only to
494. See Rostow, supra note 99, at 533 (suggesting that the American public is culpable for
the internment of persons of Japanese ancestry during World War II). Obviously, taking no action
is also a kind of action.
495. Thomas L. Friedman, Israelis Seem Ambivalent on Violence in Domestic War, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 8, 1987, atE2.
496. See LANDAU REPORT, supra note 135, at 183.
497. Levinson, supra note 273 (discussing a "don't ask, don't tell" policy with respect to
using torture in interrogations). In referring to Israeli society, Lahav notes:
The complacence of the entire family in hiding the reality is one of the gravest
consequences of terrorism and counterterrorism. People develop a dependence upon the
security forces, a tendency to defer to their judgment, and above all, a willingness to
suppress the unpleasant. It is better not to know.
Lahav, supra note 58, at 538. Lahav suggests that the Zionists' constant fight to preserve the
Jewish state against persistent Arab terrorism
has created a dual reality for Israel: the visible reality of normalcy, and the clandestine
reality of terror and counterterror. Counterterrorism is kept secret not only to assure its
success in its war against terrorism, but also to preserve the reality of normalcy and the
success of the Zionist dream.
Id. at 546.
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force public officials to make both a pragmatic analysis and moral
assessment of their illegal actions, but also to make the people take a stand
on the matter. It leaves no choice but for both government officials and the
public to take such a stand and then be politically, legally, and morally
responsible for it.
The Extra-Legal Measures model is disconcerting. It forces us to look
to what may be the darkest corners of our national life. We would rather not
look there. We would prefer to be led to believe that "we are known for
humanitarian treatment" 498 and that we, as a society, are above moral
reproach. That, however, is a luxury we cannot afford in such times. If we
take seriously our commitments to the rule of law and to individual rights
and liberties, we must not be allowed to opt out so easily. We must not be
allowed the luxury of sitting on the clean green grass in front of our houses,
while beneath the refuse is washed away in the sewer pipes, without
assuming responsibility for such unpleasant actions. 499 That the public is
put in a difficult position cannot be doubted. But this is precisely the point.
If extralegal measures have been taken on our behalf and in our name, it is
our moral, political, and legal obligation to ratify or reject such actions and
at least to be accountable for our own decisions.50 0
Take this example of how opportunities for deliberation and
responsibility sharing work together. The use of extralegal measures by
government during an emergency involves the risk of exposing the actors
to, for example, criminal charges or civil suits. Thus, it is quite likely that
upon the termination of the crisis the legislature will be called upon to ratify
governmental actions by, for example, passing acts of indemnity.5 1 This
process presents the legislative branch of government with an opportunity
to review the actions of the government and assess them ex post, relieved
from the pressures of the crisis, before deciding whether to ratify them. The
appeal to the legislature to ratify the actions of the government may further
invoke public deliberation and force the legislative branch to take an
affirmative stand on issues connected with the emergency. This is of special
significance when one considers the reluctance of legislatures to assume
498. See Pincus, supra note 273.
499. The first part of this sentence is a paraphrase on the words of one officer of the Israeli
General Security Service who appeared before the Landau Commission of Inquiry. LANDAU
REPORT, supra note 135, at 183.
500. But see Walzer, supra note 398, at 67 (suggesting that members of the public may have
a right to avoid, if they possibly can, those political or other positions in which they "might be
forced to do terrible things"); see also A. JOHN SIMMONS, MORAL PRINCIPLES AND POLITICAL
OBLIGATIONS 57-100 (1979) (identifying problems with social contract theory of legal
obligation).
501. See Mitchell v. Clark, 110 U.S. 633, 640 (1884) (noting that acts of indemnity are
"passed by all governments when the occasion requires it"); BRADLEY & EWING, supra note 7;
see also FARBER, supra note 165, at 220-2 1.
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responsibility in times of emergency, thus satisfying themselves with
acquiescence in actions taken by the executive.1
2
The Extra-Legal Measures model is a process-oriented model. It seeks
to promote deliberation, both among members of the public at large and
among public officials. At the same time, ex post ratification may be
accorded to egregious actions that practically subvert the foundations of the
constitutional and legal structures. Taken to its logical extreme, the model
does not seem to incorporate substantive limitations on the range of
possible extralegal actions taken in the face of emergency that may later be
ratified. Similar challenges have been leveled against other process-based
theories. 50 3 One possible way around this difficulty is to incorporate into the
theory some substantive elements, such as Bruce Ackerman's entrenchment
of fundamental rights against constitutional revision and amendment, 5°4 or
John Hart Ely's protection of certain minority groups.50 5 But, in addition to
the problem of putting special constitutional arrangements beyond the
ratification power of the people, such proposals suffer from internal
inconsistency with the process-based theory within which they are to
operate.50 6 If no substantive restraint on the ability to obtain ex post public
ratification for extralegal actions exists, are we left with anything short of
totalitarianism? As Judge Learned Hand suggested, if the people elect to go
down that route, no constitution, no law, and no court would save them
from the loss of liberty.50 7 Eventually, ideas such as liberty, freedom,
democracy, and rule of law must exist in the hearts of the people if they are
to survive the whirlwind of crisis and emergency. If they are not there to
begin with, neither model of emergency powers is likely to help much. At
the same time, the Extra-Legal Measures model does not make extralegal
actions and constitutionally permissible acts equal in obligation and force
under the constitutional scheme.5 0 8 The former are not made legal or
constitutional as a result of the necessity of the situation. Furthermore, as
the legal consequences (including the individual liability of acting officials)
of the two categories of actions are markedly different, the fact that an
action is branded "extralegal" raises the costs of undertaking it. Permitting
502. See, eg., KOH, supra note 62, at 117-33.
503. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 219 (1995) (challenging
Ackerman's "dualism" theory).
504. 1 ACKERMAN, supra note 441, at 320-21.
505. See EIY, supra note 32, at 135-79.
506. See, e.g., Daniel R. Ortiz, Pursuing a Perfect Politics: The Allure and Failure of
Process Theory, 77 VA. L. REv. 721, 735-41 (1991); Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence
of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063, 1076-77 (1980).
507. See HAND, supra note 3, at 189-90.
508. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176-77 (1803); see also Schauer, supra
note 380, at 102-03 (suggesting that overridable obligations survive the override despite being
overridden in a particular case).
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extralegal actions under the proposed Extra-Legal Measures model does not
undermine the theory of a written constitution.
Thus, open acknowledgment of the extralegal actions that have been
taken is a critical element for the proposed model. Such open
acknowledgment strengthens the constitutional order and the rule of law in
yet another way: Public admission that certain actions pursued by public
officials have been outside the rules amounts to at least an implicit
acknowledgment of those rules and their relevance.
50 9
Violating the law seems to undermine a habit of rule obedience. At the
same time, open acknowledgment of the extralegal nature of an act
minimizes the risks of depreciation in the value of the rule of law. Such
depreciation may result from public perceptions that either (1) the
government can provide itself with whatever powers it wishes while acting
within the framework of the legal system, thus exercising an almost
unfettered discretion under the aegis of the law (under the models of
accommodation), or (2) the legal system is utopian and must not be allowed
to interfere with the effort to overcome the crisis (under the Business as
Usual model). This may lead to a loss of confidence in the protection that
the legal system affords individual rights. The idea of legal and
constitutional constraints will thus be gravely assaulted. Demonstration of
elasticity and flexibility may be interpreted by members of the relevant
community as a sign that "everything goes," i.e., that everything can be made
legal if only the government wishes it to be so.
iii. Precedents: Hard Cases Make Bad Law
The unlawfulness of extralegal measures and powers should serve as a
warning that such actions are for "this time and this time only"-i.e.,
resulting from the exceptional nature of the threat forced on the nation.510
By refraining from introducing any changes into the existing preemergency
legal system, either by way of direct modification or by way of
interpretation, the Extra-Legal Measures model avoids the creation of legal
precedents that would be integrated into the normal system of laws.
Although actions taken and decisions made during the emergency may
509. As George Winterton explains:
The admission that the exercise of power is unlawful is also a recognition of the
continued authority of the Constitution. Action taken in such circumstances, especially
if only temporary, may not seriously weaken governmental or public respect for the
Constitution, beyond creating a degree of disenchantment due to its apparent failure to
cope with the crisis.
George Winterton, The Concept of Extra-Constitutional Executive Power in Domestic Affairs, 7
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1, 43 (1979).
510. The idea of a (judicial) decision "good for this day and train only" and meant to have no
precedential value is a well-known one. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 669 (1944) (Roberts, J.,
dissenting).
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establish a political precedent for future emergencies, the separation from
the ordinary legal system adds another level of protection against the
permeation of such precedents into times of peace and normalcy. 511 "A
breach of the law, even a necessary one, that ought to be justified, can never
destroy the law.... But an act legally done can always be drawn into
precedent."
512
Although the sequence of extralegal action and subsequent public
ratification may bring about an eventual change in the law, turning a
political precedent into a legal one, such a shift cannot happen under the
proposed model without informed public participation in the process.
In his celebrated dissenting opinion in Korematsu,"3 Justice Jackson
followed a similar line of argument. Recognizing that "[ilt would be
511. Thus, for example, Maimonides, the great Jewish sage and codificator, clarifies the state
of Jewish law regarding the concept of "the time requires it" (Ha-sh 'a/h zerikhah le-khakh):
The court may impose flogging on one who is not liable [according to the Torah law]
for lashes and execute one who is not liable for the death penalty, [and it may so act]
not to transgress the law of the Torah but in order to make a fence around the Torah.
And whenever the court sees that the people are dissolute with respect to a certain
matter, [thc judges] may safeguard and strengthen that matter as they deem proper, and
all this as a temporary measure, and not to establish a precedent for generations to
come.
RAMBAM (MAIMONIDES), MISHNE TORAH, SEFER SHOFTIM, HILKHOT SANHEDRIN 24:4; see also
TALMUD BAVLI: SANHEDRIN 46a; TALMUD BAVLI: YEVAMOT 90b; 2 MENACHFM ELON, JEWISH
LAW-HISTORY, SOURCES, PRINCIPLES 515-20 (Bernard Auerbach & Melvin J. Sykes trans.,
1994).
For warnings against the potential pernicious effect of violating the law, even for a short
time and in the face of an exigency, see, for example, LOCKE, supra note 279, § 166 (pointing out
the danger that any use of the prerogative power creates a precedent for future exercises of such
power by less benevolent rulers "managing the Government with different Thoughts," and
asserting that so perilous may be the consequences that "[u]pon this is founded that saying, That
the Reigns of good Princes have been always most dangerous to the Liberties of their People");
and NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI, THE DISCOURSES 195 (Bernard Crick ed., Pelican Classics 1970)
(1513-1517) ("Though [extralegal measures] may do good at the time, the precedent thus
established is bad, since it sanctions the usage of dispensing with constitutional methods for a
good purpose, and thereby makes it possible, on some plausible pretext, to dispense with them for
a bad purpose."). In addition, it is interesting to note Portia's response to Bassianio's urging that
"[tlo do a great right, do a little wrong." SHAKESPEARE, supra note 42, act 4, sc. 1, 1. 211. In
rejecting this advice, Portia retorts, "It must not be .... 'Twill be recorded for a precedent, and
many an error by the same example will rush into the state. It cannot be." Id. act 4, sc. 1, 11. 213-
16.
512. Wilmerding, supra note 412, at 329-30 (emphasis added). Wilmerding explains his
statement thus:
A breach of the law, even a necessary one, that ought to be justified, can never destroy
the law. It stands upon the records of Congress as an exception out of the law to be
transmitted to posterity "as a safeguard of the constitution, that in future times no evil
might come of it, from a precedent of the highest necessity, and most important service
to the country." But an act legally done can always be drawn into precedent ... [and]
since "men by habit make irregular stretches of power without discerning the
consequence and extent of them," one small wrong must lead to a greater one, and in
the end force must become the measure of law, discretion must degenerate into
despotism.
Id.
513. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
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impracticable and dangerous idealism to expect or insist that each specific
military command in an area of probable operations will conform to
conventional tests of constitutionality, '514 Justice Jackson rejected the
Business as Usual model, stating:
When an area is so beset that it must be put under military control
at all, the paramount consideration is that its measures be
successful, rather than legal. The armed services must protect a
society, not merely its Constitution.... Defense measures will not,
and often should not, be held within the limits that bind civil
authority in peace.51 5
He then went on to reject the possibility of accommodation and express
his support for taking extraconstitutional measures:
But if we cannot confine military expedients by the
Constitution, neither would I distort the Constitution to approve all
that the military may deem expedient....
•.. [A] judicial construction of the due process clause that will
sustain this order is a far more subtle blow to liberty than the
promulgation of the order itself. A military order, however
unconstitutional, is not apt to last longer than the military
emergency.... But once a judicial opinion rationalizes such an
order to show that it conforms to the Constitution, or rather
rationalizes the Constitution to show that the Constitution sanctions
such an order, the Court for all time has validated the principle of
racial discrimination in criminal procedure and of transplanting
American citizens. The principle then lies about like a loaded
weapon ready for the hand of any authority that can bring forward a
plausible claim of an urgent need.516
Indeed, recognizing a separate reality of extralegal activity in the face
of emergency may help in maintaining the integrity of the ordinary legal
system. Hard cases make bad laws. Times of emergency make some of the
hardest of cases. Keeping the ordinary legal system clean and distinct from
the dirty and messy reality of emergency prevents the perversion of that
system in order to give answers to the hard, exceptional cases. Ordinary
rules need not be modified or adapted so as to facilitate governmental crisis
measures. Insofar as exceptional measures are required to deal with the
514. Id. at 244.
515. Id.
516. Id. at 244-46 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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crisis, these measures are viewed precisely as such, "exceptional." They are
not allowed to penetrate the ordinary legal system and "contaminate" it.
Once an emergency has terminated, a return to normalcy may be possible
without the ordinary legal system being marred by scars of emergency
legislation or by interpretive stretch marks. One of the main goals of
terrorism is to push the state to adapt itself to meet the terrorist threat on its
own turf. 17 Under the Extra-Legal Measures model, while government and its
agents sink lower in their fight against terrorism, the legal system remains
afloat above the muddy water's surface.
How does this argument fit with our understanding of the illusory
nature of the assumption of separation? Does not the Extra-Legal Measures
model rely on that false assumption to a greater degree than any of the
constitutional models? 1 8 After all, it is the notion of total separation
between normalcy and emergency that enables officials to take extralegal
actions, for the argument is that the ordinary legal system will not be
tarnished by the necessities of emergency.
The Extra-Legal Measures model does rely on the assumption of
separation. Its appeal inheres, however, in the open recognition of the
assumption's limitations and in an attendant endeavor to minimize the
actual reliance on it. This minimal reliance is achieved by focusing
attention on ways to raise the costs for public officials and governmental
authorities of assuming and wielding emergency powers by forcing them to
go outside the legal system in appropriate circumstances. While in extreme
cases the benefits of acting extralegally may exceed the costs-personal
and otherwise-of such action, in many cases, the mere fact that potential
actors would need to step outside the legal framework may serve as a strong
deterrent militating against an all too easy assumption of expansive and
radical powers. By raising the costs involved in such actions, the Extra-
Legal Measures model curbs the use of emergency powers, while still
enabling their exercise in appropriate cases when the extremity of the
situation calls for it. By checking the tendency to wield sweeping powers in
order to deal with any particular exigency, the Extra-Legal Measures model
not only reduces the scope for such use but also limits the reliance on the
suspect assumption of separation.
517. "'It is impossible to fight ruthlessness with considerateness, guile with sincerity.
Opponents in battle, like partners in understanding, must meet on a common plane-which is
inevitably that of their lowest common denominator."' Lahav, supra note 58, at 531 (quoting
ARTHUR KOESTLER, PROMISE AND FULFILMENT, PALESTINE 1917-1949, at 134 (1949)).
518. See, e.g., Lobel, supra note 61, at 1397-412 (arguing that Jeffersonian constitutional
liberalism declined because of the breaking down of the dichotomy between emergency and
nonemergency powers).
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Vt. CONCLUSION: FAITH AND MICROSCOPES
Acute national emergencies are a test of faith-faith in ourselves, in our
ability to cope and emerge victorious in the face of adversity, and in
principles that we hold to be "fundamental." Crises and exigencies put to
the test our faith in the rule of law, in human rights and civil liberties, and
in their application not only to ourselves but to those different from us.
Such sharp times are also a test of our faith in government and in its ability
to "do the right thing" even in hard times, in our moral convictions, and in
our political and legal processes and institutions. Experience tells us,
however, that times of emergency call for something more than faith.
In her four-liner, "Faith " Is a Fine Invention, Emily Dickinson wrote:
"Faith" is a fine invention
When Gentlemen can see-
But Microscopes are prudent
In an Emergency. 9
Emergency powers discourse has traditionally been premised on two
articles of faith, namely our faith in the paradigm of constitutionality and
our faith in the possibility of separation. This Article suggests that it is time
to revisit those axioms and to examine carefully under a microscope the
basic assumptions that underlie the fight against terrorism and other
emergencies. The proposed Extra-Legal Measures model does not seek to
do away with the traditional discourse over emergency powers. It does not
claim to exclude the constitutional models of emergency powers. It is a
model for truly extraordinary occasions. There may be circumstances when
it would be appropriate to go outside the legal order, at times even violating
otherwise accepted constitutional dictates, when responding to emergency
situations. Yet, even in circumstances where use of the model is
inappropriate, and where the constitutional models may supply an answer to
the particular predicament, we must recognize the limitations of each of
these alternatives and its long-term implications.
Now-when the world is trying to come to terms with the aftermath of
the terrorist attacks of September 1 1th, the implications of the war on
terrorism, and, at the time this Article goes to print, the possibility of a war
against Iraq-may be the worst of times to engage in such probing review.
But as issues pertaining to emergency powers are now more on the public's
mind than they have ever been before, it may also be the best of times.
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